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The Opaque Champions 
A Relational Anatomy of China’s Large State-Owned Enterprises 
Li-Wen Lin 
 
China’s once dilapidated state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have grown into powerful 
giants.  After three decades of reform, China’s SOEs now comprise over 60 percent of the largest 
500 companies in China and more than 15 percent of Fortune Global 500 companies in the world.    
Pervasive state ownership continues with no sign of vanishing as a salient feature of Chinese 
corporate governance.  Despite their economic importance, the SOEs’ organizational structure 
and governance remain obscure to outsiders. The obscurity is attributable partly to the secretive 
culture of the Chinese government but also more importantly to the way scholars have 
approached this topic. Scholars of Chinese corporate governance have focused on listed firms, 
but China’s listed SOEs are embedded in business groups which have extended ties with various 
corporate and non-corporate entities. To fully understand the governance and behavior of 
China’s SOEs, it entails an approach that looks beyond the listed firms and considers the 
complex organizational relations surrounding the SOEs.  
This dissertation shows that China’s large industrial SOEs are organized as vertically 
integrated corporate groups under the government ownership agency (SASAC) with strategic 
linkages to other business groups as well as to various governmental organs. The vertical 
ownership structure helps power centralization and masks many actual governance practices 
from the public eye. There are many hidden institutionalized connections to various state/party 




constructed intergroup strategic ties that facilitate cross-group collaboration to achieve their 
globalization ambition.  Furthermore, the making of the managerial elite presents a high degree 
of cohesion and closure, which strengthens the relations across SOEs themselves and with other 
government organs.  The party-state uses such various connections to embed SOEs in a control 
network that facilitates resource collaboration across multiple spheres of the state system and 
maintains the economic foundation of the Party’s ruling.  
The anatomy of the relations surrounding China’s large SOEs provides contextualized 
explanations for the malfunction of many governance institutions such as the board of directors, 
independent directors and executive compensation   The density of the state’s control network 
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Why a Relational Approach? 
The downfall of Eastern European and Soviet Socialism and the softening of Chinese 
Communism in the 1980s appeared to conclusively declare a victory of the free market 
capitalism. The victory however turns out to be rather uncertain as the twenty-first century 
unfolds.  The financial crisis in 2008 unabashedly disgraced liberal capitalism. The US economy, 
the champion of free market, has even resorted to government ownership for relief.  Meanwhile, 
“the crisis of Western liberal capitalism has coincided with the rise of a powerful new form of 
capitalism in emerging markets” (Economist 2012) – frequently described as state capitalism.  
State capitalism is now often characterized as “a system in which governments use state-
owned companies and investment vehicles to dominate market activity”   (Bremmer & Stewart 
2010). This form of state capitalism is a long-term policy decision rather than a transient measure 
to rebuild a devastated economy or to lift an economy out of recession. Moreover, state 
capitalists use markets as a device to serve national interests, or at least those of ruling elites, as 
well as to magnify their political and economic power domestically and internationally 
(Bremmer 2010:51-52).  
China is regarded as the world’s leading practitioner of state capitalism. Back in the late 
twentieth century, China’s SOEs were hopeless in every aspect and seemed destined to either 
bankruptcy or mass privatization. After three decades of reform, these once dilapidated SOEs 
have grown to powerful giants. While fewer in number, SOEs still comprise over 60 percent of 
the largest 500 companies in China (Figure 1). The average revenues of the SOEs are 1.55 times 
as those of the Chinese private enterprises, the average assets as 4.4 times and the average profits 




Global 500 companies in the world (Figure 3). Pervasive state ownership continues with no sign 
of vanishing as a salient feature of Chinese national economy and corporate governance. 
[Figure 1]  
Percentage of China’s Largest 500 Enterprises as State-Owned/ State-Controlled 
 
Data Source: raw data released by China Enterprise Confederation and China Enterprise Directors Association; 
compiled by author. 
 
[Figure 2] 
Comparison of the Average Financial Performance between State-Owned and Non-State-Owned 
Enterprises among the Largest 500 Enterprises in China, 2012 
 
Data source: raw data released by China Enterprise Confederation and China Enterprise Directors 
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[Figure 3]  
Chinese Companies as Fortune Global 500 Companies 
 
Data Source: raw data from Fortune Global 500, compiled by author. 
The prominence of China’s SOEs has drawn considerable scholarly attention to their 
governance features, but to date how these mega-sized SOEs are governed remains opaque.  The 
secretive culture of China’s state-controlled institutions presents a great obstacle to revealing the 
inner workings of their governance. Furthermore, and more importantly, the way that scholars 
have approached this subject fails to penetrate into the murkiness of the governance system. The 
typical approach to understanding the governance of China’s SOEs is focused on the publicly-
listed company from the perspective of agency theory in economics. As a result, it examines the 
institutions that monitor management such as the board of directors, independent directors, 
securities regulations or other mechanisms commonly used in Western companies. This typical 
approach often leads to a conclusion that these internationally-recognized governance institutions 
are lacking or dysfunctional in China’s SOEs (e.g. Cheung et al. 2008).  This common 
conclusion raises an obvious puzzle: how can a system void of the formal institutions that are 
deemed important to Western companies produce a large army of Fortune Global 500 companies? 
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The typical approach to Chinese corporate governance overlooks an important fact that 
China’s large SOEs are organized as business groups within which a great number of member 
companies are connected with one another through various types of relations. The publicly 
traded companies are only one of several types of entities embedded in the business network. 
While a few scholars (economics-trained) have noticed business groups as an important 
organizational feature of Chinese state-owned companies, they tend to simply take the group 
feature as a dummy variable (i.e. affiliated with a group or not) for evaluating the effect on 
financial performance of publicly-traded companies (Singh and Gaur 2009, Guest and Sutherland 
2009, Carney et al. 2009).  These studies however shed little light on how the relations within 
and beyond the business groups are organized. Without an understanding of the internal and 
external relations of the business groups, it is hard to fully explain the effects of group affiliation, 
whether positive or negative. 
  Sociologist Lisa Keister offered some insights into the internal structure of some Chinese 
business groups in the late 1980s to 1990s.  Keister (1998, 2001, 2009) examined various types 
of interfirm relations within Chinese business groups including interlocking directorship ties, 
lending relations, sales relations, and personnel exchanges. Keister (1998) found that the 
presence and predominance of interlocking directorships in a Chinese business group improved 
member companies’ profitability and productivity due to faster flows of market and 
technological information. Moreover, there was a positive correlation among the presence of 
lending, sales and personnel relations in a business group (Keister 2001). Keister (2000) also 
showed that Chinese business groups having connections with foreign firms tended to perform 
better. While insightful, Keister’s subjects of study were experimental business groups before the 




Keister’s studies considered only firm relations within the boundary of a business group rather 
than external relations to other types of government units. Since SOEs are known as inextricably 
embedded in the state system, this inward looking into business groups should integrate with an 
investigation of external institutional connections in order to provide a comprehensive account of 
the operation of China’s SOEs. Furthermore, Keister’s studies analyzed intra-group relations 
from the perspective of industrial production rather than of corporate governance that concerns 
the distribution of powers and rights among various stakeholders in the system. The 
organizational relations among member companies in fact may serve not only production 
purposes but also political control goals intended by the Chinese state-owner. Thus, it entails an 
analysis of the internal and external connections of China’s business groups and how such 
network structure advances economic and political goals. 
Relations are an important object of study in economic sociology. Mark Granovettor, a 
founding theorist in the field of economic sociology, argues that “[economic actions] are 
embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (1985: p.487) and criticizes the 
atomization of economic agents in classical and neo-classical economics. Social relations can 
facilitate information flows, trust formation as well as constrain opportunistic behavior. Over the 
past decades, Mark Granovettor’s theoretical insights combined with the advent of social 
network analysis (a quantitative methodology to investigate network properties) have catalyzed 
sociologists’ interests in the roles of interpersonal and interorganizational relations in economic 
activities. At the interpersonal level, Granovettor (1974), for example, finds that professionals 
primarily rely on their personal contacts rather than formal or impersonal channels to get 
information about job-change opportunities. A wealth of studies on the importance of guanxi in 




economic sociology (Gold, Guthrie, and Wank, eds. 2002). The prevalent use of social or 
personal ties in China’s economic development raises a still underexplored question: where do 
such social connections come from? Li et al. (2010) find that organizational relations 
significantly affect the formation of governmental ties in Chinese manager’s social network. In 
other words, organizational relations create opportunities for actors to construct social or 
personal connections. To further the relational approach to Chinese economic development, it is 
important to investigate the organizational relations through which Chinese SOEs are connected 
among themselves and with other types of entities including government and non-government 
units.   
At the interorganizational level, economic sociologists are interested in investigating how 
a set of organizations are connected with one another by a particular type of relationship and how 
such organizational networks affect behavior and performance. A vast majority of business 
network studies are focused on one-mode networks composed of either interlocking directorship 
ties (e.g., Mizruchi 1996; Davis 1991, 1996, Davis & Greve 1997; Davis et al. 2003; Vedres & 
Stark 2010), ownership/equity connections (e.g., Kogut & Walker 2001; Stark & Vedres 2006), 
or contractual relations such as strategic alliances (e.g., Gulati & Gargiulo 1999) among a 
population of similar companies.  A small number of sociological network studies investigate 
relations across different types of organizations such as interlocking directorships between 
business and non-business organizations, i.e., two-mode networks in social network analysis 
parlance. Moore et al. (2002) for example, found that there were substantial leadership linkages 
among the government, nonprofit and for-profit organizations in the United States. Grant (2012) 
found a substantial increase in the interlocking directorships between for-profit and non-profit 




external sources provided by business organizations. Overall, existing organizational studies 
suggest that firms can have “multiple-embeddedness” – firms can be connected through multiple 
types of relations among themselves and with multiple types of organizations.  
Rich empirical evidence suggests organizational relations can provide information 
advantages, reduce transaction costs, relieve external environment uncertainties, and improve 
reputation or legitimacy (for empirical reviews, Oliver 1990, Podolny & Page 1998).  These 
functional purposes may be utilized by the pro-development government to attain not only 
successful firm performance but also national economic growth, such as in the case of the 
Japanese and Korean business groups (Granovettor 2005; Gilson & Milhaupt 2011; Jones & 
Sakong 1980).  The successful experience of the Japanese and Korean groups derived from the 
benefits of organizational networks prompted the Chinese government to assemble the SOEs into 
business groups (Keister 1998).  China’s state-owned business groups are not only internally 
connected among member companies but also externally connected with other state-controlled 
organs. Understanding the organizational relations within and outside the state-owned business 
groups helps to reveal the actual governance structure of China’s SOEs. It cements the gaps that 
are unobservable or unanswerable by the typical method which is focused on the individual 
(listed) firm. 
Inspired by network studies in economic sociology, this dissertation adopts a relational 
approach to understanding the governance of China’s SOEs. The relational approach is to focus 
on how the Chinese SOEs are connected with one another and with other types of entities 
through various types of organizational and to a less extent personal relations. In other words, 
this relational approach investigates the “multiple embeddedness” of China’s SOEs.  Turning the 




only institutional sources of where social ties come from but also the macro-institutional 
structure supporting corporate and national economic growth. This dissertation depicts various 
types of organizational relations including equity, strategic, supervisory, personnel connections 
as well as relations with the banking and the international business world. It further employs 
legal, regulatory, sociological, historical, and comparative methods to explain the formation, 
functions and implications of the organizational connections.  
Through the relational approach, this dissertation shows that China’s SOEs are deeply 
embedded in the party-state system, not only through ownership connections but also (more 
importantly) various control channels beyond the rights of a typical controlling shareholder. The 
hierarchical ownership structure of the business groups helps the concentration of power in the 
hand of the Chinese party-state. The state-owned business groups’ connections with various 
state-controlled organs facilitate resource flows and policy implementation across the business 
and political spheres within the state system.  The deep embeddedness in the party-state system 
however raises the concerns about “over-embeddedness” especially in terms of corporate 
governance improvement.  The internal network of a business group helps Chinese SOEs hide 
actual governance practices; the extensive integration into the party-state system increases the 
risk of running the SOEs more like government units rather than modern corporations; and the 
high elite closure may perpetuate the old management practices due to lacking access to new 
management skills and outside talents.  In this regard, the challenge of reforming the SOEs, at 
least for the Chinese ruling elite, is how to strike a balance between closure and openness, and 
between control and autonomy.  
One way to structure openness is to make connections to the non-state actors especially 




connections with foreign companies, it raises a question about how the governance of the SOEs 
would change under their globalization plan. Do international connections serve as an impetus of 
SOE governance reform? A relational approach to this question suggests investment creates not 
only flows of money but also channels of influence. The Chinese SOEs through foreign equity 
connections may be exposed to influence from where they invest and whom they partner with.  
The chances of governance improvement would be promising if they are mainly connected to 
countries of “good governance.” It entails an empirical investigation of the geographic 
distribution of the SOEs’ foreign exposure.  
This dissertation makes two scholarly contributions. First, existing network studies are 
typically focused on individual corporate behavior while this dissertation extends network 
approaches to understanding the inner workings of a national economy. Second, this dissertation 
is an attempt to explore the interdisciplinary study of corporate law and sociology. Scholars of 
corporate law primarily (in fact almost exclusively) rely on economic theories to analyze 
corporate governance issues but have little exposure to sociological approaches. The corporate 
law community’s ignorance of sociological approaches is a quite unfortunate phenomenon given 
that business school scholars, another major group specialized in corporate governance, are 
trained in sociology and/or borrow lots of ideas from sociology. This dissertation demonstrates 
an example of the limitation of economics and the usefulness of sociology in understanding 
corporate governance in one of the world’s major economies. The relational approach helps to 
explain by which specific institutional mechanisms actual corporate governance practices 





A Relational Framework of the Chinese State-Owned Enterprise 
A relational anatomy of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is to reveal how the 
Chinese SOEs are connected with one another and with other types of entities through various 
types of relations and draw implications of these connections. Using the terminology of social 
network analysis, the relational anatomy comprises two rudimentary concepts: actors and 
relational ties (Wasserman & Facust 2009). The actors consist of state-owned enterprises, 
government units and private business entities while the relational ties include ownership, 
strategic, personnel, supervisory and symbolic connections.  
SOEs as the focal actor include state-owned or state-controlled business organizations. In 
China, financial and non-financial SOEs are structured and regulated in different ways. In this 
dissertation, the industrial non-financial SOEs are the focal actors and financial SOEs (e.g., 
banks) are brought into analysis through their connections with non-financial SOEs.  Most of the 
large industrial SOEs in China now have been incorporated as closely held companies and some 
as publicly-listed companies with the state as the controlling shareholder. Existing literature on 
Chinese SOEs primarily focuses on the publicly-listed state-controlled companies such as China 
Mobile Limited, a large Chinese telecommunication company listed on the New York and Hong 
Kong stock exchanges, China Petroleum & Chemical Company (commonly referred as Sinopec 
Corp.), a large oil company listed on the New York, Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges. 
These publicly-listed companies are not atomized entities but in fact embedded in business 
groups which are controlled by wholly state-owned closed companies. For example, China 
Mobile Limited is a member company of the China Mobile Group controlled by China Mobile 
Communication Corporation; Sinopec Corp. is a member of the Sinopec Group controlled by 




largest companies in China; and the business groups that these companies exert control form the 
focal corporate networks in the landscape of China’s SOE sector.  
  [Figure 4]  




The relational anatomy of China’s SOEs starts from how a typical state-owned business 
group is constructed. A typical state-owned business group is composed of a large number of 
functionally-differentiated SOEs vertically connected with one another through ownership 
relations. Such a business group is not an isolated network but with extensive connections with 
various types of entities, including other state-controlled business groups, state-controlled 
financial institutions, private/foreign companies, and a variety of government organs such as 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), national party and 
legislative bodies, and industry-based supervisory bureaus.  [Figure 4] shows the basic relational 
framework adopted in this dissertation. The Chinese SOEs’ relations to various types of actors 
inside and outside the state system constitute the organizational environments in which the SOEs 
operate.  
Based on the relational framework, Chapter 1 presents the stylized model of China’s 
industrial SOEs. The business group structure is the typical organizational form and constitutes 




organizational structure of the state-owned business groups. It further shows a group’s typicality 
to the stylized model (i.e. how classic to the standard model) correlates with group size but does 
not promise better performance. This chapter also shows that the state-owned group itself is not 
an isolated network but with collaborative linkages with other groups. The intergroup 
connections, often among groups in complementary industries, are designed to facilitate 
resources sharing for capital-intensive or international expansion projects.      
Chapter 2 examines the state-owned groups’ various specific connections with the state 
system. This chapter especially focuses the various governance mechanisms through the 
ownership tie to the state’s ownership agency – State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). Unpacking the SOEs’ formal ownership relation with 
SASAC reveals how information flows between the government and the SOEs, how the top 
managers of the SOEs are evaluated, appointed and compensated, and how the assets and profits 
are transferred in and out of the state system. The anatomy of the SOE’s relation with SASAC 
shows involvement of multiple hidden but influential government strings attached to the SOEs. 
The state’s control network which is composed of multiple connections with SASAC and other 
government organs is largely invisible in the Chinese company law or securities regulations to 
which most scholars of Chinese corporate governance pay attention.      
Chapter 3 examines the corporate elite of China’s SOEs. It investigates the evolution of 
educational, political and career attributes of the CEOs of China’s large SOEs in the past decade. 
In particular, it traces executive personnel connections within the business groups and across 
different types of organizations.  This chapter utilizes legal, historical, sociological and 
comparative methods to explain the change and stability of the executive composition of China’s 




firm-specific-knowledge professionalism as well as some faint potential of bottom-up and 
competition-driven marketization. The empirical findings raise questions about the adequacy and 
capacity of existing international laws and enforcement in coping with the rise of Chinese SOEs, 
the challenges to improving Chinese corporate governance, and the different underlying forces in 
forming apparent similarities in elite composition across countries. 
Chapter 4 examines how the Chinese industrial SOEs are connected with the banking 
system.  Unlike many major capitalisms where financial institutions (especially banks) occupy 
the central position of the corporate network, China’s state-owned sector present sparse 
ownership and personnel connections across the industrial and financial worlds. The industrial 
SOEs do not use direct ownership or personnel connections with the major banks to secure 
financial resources. The strong capital flows between the industrial firms and the banks are 
channeled through indirect connections to the ultimate common owner. When resource 
availability is secured through the ultimate common connection, the major concern for the state 
as the owner and policymaker shifts toward risk control in the system, which explains the 
absence of direct lateral ties between the industrial and financial SOEs. 
Chapter 5 examines the SOEs’ equity connections with foreign companies. China’s SOEs 
have been active in global expansion by foreign direct investment. This chapter uses insights 
derived from network studies and institutional theory to evaluate the potential influence of the 
international connections on the SOE governance reform. The empirical evidence in this chapter 
suggests internationalization is largely irrelevant to the SOE reform pace. International 
normative or regulatory pressure is unlikely to be an effective force to change the governance of 





BUSINESS GROUP AS THE FOCAL NETWORK 
 
1.1 The Emergence of Chinese Business Groups 
Chinese business groups historically originated from the indigenous regional integration 
policy and the influence of the Japanese keiretsu. Since 1979, the Chinese government launched 
numerous initiatives to integrate the fragmented economic systems that used to be divided along 
the government bureaucratic jurisdictions. Business groups as an organizational instrument were 
part of the integration scheme to promote cross-jurisdiction collaboration for industrial 
production. In 1979, a collection of Chinese scholars visited Japan several times to understand 
the organization and operation of the Japanese keiretsu and reported their research results to the 
State Council (i.e. the Cabinet of China) (Hu & Zang 2005). The initial contact with the Japanese 
keiretsu however did not effectuate an outright adoption of business groups into the SOE reform 
package. It was not until 1987 that the Chinese government officially adopted business groups as 
an organizational form for SOE reform. Since then, the definition and organization of Chinese 
business groups evolved several times and finally became legally-definable in the late 1990s.    
Before the early 1980s, the Chinese economic system was fragmented along the 
bureaucratic jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction (e.g., province or city) was a self-contained system. 
The industrial structure in each jurisdiction was very similar, comprising a full spectrum of 
industries. It was under-specialized without considering any comparative advantage of each 
jurisdiction. Similarly, each enterprise was also a self-contained organization with a full range of 




collaboration among SOEs. The self-sufficiency character meant that a lot of resources were 
wasted on duplicative investments. The whole production system was inefficient.   
From the early 1980s, the Chinese government had launched a series of region-level and 
enterprise-level initiatives to integrate the disjointed economic systems and improve resource 
allocation.
1
 In 1980, the government introduced the so-called “business alliances” (jingji lianying 
or jingji lianheti) as an enterprise-level integration mechanism. The business alliances were to 
encourage cross-jurisdiction and cross-industry collaboration among SOEs and other institutes 
(e.g., research centers and universities). The collaboration within a business alliance could take 
various forms such as stabilizing supply-demand relationships or sharing marketing channels and 
production facilities. From a legal perspective, a business alliance was not an independent legal 
entity but a contract-based inter-firm arrangement. Each alliance partner remained as a separate 
entity. SOEs should enter into a formal agreement in order to form a business alliance.
2
 
Contracting parties should specify in the agreement the collaboration terms including monetary 
and non-monetary contribution and profit/loss sharing rules. Moreover, a business alliance 
should establish an alliance committee composed of representatives of participating parties to 
manage affairs of the alliance. The business alliance essentially was similar to a multi-lateral 
strategic alliance commonly found in the modern business world.   
Business alliances as an organizational form to reform SOEs were mainly promoted 
between 1980 and 1986. By the end of 1986, there were approximately 32,000 business alliances, 
                                                          
1
 This dissertation focuses on the enterprise-level rather than region-level integration. Briefly speaking, the regional-
level integration was to utilize comparative advantages of different regions and seek more even economic 
development across regions. In 1981, some Chinese provincial governments established the first collaboration 
region, the Northern China Economic and Technological Collaboration Region, followed by many similar regional 
collaboration efforts. Local governments took the advantage of the collaboration region to carry out projects that 
were beyond a single government’s capacity, such as building a large power plant or water system. The regional 
integration is discussed in a rich literature on regional economy, independent of the literature on business groups.       
2
 The Provisional Rules on Promoting Business Alliances laid out the primitive legal design of the business alliances, 




comprising 63,200 SOEs (Wu 2003).  But the business alliances fell out of favor in the late 
1980s as the Chinese government sought a more integrated form of inter-firm collaboration. The 
business alliances nevertheless became the building blocks for the construction of business 
groups in China.   
After years of experimentation, business alliances were ineffective in further integrating 
SOEs due to lack of unified leadership and jurisdictional conflicts. The Chinese government thus 
shifted from contract-based collaboration to equity-based collaboration by adopting business 
groups. The SOEs were organized into business groups with the intention to facilitate cross-
jurisdiction and cross-industry collaboration, to deepen specialization, to seek economies of scale, 
to transform scientific research into manufacturing power, to gain competitiveness in domestic 
and international markets, and to separate the management of the SOEs from the governance 
logic of the government.
3
  
A challenging task to intentionally construct business groups through governmental 
initiatives was the absence of any readily-available legal framework to refer to. In most countries 
including Japan, business groups are usually an outgrowth of family business expansion and/or 
private entities’ response to market imperfection without specific regulatory planning. The lack 
of a definitive legal framework to imitate means that the Chinese government had to produce its 
own blueprint to construct business groups. The legal history reflects the search for a clear 
definition of Chinese business groups. The concept of business groups was introduced as early as 
the late 1980s, but it was not until the late 1990s that the contour and internal organization of 
Chinese business groups became more legally definable.  
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A business group was initially defined in 1987 as an economic organization comprised of 
a lead member which could be an enterprise or research institute that produced branded or 
nationally important products (e.g., iron and coal) and a number of other enterprises or research 
institutes that had economic or technological connections with one another and with the lead 
member.
4
 The 1987 legal definition did not strictly require ownership connections and in reality 
most of the groups lacked any shareholding links among group members.
5
 Some local 
governments even transformed administrative bureaus into lead companies and reorganized their 
supervised SOEs under the newly-created lead companies. A large number of Chinese business 
groups were created by the government’s administrative command rather than SOEs’ self-
motivation. Unsurprisingly, such business groups did not realize the intended purposes. 
To curb the blind craze for business groups, the Chinese central government took more 
control over the creation of business groups in the 1990s. The State Council constructed 57 
experimental business groups in 1991 and then added another 63 experimental groups in 1997. 
These 120 experimental business groups were mainly in the automobile, machinery, electronics, 
steel, energy, chemistry, transportation, and textile industries. The Chinese government gave the 
business groups favorable treatment in trading, taxation, capital resources, and eligibility for 
listing shares on stock exchanges and so on. In the experimentation scheme, a business group 
was constructed with a multi-level structure. The first level was a core enterprise, which could be 
a large manufacturing enterprise or a purely holding company as the core member of the group. 
The second level included a number of enterprises in which the core member had a controlling 
stake. The third level included a number of enterprises in which the core member would 
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 It was estimated about 70-80% of the groups did not have shareholding links among group members, Fuge Li eds., 




gradually develop an equity stake. The fourth level was composed of enterprises that had close 
trading relations with enterprises in the first three levels. The first and second levels were 
required and the third and fourth levels were optional but highly recommended to be included.  
 Based on the experiment, a relatively clear legal concept of business groups finally 
emerged in 1998.
6
 A business group is now defined as a group of incorporated entities comprised 
of a parent company and its controlled subsidiaries as the main members, as well as the parent’s 
uncontrolled subsidiaries and any other incorporated entities that have production collaboration 
with the core company or its subsidiaries and take the articles of grouping as the rules to govern 
their common behavior.
7
 The articles of grouping are a formal agreement among group members 
regarding the group’s boundaries and governance rules. The legal definition makes ownership 
connections as the major ties that bind companies into a group. As of 2000, 87% of Chinese 
business groups included no purely contractually related members (Hahn & Lee 2006). 
Under the current regulatory scheme, not all companies are qualified to start a business 
group. The parent company is required to have registered capital of at least 50 million RMB 
(about 7.6 million USD) and at least 5 subsidiaries. The total registered capital of the parent and 
its subsidiaries has to be at least 100 million RMB (about 15 million USD). Moreover, although 
a business group itself is not a separate legal entity, registration is required if the group wants to 
be legally recognized and enjoy relevant benefits such as establishing a finance company within 
the group. Many Chinese companies form de facto business groups rather than de jure business 
groups, particularly given that Chinese family businesses have a tradition in organizing family 
firms into groups. The specific regulations on Chinese business groups are applicable only to de 
jure business groups. [Figure 5] below illustrates the basic structure of a business group 
                                                          
6
 Provisional Rules on Business Groups Registration (1998), promulgated by the State Council. 
7




according to the Chinese regulatory framework. Because the regulatory scheme is primarily 
designed to reform SOEs, a large number of the registered business groups are state controlled. 
As of 2008, 43.5% of the largest 2,971 registered business groups were controlled by the Chinese 
state.
8
    
[Figure 5] 







1.2 Major Actors in the Focal Network  
Inside the Chinese state-owned business group, there are several types of actors 
performing different functions. The major actors include a core company, a finance company, 
one or more publicly traded companies and research institutes. This section examines in some 
detail the key actors of the business group. 
1.2.1 Core Company 
China’s large state-owned non-financial enterprises are typically organized as vertically-
integrated corporate groups. Each corporate group has a wholly stated-owned holding company 
standing at the top of the ownership hierarchy, known as the core company of the group.  Below 
the core company are there a large number of subsidiaries including listed companies, finance 
companies, research institutes, and many other related firms along the production chain. 
                                                          
8
 Statistics Bureau of China, Zhongguo Da Qiye Jituan Jingzhengli Niandu Baogao 2009 [Annual Report on the 
Competitiveness of China’s Large Business Groups 2008] 
Parent Company (Required) 
At Least 5 Controlled Subsidiaries (Required) 
Uncontrolled Subsidiaries (Optional) 




Historically many of the core companies were created through transformation from government 
ministries or bureaus while some were deliberately designed in the 1990s to shoulder bad assets 
for the creation of beautified publicly traded subsidiaries (Walter & Howie 2003). At present, the 
core companies through the vertical ownership structure controlling a large army of subsidiaries 
have become the largest companies in China. The core company through its central position in 
the network lays down the group’s development plans and strategies, unifies group members’ 
action, and coordinates the relationships among member companies. 
Above the core company is an ownership supervision agency of the central or local 
government known as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), exercising controlling shareholder rights on behalf of the state. The core company is 
an ownership vehicle through which the state keeps direct or indirect control rights over a large 
number of SOEs. It plays a vertical coordination role between the state and group members that 
engage in actual production by transmitting policy downward from the government to member 
firms and information and advice upward to the state. As some Chinese commentators note, “The 
key sectors and backbone industries are still controlled by the state through wholly state-owned 
or state-controlled enterprises….In reality, the state can control the nationally important 
industries and key areas to lead the economy simply by grasping a few hundred large state-
owned holding companies or business groups” (Zheng et al. 2009:2).   
Despite their bigness in size and closeness with the state, the core companies to date have 
received little scholarly scrutiny, partly due to their low transparency.  The core companies are 
organized as closely-held companies without disclosure obligations as publicly-traded companies 
do.  Part of the dissertation, especially Chapters 2 and 3, is an endeavor to fill this void by 




1.2.2 Listed Company 
The facade of the Chinese state-owned business group is the listed company rather than 
the core company or a group of companies.  The Chinese government’s strategy in managing 
groups under its supervision has been to consolidate high-quality assets into specific companies 
and to seek public listing for those companies. There is usually one or more listed companies in 
the group. For example, PetroChina, one of the largest oil companies in the world, has shares 
listed on the Shanghai and New York Stock Exchanges and is the external face of the CNPC 
Group, the core company of which is the China National Petroleum Corporation. As of the end 
of 2010, the business groups under the Chinese central government’s supervision controlled 336 
listed companies, domestically and internationally.
9
 These listed firms are the focus of most 
existing scholarship on Chinese corporate governance.  
The listed company is one of the structural openings that connect the state ownership 
network to the non-state world. The listed company creates opportunities for non-state actors 
including international and private entities to participate in the SOE sector. The creation of such 
a structural opening serves multiple purposes. Besides raising capital, it is more intended to 
improve the governance quality of the SOEs through exposing them to higher corporate 
governance standards and market pressure, especially for the case of overseas listing.
10
 The 
existence of the listed company may reduce the potential governance problems arising from 
complete closeness or over-embeddedness of the SOEs and hopefully diffuse positive effects 
throughout the ownership network.  The existence of the listed company also serves political 
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purposes: to gain international publicity for Chinese SOEs and to relieve the pressure of 
immediate mass privatization to the detriment of state control.  
1.2.3 Finance Company 
According to transaction cost economics, business groups in developing countries are a 
substitute for missing institutions including well-functioning capital markets (Leff 1978). 
Information asymmetry is an inherent problem in any financial system, and the problem is 
compounded by severe market imperfection which exists commonly in developing countries 
such as China. The trust and sustained relationships among group members can mitigate the 
information asymmetry problem as the close relationships permit thick and rich information 
communicated across firm boundaries. As a result, group members can accurately assess risks 
and allocate capital efficiently. Business groups function as an institution to mobilize pooled 
capital which extends beyond the resources of a single firm. 
The Japanese keiretsu built around the main bank system presents the classic model of 
intra-group financing collaboration (Lincoln, Gerlach and Ahmadjian 1996). Although Chinese 
economic strategists indeed contemplated the Japanese main bank model in the formative period 
of China’s business groups, the strategists ultimately decided to adopt a limited version of the 
main bank – the finance company.  Three plausible reasons are advanced to explain why the 
Chinese policymakers shied away from an outright adoption of the Japanese main bank system.  
First, the industrial SOEs were already trapped in their own productivity problems and unlikely 
to have adequate skills to manage financial complexities and risks. Second, putting a bank in the 
business group would dilute and complicate the hierarchical governance structure under the core 
company and the centralized state supervision.  Thus, constructing a finance company as a 




order.  Third, having a full-fledged financial institution in the business group might pose a 
competition threat to the state-owned commercial bank sector.
11
   
The finance company is a non-bank financial institution that provides an expanding range 
of financial services for group members. Under the current regulations, a finance company 
essentially is a mini-hybrid of the commercial bank and the investment bank. A finance company, 
subject to the China Banking Regulatory Commission’s approval, can accept member companies’ 
deposits, lend money to member companies, provide loan syndication services, offer foreign 
exchange services, handle acceptances and discounts on negotiable instruments, act as a 
guarantor for member companies, engage in insurance agency business, assist payments between 
member companies, provide financing consulting services, conduct inter-bank loans, issue 
securities to the inter-bank bond market, underwrite group members’ securities, engage in equity 
investment in financial institutions, engage in financial leasing, provide consumer loans related 
to member companies’ products, and so on.   
A significant advantage provided by the finance company is it breaks the inter-company 
lending prohibition in China.
12
 The finance company acts as a hub linking the financial resources 
of member companies and realizes the collective financial power. Another advantage of having a 
finance company in the group is it opens a business channel into the financial sector. The 
industrial SOEs have been very interested in branching into the financial sector, but Chinese 
financial regulators have been cautious about their expansion due to the complexity of financial 
risk management. As the finance company can lawfully provide financial services to member 
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companies and invest in other financial institutes including banks, it acts as a learning device for 
industrial SOEs to acquit themselves with the services of the finance sector. In recent years, 
many state-owned business groups have used their finance companies to make connections with 
the financial sector.  The connections with the financial sector through the finance company will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
Not all Chinese business groups are eligible to set up a finance company, however. The 
China Banking Regulatory Commission promulgated a list of substantive requirements. Top on 
the list is the business group should be consistent with the Chinese government’s industrial 
policies.
13
 Unsurprisingly, most of the finance companies are affiliated with business groups in 
heavy industries or the SOE sector, as shown in [Table 1] and [Table 2].   Almost all of the 
largest finance companies are state-owned, and some are formidable in size, as shown in [Table 
3]. The largest finance company in China is comparable in size (by assets) to the country’s 
twentieth-largest bank. In addition, the business group should satisfy certain capital and 
profitability requirements in order to establish and maintain a finance company.  Thus, small or 
unprofitable business groups are excluded from having a finance company, though the Chinese 
regulatory authorities have slightly relaxed these requirements. As of the end of 2011, there were 
127 finance companies with 7,018 employees in China.
14
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[Table 1]  
The Industrial Distribution of Chinese Finance Companies, 2009 
Industry Number Percentage 
Electricity 14 14.9% 
Military 10 10.6% 
Electronics 8 8.5% 
Transportation 7 7.4% 
Coal 7 7.4% 
Machinery 6 6.4% 
Automobile Manufacturing 6 6.4% 
Oil and Chemistry 6 6.4% 
Steel 5 5.3% 
Metals 5 5.3% 
Construction Materials 2 2.1% 
Trade 1 1.1% 
Others 17 18.1% 
Total 94 100.0% 
Source: raw data collected from Almanac of Chinese Finance Companies (2010), compiled by author.  
 
[Table 2] 
Distribution of Chinese Finance Companies, 2009 
Ownership Type No. Company Avg. Assets 
(million USD) 




State-Owned under the Central Government 50 3,021 320 51 
State-Owned under the Local Governments 31 996 153 14 
Private 9 961 139 16 
Foreign 4 481 77 4 
Total 94 2,122 244 35 
Source: raw data from Almanac of Chinese Finance Companies (2010), compiled by author. USD: RMB=1:6.83 (Dec. 2009) 
 
[Table 3]  
Top 10 Finance Companies in China, by Asset Size, 2009 














1 China Petroleum Finance Co. 1995 40.87 Oil Beijing Rural Commercial 
Bank (20) 
State 
2 China Power Finance Co 
. 
2000 16.46 Electricity Shengjing Bank (36) State 
3 Sinopec Finance Co. 
 
1988 8.31 Oil Bank of Hebei (52) State 
4 China Shipbuilding Industry 
Finance Co. 
 
2001 6.85 Shipbuilding Bank of Nanchang (57) State 
5 SAIC Finance Co. 
 
1994 6.43 Automobile Bank of Qingdao (58) State 
6 China Aerospace Science & 
Tech. Finance Co. 
 
2001 4.56 Aerospace Bank of Weifang (79) State 
7 CNOOC Finance Co. 
 
2002 4.44 Oil Qishang Bank (82) State 
8 Haier Group Finance Co. 2002 3.64 Home 
Appliances 
Kushan Rural Commercial 
Bank (93) 
Nonstate 
9 China Power Investment 
Financial Co. 
 
2005 3.55 Electricity Chang’An Bank (95) State 
10 WISCO Finance Co. 1993 3.27 Steel Bank of Jujiang (96) State 
Source: Raw data from Almanac of Finance Companies of Chinese Business Groups (2010 Edition), compiled by author. The 




The regulatory control suggests that Chinese finance companies are not a pure-market 
substitute that exists simply to fill the institutional void as explained by transaction cost 
economics. The market-substitute-explanation appears inadequate as most of the finance 
companies exist in state-owned business groups that have easy access to the major state-owned 
banks rather than in private business groups that really need alternatives to banks.  The finance 
company seems to be more of an additional rather than substitute vehicle for state-owned 
business groups to manage financial resources. Furthermore, the regulatory requirements raise 
questions about the causality between the existence of a finance company and the economic 
performance of the business group. Based on transaction cost theory, Keister (1998) argued and 
found that Chinese business groups with a finance company performed better economically than 
those without one. This transaction cost approach, however, might suffer the problem of reverse 
causality as the eligibility to establish and continuously own a finance company is strictly limited 
to financially good business groups.   
1.2.4 Research Institute 
Chinese policymakers have encouraged business groups to include research institutes as 
members to promote high technology development and increase international competitiveness.  
Most of the national business groups contain one or more research institutes. For example, the 
Sinopec Group, one of the largest oil groups in China, comprises nine research institutes. The 
research institutes conduct R&D, with particular emphasis on applied research in areas related to 
the group’s products and production processes. They are the major patent producers for other 
member companies. Often, the research institutes collaborate with universities on particular 
projects to derive complementarities between the applied focus of business R&D programs and 




degree awarding programs approved by the state.  [Table 4] shows the employment information 
and activities of the Sinopec research institutes.  Their activity in patent applications made 
Sinopec one of the top ten patent filers in China.
15
 
[Table 4]  
Research Institutes of the Sinopec Group 




















Sinopec Research Institute of 
Petroleum Processing 
 
1,333 866 254 152 1,320 1026 Yes 
Sinopec Fushun Research 
Institute  of Petroleum and 
Petrochemicals 
 
930 584 18 27 711 446 No 
Sinopec Qingdao Safety 
Engineering Institute 
 
31 18 0 0 400+ -- No 
Sinopec Research Institute of 
Petroleum Engineering 
 
47 10 2 0 249 -- No 
Sinopec Beijing Research 
Institute of Chemical Industry 
 
608 310 151 76 822 658 No 
Sinopec Shanghai Research 
Institute of Petrochemical 
Technology 
 
921 544 85 30 621 500+ No 
Sinopec Exploration & 
Production Research Institute 
 




-- -- -- -- -- -- No 
Sinopec Geophysical Research 
Institute 
-- -- -- -- -- -- No 
Note: raw data collected from China Petrochemical Corporation Yearbook (2010), compiled by author. The patent data for 
Sinopec Research Institute of Petroleum Process only cover the years from 2005-2009. 
 
Typically established as not-for-profit institutions, the research institutes receive funding 
from their holding company (usually the core or the listed company) in the group. Research 
institutes in groups with a diverse range of products may be multilayered, with a chief institute 
affiliated with the core company or the listed company and second-tier institutes established 
under particular operating subsidiaries. Intellectual property arising out of the research activities 
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is typically owned by the holding company or allocated by contract in joint projects with outside 
institutes. 
1.2.5 Internal Structure and Governance of the Business Group 
The major actors and a large number of subsidiaries related to the production chain form 
a vertical ownership network with the core company at the top of the corporate hierarchy. Unlike 
the extensive cross-shareholding found in the Japanese business groups, cross-shareholding is 
very rare in the Chinese state-owned business groups. The top-down ownership structure in part 
reflects a legacy of the old administrative system governing the SOEs. Some of the core 
companies were former government ministries or bureaus and their subsidiaries were the old 
SOEs supervised by the ministries or bureaus.  This vertical ownership structure facilitates the 
state’s centralized control through the core companies. 
  Internal group-governance structures are specified in legally binding agreements called 
articles of grouping, which are adopted by all group members. The articles of grouping are state-
supplied, standard form contracts required for all registered business groups, and their specific 
provisions are largely composed of default rules. In reality, the core company dictates the terms 
of the articles, and the internal governance rules grant the core company veto rights and other 
enhanced governance rights with respect to the group. Many articles of grouping provide for 
plenary or management bodies to facilitate group or delegated decisionmaking, respectively, but 
these organs typically either have only advisory power or are structured so that the core company 
effectively controls their decision-making processes. In short, the governance of a Chinese 





This section uses two examples to demonstrate the intra-group network structure and 
governance. China Datang Group represents the SOEs at the national level while Yudean Group 
for those at the local level. These two examples nicely illustrate the vertical network common in 
major Chinese SOEs today.   
China Datang Group is a state-owned business group under the Chinese central 
government’s supervision.  The core company of the group is China Datang Corporation, a 
Fortune Global 500 company and one of the five largest power-generation companies in China.  
[Figure 6] shows the ownership structure of the group, which is comprised of 143 companies. 
Note the layered structure, which features a core holding company at the top and layers of 
subsidiaries directly or indirectly controlled by the holding company below. Also note the top-
down nature of the ownership structure and a nearly complete absence of cross shareholding 
among group member companies. The Group includes three publicly listed companies controlled 
by the holding company. These include Datang International Power Generation Corporation 
(Publicly Traded Company #1 in the Figure), the shares of which are listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. Another key member is the finance company, 


















[Figure 6]  











Source: raw ownership data hand collected from Yearbook of China Datang Group (2009 Edition). 
Note: The red circles indicate member companies in China Datang Group; the blue squares indicate non-member 
companies. There are 143 member companies and 84 non-member companies in the figure. The black ties with 
arrows indicate ownership direction. For example, X Y means X Company has an ownership stake in Y Company. 
There are 248 ownership connections in this graph. 
 
The vertical ownership network structure is also typical for business groups under the 
control of the local governments. [Figure 7] illustrates the ownership network of Yudean Group, 
a business group controlled by the provincial government of Guangdong Province. Guangdong 
Yudean Group Company is the core company, which is one of the largest 500 enterprises in 
China and the ninth largest in the Chinese power industry.  Similar to the network structure of 
China Datang Group, the core company of Yudean Group occupies the central position in the 
network and it has direct ownership stakes in 66 member companies.  The group has only one 
publicly traded company, Guangdong Electric Development Company (C49 in the Figure), 
whose shares are listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The publicly traded company has 




company, which is owned by the core company and two other member companies (C49 & C52). 
The finance company itself does not hold any ownership stake in any other member companies. 
Overall, the ownership structure of Yudean Group is a highly centralized network revolving 
around the core company rather than a distributed network comprised of extensive cross-
shareholding among member companies.  
[Figure 7] 
Ownership Structure of Yudean Group, 2010 
 
Source: raw data collected from the official website of Guangdong Yudean Group Company, the 2010 prospectus of 
Guangdong Yudean Group Company and 2010, 2009 annual reports of Guangdong Electronic Development 
Company. 
Member companies are marked as red round nodes; non-member companies are blue square nodes. There are 162 
companies in this graph, including 87 member companies and 75 non-member companies.  





According to Yudean Group’s articles of grouping, the legally-binding agreement on 
internal governance, the purposes of the group are to implement the economic development 
policies of the Guangdong government, to facilitate efficient allocation of resources, and to 
eventually become a domestically first-rate and internationally competitive business group in the 
energy industry.  While the articles of grouping allow membership based on contractual relations 
to the group, in reality membership are all based on shareholding relations. 
In order to coordinate members, Yudean Group sets up a general assembly composed of 
representatives of all member companies in the group. The general assembly meets once a year 
and is the ultimate coordination institution of the group. The major responsibilities of the general 
assembly are to research the group’s development strategies, amend the articles of grouping, and 
vote on the matters proposed by the executive committee of the group. Because the general 
assembly only meets once a year, the executive committee undertakes the responsibilities of 
managing the group’s ordinary affairs. The executive committee is comprised of all the board 
members of the core company. The major responsibilities of the executive committee include 
laying down the group’s development plans and strategies, unifying group members’ action, 
coordinating the relationships among member companies, protecting the group’s and member 
companies’ interests, granting or terminating membership, and any other matters delegated by 
the general assembly. The executive committee does not maintain an independent management 
system to implement its decisions but utilizes the management departments of the core company. 
Such legal design essentially merges the group’s governance institution with the core company. 





1.2.5 Characteristics, Governance and Performance 
A typical research question regarding the business group organization is how group 
affiliation affects firm performance (e.g., Khanna & Rivkin 2001 for group affiliation effects in 
14 developing countries; Lincoln, Gerlach & Ahmadjian 1996 for Japan;  Kim& Yi 2006 for 
Korea).  The prevailing explanation for the relationship between group affiliation and firm 
performance is based on the transaction cost theory in which business groups arise as a substitute 
for missing institutions, including capital, product, human resources, technology market 
institutions (Leff 1978; Chang and Choi 1988; Khanna and Palepu 1997, 1999, 2000).  The 
transaction cost approach predicts that business groups enjoy better economic performance when 
market institutions are weak but the superior performance will decline and eventually disappear 
when institutional environments get improved.  Existing empirical evidence in China seems 
consistent with the transaction cost theory.  Based on a sample of 1,119 publicly-listed Chinese 
companies, Ma et al. (2006) find that the interaction of business group affiliation and state 
ownership has a significant and positive effect on firm performance. Based on a sample of more 
than 400 publicly-listed Chinese companies in the period of 1999-2004, Carney et al. (2009) also 
find that affiliation with a business group improves performance but the value of group 
affiliation declines over time as the market institutions get mature. 
As explained in the previous sections, the publicly-listed firm is only one type of major 
actors embedded in the vertical business network. While existing research has provided some 
insights into the group affiliation effects on the listed company’s performance, it remains unclear 
how the business network would affect the behavior and performance of the core company, the 
central coordinator in the vertical network and the immediate portal through which the state-




presented as the consolidated financial statement of the core company itself and its controlled 
subsidiaries, provides a window to the assessment of the overall group performance in relation to 
the business group structure.
16
  
In recent years, the state-owner has introduced many measures to modernize core 
companies. One of the important reforms is to experimenting with the board of directors as a 
monitoring device. Does the board of directors as a new governance institution improve the core 
company’s performance?  The state-owner also has used the listed company as a governance 
improvement strategy.  It expects the listed company, especially the overseas listed one which is 
subject to higher corporate governance standards, can diffuse positive governance effects to 
other members in the business network.  Thus, does the existence of a listed subsidiary, 
especially an overseas listed one, in the business group improve the core company’s performance? 
Moreover, does the core company as the controlling shareholder of the finance company benefit 
from having such financial management device in hand? Also, since the core company is 
immediately owned and managed by the central or local government, do the institutional quality 
of the central or local government affect the core company’s performance? Extant evidence 
shows listed subsidiaries controlled by local-government-owned core companies are more likely 
to be expropriated by their parents (Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis 2010). It implies core companies 
(and groups) owned by local governments may have poorer corporate governance and 
consequently inferior performance than those owned by the central government. Alternatively, 
the core companies owned by the central government may perform better because the central 
government is more likely to retain control of better firms while the local governments keep less 
important and less efficient firms.      
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Finally, do groups presenting a stylized model in which all the key actors (a core 
company, a finance company, a listed firm and a research institute) exist in the group have better 
financial performance than those that fall short of the model?  Theoretically, the stylized model 
appears to offer great competitive advantages. It has a core company that may coordinate a large 
number of member companies to achieve planned goals and transmit advice to the government 
through its close ownership tie with the state.  The listed company may give the group visibility 
and expose it to higher corporate governance standards. The finance company may provide 
additional financial management tools to deploy resources and diversify risks. The research 
institute may improve the group’s production technologies and gain competitive edges. The ideal 
advantages however are conditioned by institutional realities. While the core company may have 
access to government decisionmakers, it may be vulnerable to undue state intervention.  The 
listed company is expected to comply with higher corporate governance standards, but the 
Chinese capital market regulators remain ineffective in implementing the rules. The finance 
company itself may be a source of governance problem as there is meager regulatory oversight in 
China’s shadow banking system (Zhang 2013). Finally, while many research institutes of the 
state-owned business groups are top filers of patent applications in China, the patent quality 
generally remains low (Xinhua 2013, Economist 2010). As a result, the efficiency of the stylized 
model may be ambivalent in practice. 
1.2.5.1 Data and Methods 
To evaluate the relationships between group features and performance, this chapter 
examines the largest state-owned business groups in China as of 2010, according to the annual 
ranking of the China Enterprise Confederation and China Enterprise Directors Association. Of 




Ordinary least squares regressions will be used to analyze the relationships between 
group features and performance. The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA) and return 
on sales (ROS) of the group (essentially the consolidated performance of the core company and 
its controlled subsidiaries). The financial data are collected from the China Enterprise 
Confederation and China Enterprise Directors Association. The independent variables include 
various group features. For the core company, it examines whether the core company is owned 
by the central or local government (central=1, local=0) and whether the core company has set up 
the board of directors (yes=1). For the listed company, it examines whether the group has any 
listed company (yes=1) and whether the group has listed shares overseas (yes=1). It also includes 
variables regarding whether the group has a finance company (yes=1) and whether the group has 
any research institute (yes=1).  Furthermore, two variables are created to evaluate whether 
groups presenting the stylized model where all the key actors exist in the group perform better 
than those that fall short of the full model: (a) Stylized Model 1 indicates the group has a core 
company, a listed company, a finance company and a research institute; and (b) Stylized Model 2 
indicates the group has a core company, an overseas listed company, a finance company and a 
research institute.  
In addition, (log) number of employees is included as a control variable to account for 
firm size. Since the profitability of Chinese SOEs has been seriously criticized for their heavy 
reliant on monopoly power and government favorable treatment, it is expected that Chinese 
SOEs operate in a more liberalized market would have less impressive performance. This chapter 
uses China’s NERI Marketization Index (2009) developed by Gang Fang et al. (2011) to assess 
the institutional environment where an SOE is headquartered. The marketization index measures 




market reform indicators and large-sample business surveys. Finally, prior year performance is 
included as a lagged dependent variable.  
1.2.5.2 Results and Analysis 
[Table 5] gives a summary of the descriptive statistics. It shows that 27.5% of the 302 
non-financial SOEs are owned by the central government; 81.5% of the SOEs have set up the 
board of directors in the core company; 80.5% have at least one listed company; 18.5% have 
listed shares overseas; 27.5% have a finance company in the group; and 56.3% have at least one 
formal research institute. While all the state-owned groups contain some key actors, only 18.2% 
present a full-fledged model (Stylized Model 1) and only 8.3% for Stylized Model 2. The 
average revenues of the SOEs are approximately 88.8 billion RMB (13.4 billion USD) and the 
average number of employees is around 70,000. The average ROA and ROS are around 3-4%. 
The average institutional quality of the SOE’s headquarters locations is 8.962 with a minimum at 





[Table 5]  
Descriptive Statistics Summary (2010) 
 




Group Organizational Structure   
Owned by Central Government  302 .275 
(.447) 
Core Company Having Board of Directors 302 ..815 
(.389) 
















Stylized Model    










Group Size and Performance   

























Headquarters’ Location    





 While one may assume that larger SOEs tend to encompass all types of the key actors, 
[Table 6] shows that revenues and the number of employees are weakly correlated with the 
existence of a finance company, a research institute or an overseas listed company.  Moreover, 
while the SOEs under the central government’s control tend to have more economic significance, 
there is only a moderate positive correlation between central government ownership and the 
existence of the stylized model.  In other words, the stylized model is applicable both to the 





[Table 6]  
Correlations 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (O) 
Phi Coefficient                
Owned by Central 
Government (A) 
 
1.000               
Having Board of 
Directors 
(B) 
-.546 1.000              




.098 .023 1.000             
Having an Overseas 
Listed Company (D) 
 
.451 -.255 .235 1.000            




.385 -.260 .247 .279 1.000           
Having a Research 
Institute 
(F) 
.333 -.163 .121 .249 .169 1.000          
Stylized Model 1 
(G) 
 
.401 -.305 .232 .327 .767 .416 1.000         
Stylized Model 2 
(H) 
 









.378 -.199 .046 .292 .294 .217 .303 .343 1.000       
Employees 
(J) 




-.100 -.071 -.025 .012 -.063 -.064 -.031 .032 -.028 -.116 1.000     
ROS  (2010) 
(L) 
 
.021 -.021 .046 .087 .096 -.042 .025 .081 -.022 -.029 .590 1.000    
ROA (2009) 
(M) 









.258 -.078 .036 .122 .045 -.007 .058 .080 .119 .042 .012 .007 .020 .055 1.000 
 
 [Table 7] shows the results of the relationships between group features and financial 
performance.  Contrary to the hypothesis that SOEs under the central government’s control 
would have better financial performance, the results here show that the central government 
owned SOEs have worse performance, albeit not statistically significant. Neither the existence of 




further investigation regarding why the board of directors as an instrument to modernize the 
SOEs does not deliver what it is expected to give (see discussion in Chapter 2).  
The effect of having a listed subsidiary, whether overseas listed or not, is ambiguous. It is 
positively associated with ROA but negatively with ROS. The effect of a research institute is 
also unclear, negative on ROA and positive on ROS.  Having a financial company has positive 
effects both on ROA and ROS. All these results are statistically insignificant, however.  
[Table 7] also shows that groups presenting the full-fledged stylized model appear to perform 
better than those that fall short of the full model; nevertheless, the effect is statistically 
significant only on ROA and only when the group has shares listed overseas (b=.750, p<.05). 
 For control variables, both the number of employees and location institutional quality are 
negatively, albeit statistically insignificant, associated with financial performance. The result of 
location institutional quality suggests the competitive advantages of the SOEs might be undercut 
when the market becomes more liberalized. The regression models in [Table 6] do not have the 





  [Table 7]  
Group Features and Performance, with Lagged Dependent Variable 
 Performance 
 ROA ROS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 










































   -.138 
(.502) 
   





























Stylized Model 1 
(Core Company + Listed Company + Finance Company+ 
Research Institute) 
 
  .388 
(.282) 
   .135 
(.474) 
 
Stylized Model 2 
(Core Company + Overseas Listed Company+ Finance Company 
+ Research Institute) 
 
   .750* 
(.377) 
   .682 
(.637) 



















Prior Year Performance 






















































Observations 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 
R
2 
.769 .768 .765 .767 .720 .712 .717 .718 
The table presents unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .05 
To double-check the above findings, differences in ROA (current year ROA minus prior 
year ROA) and differences in ROS (current year ROS minus prior year ROS) are used as 
alternative dependent variables. [Table 8] reports the results. The findings are very similar to 
[Table 7].  Note that the existence of a finance company has a statistically significant effect on 
ROA in Model 10, but not in other models. Also note that all the coefficients of the stylized 





[Table 8]  
Group Features and Performance, with ∆ ROA and ∆ ROS as Dependent Variables 
 Performance 
 ∆ ROA ∆ ROS 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
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(.508) 
   





























Fitness to Stylized Model 1 
(Listed Company + Finance Company+ Research Institute) 
 
  .372 
(.288) 
   .117 
(.480) 
 
Fitness to Stylized Model 2 
(Overseas Listed Company+ Finance Company + Research 
Institute) 
 
   .683 
(.386) 
   .582 
(.644) 






















































Observations 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 
R
2 
.036 .030 .016 .021 .021 .025 .007 .010 
The table presents unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .05  
Overall, the stylized model which appears to have governance, financial and technology 
advantages does not render superior performance. Two complementary explanations might be 
offered. The first is the key actors themselves do not have adequate capacity to realize the 
proposed advantages. For example, the listed company itself does not have good corporate 
governance and therefore cannot diffuse positive effects to the group. Similarly, the research 
institute itself does not produce high quality patents and thus generates little benefits to the group. 
Second, collaborative relations among the key actors may not exist or function properly. For 
instance, the listed company itself may have good governance practices but restricted interaction 
with other group members and, as a result, it does not diffuse good practices in the group. Due to 
the unavailability of comprehensive data on the internal relations among member firms of the 





1.2.6 Beyond the Focal: Intergroup Networks 
While a large state-owned group in China is typically structured as a vertical network of 
ownership relations, the group itself is not an isolated network but with collaborative linkages 
with other groups. Although groups in the same industry do compete domestically, they have 
been encouraged by the state to collaborate in overseas projects to increase their global 
competitiveness. These collaborative linkages typically take two forms: equity joint ventures and 
contractual strategic alliances. These linkages, often among groups in complementary industries, 
are designed to facilitate technological development and a host of other objectives, such as 
information sharing, marketing, and pooling of capital for capital-intensive projects.  
  To assess the intergroup relations, I collected data on joint ventures and strategic alliances 
among the national industrial groups under the control of the State-Owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the central government. The central SASAC is the 
agency that manages the most important SOEs in China (detailed discussion in Chapter 2). As of 
the time of data collection, there were 117 SOEs under the central SASAC’s supervision. The 
joint ventures and strategic alliances of the 117 SOEs were collected from SDC Platinum 
Database, one of the most commonly used sources regarding global joint ventures and strategic 
alliances. The deals took place in the period of 2003-2011. 
   [Figures 8 & 9] illustrate the use of both ownership and contract to construct intergroup 
networks among the industrial business groups under the control of the Chinese central 
government. The number of the inter-group collaborative relations in reality is much greater than 
presented in the Figures as SDC Platinum Database is focused more on international than 
domestic deals. The Figures show that such collaborative linkages are constructed among both 




economies, these forms of collaboration would raise obvious antitrust concerns. China has an 
Antitrust Law, enacted in 2008, that, as a formal matter, would appear to subject these alliances, 
along with mergers and other combinations between SOEs, to antitrust scrutiny. In practice, 
however, the SOEs have thus far been virtually exempt from antitrust enforcement.17 
[Figure 8]  
Joint Venture Network Among the Industrial Business Groups Controlled by the Chinese Central 
Government, 2003-2011 
 
Data Source: raw data manually collected from SDC Platinum M&A Database. When two business groups have set 
up at least a joint venture together, there is a link between the two groups. 
 
  
                                                          
 17. The only major exception to date is an antitrust investigation into abuse of dominance of the domestic 
broadband market by China Telecom and China Unicom, but the investigation ended up with no further government 
action. Despite SOEs’ size and active role in mergers and acquisitions, very few merger rulings, to date, involve 




[Figure 9]  
Strategic Alliance Network among the Industrial Business Groups Controlled by the Chinese 
Central Government, 2003-2011 
 
Data Source: raw data manually collected from SDC Platinum M&A Database. When two business groups have set 
up at least a strategic alliance together, there is a link between the two groups. 
 
  The ownership network of China Datang Group, as previously shown in [Figure 6], shows 
the details of the equity linkages across the business groups under the control of the central 
government. Eighty-four nonmember companies have equity relations with group members. 
Some of these nonmember companies are the core companies or affiliates of other major state-
owned groups in the related or complementary industries, including Guodian Group, Huadian 
Group, Huaneng Group, and Three Gorges Group. 18 
  The inter-group linkages are constructed not only between the national groups (i.e. groups 
controlled by the Chinese central government) but also between national and local groups (i.e. 
groups controlled by the Chinese local governments). The ownership network of Yudean Group, 
as earlier shown in [Figure 7], nicely illustrates the central-local intergroup linkages. The 
                                                          
 18. In 2002, the Chinese government reorganized the national power industry. National Power Corporation, 
which controlled half the power generators and all of the power grids in China, was dissolved, and its assets were 
divided into eleven business groups under SASAC supervision. Datang is one of the power-generation companies 
created in the reorganization. See HENGYUN MA & LES OXLEY, CHINA’S ENERGY ECONOMY: SITUATION, REFORMS, 




provincial group has equity connections with the core or member companies of other national 
business groups in the related or complementary industries, such as China Datang Group, China 
Huaneng Group, and CNOOC Group.  These central-local linkages are the result of an evolving 
dynamic between the central and local governments. Initially, local governments sought 
investment from the national groups to rescue moribund local SOEs. As the national groups 
expanded, local governments began to view them as competitive threats to local businesses. 
Local protectionism increased, and a push was made to create “provincial champions”. The 
relationship between national and local groups appears to be in flux again because of the global 
financial crisis, which prompted renewed central-local cooperation. The local governments now 
view the national champions as sources of support for small and midsize enterprises, which 
suffered when they lost the backing of foreign and private companies.19 For the national groups, 
which are under pressure from their governmental supervisors to grow, tie-ups with local groups 
are an avenue of expansion.  
       
  
                                                          
 19. As an example of the importance provincial governments are now placing on tie-ups with national groups, 
over a one-month period in 2011, the Guangdong provincial government reached 249 collaboration agreements, 
representing a total investment of $40 million, with 71 national groups. See Li Peng (李鹏), Yangqi ru Yuechao (央






POLITICAL NETWORKS, CONTROL MECHANISMS AND OBSCURITIES 
 
Introduction  
 Obviously, as SOEs are owned by the state, they are connected to the government.  But 
this inference over-simplifies the density and complexity of the Chinese SOEs’ connections with 
the state system.  The Chinese large SOEs are embedded in multiple types of specific ties with 
various government organs under the canopy of the Chinese Communist Party.  
Along the ownership ties, the major formal connection through which the state exercises 
equity control rights is the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration (SASAC) of the 
central or local governments. Dissecting the SOEs’ relation with SASAC reveals how 
information flows between the government and the SOEs, how the top managers of the SOEs are 
evaluated, appointed and compensated, and how the assets and profits are transferred in and out 
of the state system. The anatomy of the SOEs’ relation with SASAC also shows involvement of 
multiple hidden but powerful governmental strings attached to the SOEs. The Chinese 
Communist Party, supervisory bureaus and political assemblies all have institutionalized 
practices such as personnel exchanges that tie the SOEs to themselves. The state’s control 
network created through such multiple connections with SASAC and other government organs is 
largely invisible in the Chinese company law or securities regulations to which most scholars of 
Chinese corporate governance pay attention.  The comprehensive embeddedness in the state 
system makes the SOE governance often diverge from the expected standards in the formal laws. 




network structures and the various relations with the government organs work together to mask 
the actual governance of China’s large SOEs.   
2.1 Systematic Connections to the Party and Other Political Organs 
 The Communist Party of China as the single ruling party has its tentacles reaching into 
every important institution in China. Despite many reforms over the years to grant more 
management autonomy to the SOEs, the Party’s grip on the SOEs remains strong and unshakable.  
The Party has institutionalized a number of ways in constructing systematic organizational 
connections to the SOEs.  One particular way to make the organizational connections is to 
establish and strengthen the party committees and party organs in the SOEs.  As a result, all 
Chinese SOEs have two parallel systems in personnel management: the regular corporate 
management system and the party system. In the corporate management system, positions are 
similar to those commonly found in firms elsewhere and include CEO, vice CEO, chief 
accountant, and if the company has a board of directors, a chairman and independent board 
members. A leadership team in the party system includes the secretary and several deputy 
secretaries of the party committee, and a secretary of the discipline inspection commission (an 
anticorruption office), along with other members of the party committee.  Institutionalizing party 
penetration of corporate roles is formal policy, and overlaps between the two systems appear 
rather uniform, such that a corporate manager of a given rank typically holds a position of 
equivalent rank in the party system.
20
 The interlinking between the corporate and party 
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 In 2004, the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party and the Party Committee of SASAC 
released Guanyu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Zhongyang Qiyedang Jian Gongzuo de Yijian [Opinions Concerning 
Strengthening and Improving the Party Construction Work in the Central Enterprises] (promulgated by the Org. 
Dep’t Communist Party of China & Party Comm. SASAC, Oct. 31, 2004). A key principle of the Opinions is the 
policy of “bilateral entries and cross appointments.” Bilateral entries means that members of the Party Committee 
can serve on the board of directors, the supervisory board, and the top management team, while board members and 
top managers who are party members can join the Party Committee. Cross appointments means that, if the company 




leadership teams is intended to ensure the corporate decision-making always consistent with the 
party’s policy.   
The Party’s penetration into the SOE system reaches not only to the core companies but 
also all the controlled subsidiaries, and not only at the top management level but also throughout 
the corporate hierarchy. As of the end of 2009, more than three million of the 9.36 million 
employees of the central SOEs were party members.
21
  Furthermore, the Party is now planning to 
launch party committees in the SOEs’ foreign joint ventures in order to ensure its influence over 
the SOEs would not be diluted by foreign exposure.
22
  
The party leadership committee is a unique feature of Chinese corporate governance. 
According to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, a main function of the party 
organs in an SOE is to “participate in decision making on the enterprise’s major matters.”
23
 The 
major matters include, but not limited to: the enterprise’s development strategies, mid- and long-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
person. If the company does not have a board of directors, then the secretary of the Party Committee can be assumed 
to be the CEO, and the vice-CEO can be assumed to be the deputy secretary of the Party Committee. 
21
 China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Yearbook (2010). 
22
 Dongfeng Motor Company Limited (Dongfeng JV), the largest Sino-foreign joint venture in China’s domestic 
automobile industry, is a prominent case. Dongfeng Motor Company Limited was established in 2006 as a 50/50 
joint venture between Nissan Motors and Dongfeng Motor Corporation (the core company of Dongfeng Group), a 
large SOE under the central SASAC’s supervision. Nissan Motors initially refused to include in the joint venture’s 
articles of association any formal recognition for the party involvement. After nine months of negotiation, Nissan 
Motors conceded. As a result, the joint venture’s articles of association include provisions which formally recognize 
the establishment of party organs within the joint venture and its subsidiaries and require the joint venture to provide 
personnel, monetary and material supports to the operation of the party organs. Moreover, the Dongfeng core 
company and Nissan Motors signed a memorandum regarding the operation of the party organs in the joint venture, 
which specified that the number of the party organ staff should be 0.6 percent of the joint venture’s total employees; 
the party operation budget should be equivalent to 0.6 percent of the joint venture’s total employee wages; and the 
leaders of the party organs should enjoy the same benefits as the top corporate managers of the equivalent level. At 
present, the joint venture has over 800 party organs with more than 700 full-time staff members serving over 13,000 
party-employees. The institutionalization of party penetration in Dongfeng JV is acclaimed and promoted by the 
central Party Organization and SASAC. See Research Reports on Dongfeng Corporation Party Committee’s 
Participation in the Important Decisionmaking of Joint Ventures [ 关于东风公司党组织参与合资企业重大问题决
策的调研报告]. 
23




term development plans, operation management directions, annual financial budgets, assets 
reorganization, corporate reform policies and rules, and appointments of important positions.
24
 
The party committee’s appointment power is of particular importance because appointing 
decision-makers is a fundamental step in controlling other important matters.  
[Figures 10-12] illustrate how the party committee at the core company of Baosteel 
Group participates in the appointment process. Baosteel Group is a large business group owned 
by the Chinese central government and the core company is now ranked at197
th
 on the Fortune 
Global 500 list. As shown in the figures of the appointment processes, the party committee 
surveys and screens possible candidates before the board of directors can make a final decision. 
The board of directors essentially exercises its appointment power within the boundary delimited 
by the party committee.  Moreover, the appointment power of the core company’s party 
committee reaches down to subsidiaries in the group, including its publicly traded subsidiary, as 
shown in [Figures 11 and 12]. While the party committee plays such an important role in 
corporate decision-making, the party institution is entirely missing in the Chinese company law 
and only slightly mentioned (if at all) in corporate annual reports published to outside investors. 
  
                                                          




































Note: This appointment process applies only to positions from vice CEOs and below. CEO and board members are 
appointed by a separate process controlled by the central SASAC. 
Source: adapted from Baosteel Group Party Committee’s Organization Department et al. (2009). 
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Source: adapted from Baosteel Group Party Committee’s Organization Department et al. (2009). 
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In addition to inserting party organs into the SOEs, the Party has institutionalized 
personnel linkages between the SOEs and several elite (if functionally obscure) political bodies.  
Chief among these bodies are the national and local People’s Congresses, the central and local 
governments’ symbolic legislative bodies; the People’s national and local Political Consultative 
Conferences, a type of advisory bodies composed of representatives of different social and 
political groups; and the national and local Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party, the 
Party’s general assemblies at the national and local levels. For example, based on a pool of 
candidates recommended by the party committees of the 120 central enterprises extent at the 
time, the central SASAC, the SOE supervision agency of the central government, nominated 22 
managers as representatives in the 11th National People’s Congress and 99 managers to be 
representatives in the 11th People’s Political Consultative Conference, both of which run from 
2008 to 2013.
25
  In 2007, the Party Committee of SASAC and the party committees of the 125 
central enterprises extent at the time selected 47 representatives to the 17
th
 National Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party.
26
 The composition of the selected representatives was based on 
instructions from the Central Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party, which 
specified that no more than 70% of the positions should go to top managers of the core 
companies, and that no less than 30% should go to middle managers of core companies and top 
managers of their subsidiaries.
27
  As the Chinese “democracy” operates a representation system 
with quotas based on groups of political, social and economic importance, the allocation of 
political seats to the economically- prominent  SOEs comes with little surprise. 
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 China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Yearbook (2008), p.81. 
26关于做好中央企业系统（在京）十七大代表候选人推荐工作的通知, issued in  2006. Also, China’s State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Yearbook (2008), p.93. 
27




As shown in details below and Chapter 3, the Party and many other government units 
such as SASAC and supervisory bureaus also play a major role in the appointment and business 
matters in the SOEs. At one time, there may have been ideological reasons for the Party’s 
pervasive role in SOEs. But a compelling political economy explanation for the practice is also 
apparent: The Party constitutes a massive interest group that maintained extensive ties to 
economic enterprises in the central-planning era. Indeed, in that era, there was often little 
separation between governmental, economic, and social organizations, and the Party was 
involved pervasively across all three spheres of activity. Corporatization and other economic 
reforms could have posed a major threat to the comprehensive integration under the party rule.  
Institutionalized political connections in the post-reform SOE sector can be seen as a way of 
maintaining the integration. The institutionalized political ties, on the one hand, help SOEs buy 
the support of the Party for reforms that it might have otherwise blocked and on the other hand, 
help the Party monitor the SOEs.  
2.2 Schizophrenic Connections to SASAC  
 As explained in Chapter 1, China’s large SOEs are organized as business groups with the 
core companies standing at the top of ownership hierarchy. Tracing the ownership connections 
upward beyond the core companies leads to the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), a SOE supervision agency exercising shareholder rights 
on behalf of the state-owner.  
 China’s SOEs traditionally were indistinguishable from other government units and 
strictly integrated into the state system. There was no discernible distinction between the state as 
the government and as the asset owner, which has been viewed as a root cause of inefficient 




the China Economic Reform Commission and the World Bank, the Chinese central government 
in 1988 created the Bureau of State Assets Management, an agency organized directly under the 
State Council but supervised by the Ministry of Finance. The Bureau was authorized to exercise 
the control rights, the financial right and the right of asset disposal. However, at that time, the 
State Council did not seriously intend to centralize the management powers over the SOEs into 
one single agency. The management powers in fact were still distributed among multiple party or 
government organs. For the central SOEs, capital management issues were supervised by the 
Ministry of Finance, investment projects were managed by the National Planning Committee, 
ordinary business operation matters were by the National Economic and Trade Commission, 
labor and wage issues were by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, top manager 
appointments were decided jointly by the Organization Department of CPC and the Enterprise 
Working Committee of CPC, and industrial production matters were supervised by related 
industrial ministries. There remained little coordination and lots of conflicts among these 
supervisory entities. The Bureau’s actual functions in reality were reduced to assessing asset 
values, clarifying and registering which assets belonged to which enterprises, and promulgating 
rules concerning the previous two functions. In 1984 the Bureau was absorbed by the Ministry of 
Finance, essentially abolished.  The old dispersed governance structure continued after the 
abolishment of the Bureau.  
 The creation of SASAC represents the state’s second attempt to consolidate control rights 
over the SOEs.  SASAC is a special agency established under the central or local governments.  
At present, besides the central SASAC, there are 31 SASACs at the provincial level and 331 at 
the lower-government levels.
28
 Most of the largest 300 or so non-financial SOEs in China are 
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supervised either by the central or provincial SASACs. The major functions and responsibilities 
of SASAC include preserving and enhancing the value of state-owned assets, restructuring SOEs, 
appointing and removing top SOE executives, and drafting regulations on the management of 
SOE assets.
29
 But despite outward appearances of consolidated control over the SOEs it formally 
supervises, SASAC is a work in progress, and the SOEs’ legacy of diffused control rights was 
not overcome simply by SASAC’s establishment. This is evidenced in SASAC’s location in the 
government organizational charts. Although the central SASAC is a ministry-level agency, so are 
fifty-three of the most important SOEs under its supervision.  The central SASAC faces potential 
resistance not only from the firms it supervises but also from the competing agendas pursued by 
other important ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance (Naughton 2008). Some of the local 
SASACs have a more awkward status as they have been downgraded as part of other 
administrative agencies.
30
  As one commentator notes, “In practice, SASAC has faced an uphill 
struggle to establish its authority over the SOEs that it supposedly controls as a representative of 
the state owner” (Martin 2011).  
  Until recently, there was no overarching legal authority governing SASAC in its role as 
controlling shareholder. In 2008—tellingly, after an arduous process of interest group balancing 
that began in 1993—the Law of the People’s Republic of China on State-Owned Assets of 
Enterprises (SOE Asset Law) was enacted to “safeguard[] the basic economic system of China . . 
. , giving full play to the leading role of the state-owned economy in the national economy.”31 
While the law ostensibly authorizes SASAC comprehensive shareholder rights over the SOEs, 
SASAC in reality has both less and more power than those available to a typical controlling 
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31.Zhonghua Renming Gonghe Guo Qiye Gouyou Zichan Fa [SOE Asset Law], art. 1 (promulgated by the Standing 





shareholder under corporate law. An anatomy of SASAC’s control rights below show that it is 
weaker because it has incomplete appointment and cash flow rights to the SOEs under its 
control. It is more powerful due to the vast scope of its holdings over the most important firms in 
the national economy and because of its super control rights, which trump standard corporate-
law norms, in state-enterprise assets. Even beyond this disjuncture in its formal status and 
powers, SASAC is unique as the focal point in the Chinese state capitalism.  SASAC in the front 
has legal control rights over the SOEs along the ownership linkages while in the back there are 
legally-invisible but practically constraining ties attached to it by other major actors in the party-
state’s control network. The party-state exerts control over the SOEs through a network of the 
invisible linkages attached behind SASAC’s legal appearance. 
2.2.1 Control Rights in Management 
  As with controlling shareholders everywhere, one of SASAC’s main formal powers is the 
selection and compensation of top managers. But SASAC exercises this power in the shadow of 
party control. Various party organs held appointment power in the SOEs prior to the 
establishment of SASAC and retained this practice even after its establishment. “Political 
qualities,” including party membership, are among the major criteria against which managerial 
performance is evaluated.32  
  As just noted, all Chinese SOEs have both party and corporate management teams. Party 
and corporate leadership appointments take place in a highly institutionalized sharing 
arrangement between the Party and SASAC. In fifty-three central enterprises, the occupants of 
top positions, including board chairmen, CEOs, and party secretaries, are appointed and 
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evaluated by the Organization Department of the Party’s Central Committee. This is a legacy of 
the appointment practice prior to the establishment of SASAC. Some of these positions hold 
ministerial rank equivalent to provincial governors and members of the State Council; others 
hold vice-ministerial rank. Deputy positions in these enterprises are appointed by the Party 
Building Bureau of SASAC (the Party’s organization department within SASAC). A separate 
division of SASAC, the First Bureau for the Administration of Corporate Executives, assists in 
this appointment process. Appointments and evaluations of top executives in the remaining 
central enterprises are made by yet another division of SASAC, the Second Bureau for the 
Administration of Corporate Executives. While the appointments power formally resides with 
SASAC, appointments are made with input from various party organs and ministries supervising 
relevant business operations, and are subject to approval by the State Council.33 
 The appointment and evaluation process for top managers of the SOEs is supported in two 
ways: ministry/bureau recommendations and Party leadership training. The Party’s Organization 
Department and SASAC compensate for information asymmetries about talent and suitability of 
individual SOE managers by obtaining input from the ministries or bureaus overseeing the 
industries in which SOEs operate. Moreover, SOE managers are trained in the Party school 
system, which serves as a think tank and midcareer training center for cadres. The Central Party 
School in Beijing, the most important and prestigious of these schools, offers specialized training 
classes for SOE managers (Shambaugh 2008). While little information is available about the 
content of this training, the Party school system appears to provide an excellent opportunity for 
Party leadership to evaluate the intelligence, skills, and commitment of those who pass through 
its programs. 
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 The standard corporate mechanism for the appointment and evaluation of senior 
executives—the board of directors—is missing entirely from this process. Indeed, only fifty-one 
of the core companies of the 117 central business groups even had boards of directors at the end 
of 2012. Although SASAC and the Party have begun to bring boards of directors into the 
appointment process and to create boards for those core companies that do not yet have them, the 
steps taken thus far leave little doubt that the Party does not intend to relinquish appointment 
authority over the most important enterprises and the highest-level appointments.34 
  [Table 9] shows the leadership appointments and removals of the SOEs under the central 
SASAC’s supervision from 2003-2009.  The data include leaders in the corporate and party 
personnel systems. It shows that from one-third to three-quarters of the central SOEs experienced 
at least one appointment or removal of a leader by the central SASAC in the covered years. The 
central SASAC does not explain why the number of appointments systematically exceeds the 
number of removals. But the most likely explanations are that (1) some appointments are 
actually reappointments of incumbents without any corresponding removal and (2) some 
enterprises established a board of directors during the covered period, creating new positions for 
appointment.  
  
                                                          
 34. In 2008, SASAC and the Organization Department of the Communist Party promulgated Guidance 
Opinions on Top Manager Appointments by the Board of Directors of Central Enterprises. These Opinions for the 
first time gave some appointment power to boards. However, the CEOs of the top fifty-three central enterprises are 
not covered by the Opinions. Even with respect to other enterprises, the nomination committee of the board is 
required to “fully consult” with the Party Committee and SASAC before nominating a CEO. The preliminary 





Appointments and Removals of Leaders of the Chinese Central Enterprises 
 




Number of Central  
Enterprises with  
Appointments or Removals 
Percentage of Central  
Enterprises with  





2003 196 65 33.16% 150 79 
2004 178 77 43.26% 224 155 
2005 169 113 66.86% 237 158 
2006 159 101 63.52% 323 136 
2007 155 90 58.06% 317 113 
2008 148 95 64.19% 358 146 
2009 129 97 75.19% 312 145 
 
Source: SASAC, Zhongguo Guoyou Zichan Jiandu Guanli Nianjian (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) 
[CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION YEARBOOK] (2005) (2006) (2007) 
(2008) (2009) (2010) 
*Leaders include members of boards of directors, CEOs, vice-CEOs, chief accountants, secretaries of the Party 
Committee, deputy secretaries of the Party Committee, and secretaries of the Party’s Discipline Inspection Committee. 
 
 One of SASAC’s leadership management strategies is rotating senior corporate and party 
leaders among business groups.  [Table 10] shows that rotations are fairly common. Most of the 
corporate rotations reflected in the table are of directors or vice-CEOs and that the party rotations 
are for positions below secretary of the party committee. From time to time, however, the 
rotations were among top executives in key industries. For example, in April 2011, the central 
SASAC rotated CEOs of the three central petroleum enterprises, each of which is a Fortune 
Global 500 Company. The central SASAC made similar rotations among top executives in the 
energy sector in 2008 and telecom in 2007 and 2004. Such rotations obviously ignore the 
separate identity of the corporate groups and flout standard corporate-law concepts. But the 
practice is less jarring conceptually if all the national SOEs are viewed as one diversified meta-
group under common (if somewhat attenuated) control of SASAC. Such rotation functions as a 
learning device to share management experience as well as a monitoring device to reduce 
concentration of authority in a single individual in firms in which institutionalized corporate-




leaders are also rotated across the spheres of business, government, and the Party. The inter-
sphere rotations are viewed to facilitate the mutual understanding and strengthen the binding 
between the government/the Party and SOEs.
35
 Chapter 3 will give a detailed analysis of the 
rotation patterns at the individual career level.  
[Table 10] 
Leader Rotations in the Chinese Central State-Owned Enterprises 
 



















2004 27 6 13 0 46 
2005 27 5 14 0 46 
2006 20 3 10 1 34 
2007 33 7 16 0 56 
2008 NA NA NA NA 50 
2009 NA NA NA NA 27 
 
Source: SASAC, Zhongguo Guoyou Zichan Jiandu Guanli Nianjian (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) [CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ASSETS 
SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION YEARBOOK] (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) 
*Leaders include members of board of directors, CEOs, vice-CEOs, chief accountants, secretaries of the Party Committee, deputy secretaries of 
the Party Committee, and secretaries of the Party’s Discipline Inspection Committee. 
 
  Concomitant to its appointment power, SASAC in coordination with the Party’s 
Organization Department, the Ministry (Bureau) of Human Resources and Security, the Ministry 
(Bureau) of Finance and a number of other government agencies also supervises executive 
compensation at the SOEs. Prior to SASAC’s establishment, managerial compensation was 
determined by the SOEs themselves, which led to a series of problems as well as major 
inequalities in pay across firms. 36  In 2004, SASAC introduced a system to supervise 
compensation. Under this system, the basic structure of managerial compensation consists of 
base salary, performance bonuses, and mid- to long-term incentive compensation. The standard 
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 Dang Zheng Ganbu Jiaoliu Gongzuo Guiding [Regulations on Party and Political Leadership Exchanges], 
promulgated 2006.  
 36. Based on SASAC’s investigation, the major problems included lack of state supervision and mechanisms to 
encourage long-term performance, loose linkage between compensation and performance, and great pay inequalities 




corporate-law organs for determining executive compensation—boards or, perhaps, boards in 
cooperation with shareholders—are bypassed by this process. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2.3 
below, the board-approved, shareholder-disclosed compensation paid to executives of listed 
companies of the state-owned groups is something of a fiction—the actual compensation 
received by the executive is set by SASAC.   
2.2.2 Control Rights in State Enterprise Assets 
 SASAC’s central mission is to preserve and increase the value of state assets while 
transforming SOEs into public companies. Since its establishment, SASAC has pursued a policy 
of building several large enterprises in each key industry. In recent years, SASAC has 
consolidated smaller and weaker SOEs into larger business groups. In the process, the number of 
SOEs under the central SASAC’s supervision has declined to 113 in 2013, from 198 in 2003. 
The central SASAC’s goal is to bring the number to below 100. Simultaneously, as the Fortune 
Global 500 list attests, the central and a few local SASACs have successfully pursued the goal of 
building globally competitive conglomerates. 
 This central mission makes SASAC a gatekeeper with respect to transfers of SOE assets. 
With passage of the SOE Asset Law, SASAC now has solid legal backing for this role. Under 
the SOE Asset Law, share transfers involving SOEs require SASAC’s approval, even with 
respect to transactions over which it does not have veto power as a shareholder under the 
Company Law.37 Some Chinese courts have upheld SASAC’s superior control rights under the 
SOE Asset Law by holding that contracts for transfer of shares entered into without SASAC’s 
approval are unenforceable or invalid, even when they are consistent with the Company Law. 
SASAC has super control rights in the transfer of SOEs.  
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2.2.3 Cash Flow Rights 
 
 The separation of cash flow rights from control rights is a central problem in controlling-
shareholder regimes. When a shareholder’s control rights exceed its rights to cash flows, the 
agency problem between the controller and minority shareholders is magnified; the scale of the 
problem grows as the wedge increases. As Ronald Gilson puts it: “Conditional on maintaining 
control, the less equity the controlling shareholder has, the greater the incentive to extract private 
benefits [at the expense of minority shareholders]; increased productivity accrues to shareholders 
in proportion to their equity, while private benefits of control are allocated based on governance 
power” (Gilson 2006:1651). 
 In controlling-shareholder regimes outside the SOE context, the separation of control 
rights from cash flow rights, and the ensuing potential to extract private benefits, arises because 
controllers are able to magnify equity’s voting power through pyramiding and circular stock-
ownership arrangements among corporations in the group. In the SOE context, regulators and 
politicians acting as “owners” on behalf of the state may reap private benefits of control not 
shared with ordinary financial investors, such as political influence, opportunities for patronage 
or corruption, and national prestige. These types of pecuniary and nonpecuniary private benefits 
of control over the SOEs are clearly available to the Chinese party-state’s managerial elite, and 
SASAC is a major vehicle through which such control is exercised. Beyond its role as a vehicle 
for party-state governance of the SOE sector, the organizational incentives of SASAC as the 
formal “owner” of the SOEs are affected by a peculiar historical circumstance: SASAC’s control 
rights exceed its rights to cash flows because, until recently, the state collected no dividends 
from wholly state-owned firms (i.e. the core companies) under SASAC.  
 As the SOEs historically were in a moribund condition, the state relieved all the wholly 






  The old power structure prior the establishment of SASAC remains valid in 
exercising the right to collect and distribute financial returns (Naughton 2008). The financial 
agency (the Ministry of Finance for the central SOEs while the Bureaus of Finance for the local 
SOEs) collects the dividends and coordinates with SASAC regarding the use of the money. The 
dividend rates are set mainly based on broad-brush industrial categories rather than specific 
individual firm performance. At present, the dividend payouts for the central SOEs are between 
5%-20% of net profits depending on their industry sector, while most local SOEs are still exempt 
from paying dividends.   
 Of the 100 billion RMB ($16.5 billion USD) dividends collected from the non-financial 
central SOEs in 2013, about 93.5% was ploughed back into SOEs in the form of financing for 
corporate restructuring, foreign investments and technology invention, according to the Ministry 
of Finance 2013 budget report. Thus, SASAC does not fully internalize the financial 
consequences of its control rights over the SOEs, and it cross subsidizes the firms under its 
supervision with the cash flow rights that it does hold.  
 These realities suggest that SASAC considers all the SOEs under its supervision as a 
whole when carrying out its governance responsibilities, and they may account for several 
outwardly puzzling aspects of governance in China. For example, the practice of rotating top 
managers among firms in the same industry makes a good deal of sense if maximizing 
shareholder wealth at individual firms is less important to the controlling shareholder than 
building up a number of globally competitive firms in critical industries. Another example is 
SASAC’s heavy emphasis on corporate social responsibility (CSR) of the enterprises under its 
supervision (Lin 2007, 2009, 2010). CSR is a theme typically trumpeted by non-shareholder 
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corporate constituencies or by NGOs, not by large investors. But the CSR campaign by SASAC 
might be a means of building support for state capitalism domestically, improving its image 
abroad, and justifying management of the SOEs in ways that are not explicable solely from the 
standpoint of profitability and efficiency of individual firms. 
2.3 Managerial Compensation Obscured in the Network 
As shown so far, China’s large SOEs are not only embedded in a vertically-integrated 
ownership network in the form of a business group but also a network of pervasive connections 
to the Party, SASAC, and various government organs. From a network insider’s perspective, 
such organizational relations can create information flows, enhance mutual understanding, share 
learning experience, and strengthen elite cohesion. But from a network outsider’s perspective, 
they create obstacles to penetrating into the inner working of the governance system, especially 
as many relations are invisible to the public eye. Network insiders can easily hide information in 
the network and therefore obfuscate transparency of corporate governance. The practice of 
managerial compensation in China’s SOEs provides a good example of how both the business 
group and the state control network complicate actual executive pay. 
    When approaching managerial compensation of China’s SOEs, most scholars focus on 
the listed subsidiaries of the corporate groups primarily due to data availability. They also tend to 
ground their research questions from the perspective of agency theory. As agency theory is 
concerned with how to align the interests between top managers (agents) and shareholders 
(principles), the main research question revolves around the correlation between executive pay 
and firm performance.  Chinese state-owned listed companies are found to pay less than private 
firms (Chen et al. 2011; Firth el al.2006, 2007; Conyon & He 2011, 2012) and to have weaker 




Conyon & He 2011). Moreover, the state-owned listed companies are more likely to link 
executive compensation to accounting performance and employment intensity than stock returns 
(Firth et al, 2006 2007; Conyon & He 2012). 
All the empirical studies are based on the executive pay information disclosed in the 
annual reports of the state-owned listed companies. While the findings are insightful, there are 
limitations in understanding Chinese SOEs’ actual managerial compensation practices by relying 
on such executive pay information disclosed in the annual reports. As shown in details below, 
there are simultaneously under-, over- and non-reporting problems in China’s SOEs’ executive 
compensation disclosure. These problems are directly or indirectly related to the organizational 
networks in which the SOEs are embedded.  The business group structure and the state control 
network create routine personnel flows among member companies in the business group and 
across the SOE and government spheres. Such personnel flows generate peer effects on 
compensation among the business and government leaders and thus complicate in actual SOE 
managerial compensation. 
First of all, an under-reporting problem in the executive compensation disclosure comes 
from an institutionalized practice called on-duty consumption.  An average CEO of a Chinese 
listed company earns only 355,150 RMB (about 58,000 USD) as disclosed in the 2011 corporate 
annual reports (Conyon & He 2012). While the executive pay seems significantly lower than that 
in Western counterparts, the number does not include perks and benefits such as free lavish 
housing, education, and entertainment.  In the United States, similar on-duty consumption is used 
and explicitly stipulated in employment contracts but accounts for only a small portion of 




for a significant part of executive income.
39  On-duty consumption as an important component in 
the pay structure was historically designed to supplement the government cadres’ low salaries 
and remains implemented throughout the government system nowadays.  The personnel 
connections between the SOEs and government bureaus foster the identity interchangeability 
between SOE executives and government cadres. The identity interchangeability creates peer 
group effects on the pay structure and makes the SOE executive compensation method oriented 
toward the pay standards in the government system.  
 Second, the disclosure practice of China’s state-owned listed companies has an over-
reporting problem.  Based on interviews with insiders of the SOEs, information from publicly 
available news reports and analysis of directors’ stock option exercise behavior, Chen et al. 
(2011) find that the stock options granted to the directors of China’s state-owned listed firms are 
fake, primarily designed to fool foreign investors. The SOEs executives are contractually 
prohibited from freely exercising granted stock options without the state-owner’s specific 
consent.
40
 The state-owner imposes such constraint because this high-powered incentive 
compensation is incompatible with the personnel network in which the SOEs are embedded. 
The identity interchangeability through the SOE-government personnel connections practically 
creates compensation comparability across the SOE and government leaders. Exercising stock 
options can skyrocket executive pays. It would cause a great pay divide between SOE executives 
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 There is no outright method to show the scale of on-duty consumption. The disclosure regulations of the Shenzhen 
and Shanghai stock exchanges stipulate that on-duty consumption by executives is to be accounted for as an 
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in annual reports as an indirect indicate for on-duty consumption, a study finds that 10 of the top 100 public 
companies in the year of 2010 had the on-duty expenses exceeded the revenues. Another study finds that based on 
1,320 listed companies examined between 2002 and 2009, on-duty consumption exceeded average executive 
compensation by two to 50 times, and has been growing over the years. One study finds that on-duty consumption in 
SOEs has a significant negative correlation with corporate earnings. (Knowledge@Wharton 2012) 
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(executives) to ‘not exercise these rights with liberty’. – said by an anonymous PetroChina executive quoted by the 




and other cadres staying in the government system and as a result would potentially breed a 
sense of resentment and unfairness.  
Third, the personnel connections within the business group combined with a regulatory 
lacuna allow non-disclosure of executive compensation of many top managers of China’s state-
owned listed companies.  Under the Chinese securities regulations, the listed company is not 
required to disclose the manager’s compensation if the manager receives no pay from the listed 
company.  [Table 11] below shows a significant number of top managers in China’s listed 
companies received no compensation from the listed companies. In the past years, about 24% of 
the top managers of all the listed companies received no pay from the listed companies. This 
phenomenon is even more prominent among the listed companies affiliated with the national 
groups under the central SASAC’s supervision. On average, about 30% of the top managers of 
listed companies affiliated with the national groups received no compensation from the listed 
companies.  [Table 12] breaks down the types of managers who received no compensation from 
the listed companies.  A majority of the non-pay managers were board members. [Table 13] 
shows in more detail about the number of no-pay chairmen of the listed companies. Over the past 
several years, about 35% of the chairmen received no compensation. The figure is more 
astounding for the population of the listed companies affiliated with the national groups under 
the central SASAC’s control. On average, about 64% of the chairmen received no compensation 
from the listed companies.  Such no-pay phenomenon is mainly due to many top managers of the 
listed companies are simultaneously executives of the core companies or other member 
companies in the business groups and compensated by these non-publicly traded affiliated 
entities subject to no disclosure obligations. Managerial compensation thus can be shrouded in 




[Table 11]  
No-Pay Top Managers of Listed Companies 
 All Listed Companies Listed Companies Affiliated with 













2005 24,722 6,077 24.58% 3,555 1,117 31.42% 
2006 25,981 6,360 24.48% 3,727 1,139 30.56% 
2007 28,253 6,689 23.68% 3,959 1,170 29.55% 
2008 30,063 7,168 23.84% 4,116 1,208 29.35% 
2009 32,531 7,585 23.32% 4,420 1,270 28.73% 
2010 38,466 8,359 21.73% 4,387 1,306 29.77% 
Data Source: collected by author from CSMAR database. CSMAR is one of the most commonly used databases 
providing comprehensive financial and corporate governance information of China’s listed companies. 
 
[Table 12]  
No-Pay Top Managers of All Listed Companies, by Position Type 
Year 












2005 6,077 3,742 195 484 57 2,278 
2006 6,360 3,941 238 510 63 2,356 
2007 6,689 4,147 286 550 63 2,479 
2008 7,168 4,508 352 600 60 2,600 
2009 7,585 4,772 414 619 73 2,740 
2010 8,359 5,271 397 671 83 3,005 
Data Source: collected by author from CSMAR database.  
 
[Table 13] 
No-Pay Chairmen of Listed Companies 
 All Listed Companies Listed Companies Affiliated with  











No Pay Chairmen 
(%) 
2005 1,372 484 35.28% 187 123 65.78% 
2006 1,448 510 35.22% 194 121 62.37% 
2007 1,570 550 35.03% 203 130 64.04% 
2008 1,686 600 35.59% 211 136 64.45% 
2009 1,792 619 34.54% 219 136 62.10% 
2010 2,170 671 30.92% 228 143 62.72% 
Data Source: collected by author from CSMAR database.  
 
Finally, executive compensation disclosed in the state-owned listed company’s annual 
reports can be seriously misleading as SASAC can exert control over the listed company’s 




group. Whenever an executive takes positions both in the core company and the listed company, 
the executive’s pay is directly determined by SASAC rather than the board of the listed company.   
In 2004, SASAC introduced a system to supervise compensation at the SOEs. Under the 
system, the basic structure of managerial compensation consists of base salary, performance 
bonuses, and mid- to long-term incentive compensation. It employs complex personnel-
evaluation systems to determine managerial compensation. Top managers enter into binding 
annual performance agreements with SASAC that specify evaluation criteria and benchmarks 
and applicable rewards and punishments. Annual performance scores are transformed into letter 
grades from A to E, and bonuses are determined according to these grades. Moreover, since 
maintaining income equality is a government policy, SASAC imposes executive-to-worker pay 
ratios. For example, according to the central SASAC’s most recent rule, executive compensation 
including base salary and performance bonus should be no more than 20 times of an average 
central SOE worker’s pay.
41
 The equality policy may partially explain a common empirical 
finding that Chinese SOEs have weaker sensitivity between performance and executive 
compensation than their private counterparts. 
[Table 14]  
Executive Compensation of Central SOEs under SASAC’s Supervision 
Year Average Compensation (1,000 RMB) 
2004 350    
2005 430    
2006 470   
2007 550    
2008 NA 
2009 600  
2010 650-700 
2011 650-700 
Note: About one-third was base pay and two-thirds performance based.  Data Sources: Speech of Li Rongong, 
SASAC Chairman, at Peking University Business School, PEOPLE.COM.CN, (Jan. 10, 2010, 8:22 AM), 
politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/10736395.html; Interview of SASAC Official, SASAC’s Response to Doubt on 
Barriers to Redistribution Reform, Jinghua News, Jan 25, 2013, available at http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2013-
01/25/content_1965158.htm.
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  The average executive compensation of the core companies under the central SASAC’s 
supervision is summarized in [Table 14].  At first glance, the pay information released by 
SASAC seems to demystify executive compensation managed by the state-owner.  Digging 
deeper, it raises more puzzles about the actual compensation practices of China’s SOEs. While 
comprehensive evidence is hard to come by, some case evidence suggests executive 
compensation disclosed in the state-owned listed companies’ annual reports can be deceiving or 
conflicting. According to the central SASAC, the highest-paid executive in 2007 was the 
chairman (Mr. Jianzhou Wang) of the core company as well as the listed company of China 
Mobile Group, who earned 1.3 million RMB (about $182,000 USD) including salary and bonus. 
But the annual report of the listed company of China Mobile Group shows that the chairman’s 
pay (salary and bonus) in 2007 was 2.282 million HKS (2.145 million RMB) much more than 
the figure disclosed by the central SASAC. Using the SASAC’s number (i.e. 1.3 million RMB) 
as the maximum benchmark, the 2007 annual reports of the listed companies of UNICOM Group 
and China Telecom Group, the other two telecom groups under the central SASAC’s 
supervision, also disclosed way-over-the-benchmark compensation for the executives who 
assumed positions both in the core and the listed companies.
42
 In other words, the SASAC’s 
executive compensation information is inconsistent with the information released in the listed 
companies’ annual reports. The details of other similar cases suggest the board-approved 
compensation disclosed in the state-owned listed companies’ annual reports is something of a 
fiction because the actual compensation is determined by SASAC rather than the listed company 
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 In 2007, the Chairman and CEO of the listed subsidiary and the Chairman of the core company of China Unicom 
Group was paid by the amount of 4.713 million RMB, according to the listed company’s annual report. Along with 
the Chairman, other 7 top executives of the listed company, who were also top managers of the core company, also 
received compensation way above the number disclosed by SASAC. Similarly, in 2007, the Chairman of the listed 
subsidiary and the CEO of the core company of China Telecom Group should receive 1.98 million RMB, according 
to the annual report; and other 6 top executives of the listed company, who were also executives of the core 






  The state-owner uses the ownership and personnel networks in which the listed 
companies are embedded to exert covert control over executive compensation down at the level 
of listed subsidiaries. Thus, focusing on the state-owned listed companies alone without probing 
into their organizational networks is unlikely to observe the actual managerial compensation 
practices of China’s SOEs.     
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 Two prominent cases provide vivid details of the actual managerial compensation practices. One is about the 
executive compensation of CNOOC Group, one of the largest state-owned oil groups in China. The chairman (Mr. 
Chengyu Fu) of the listed company and the core company of CNOOC Group, one of the largest state-owned oil 
groups in China, would receive 6.692 million RMB (salary and bonus) according to the listed company’s 2007 
annual report, far exceeding the maximum figure (1.3 million RMB) released by SASAC. According to the 
chairman himself and the formal statement by the spokesperson of the listed company, at the time of listing shares 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchanges in 2001, the executives of CNOOC, Inc., the 
major subsidiary of the CNOOC Group, reached an internal agreement whereby they would “donate” the 
compensation approved by the broad to the core company of the group. Thus, the compensation approved and 
reported in compliance with corporate and securities law norms is not actually received by the executives. (Xinhua 
2009) 
The other case is about the compensation of Huayuan Group, a local state-owned real estate group supervised by 
Beijing SASAC. According to the annual reports of the listed subsidiary of Huayuan Group, the chairman (Mr. Ren) 
of the listed company as well as the core company of the Group, received more than 7 million RMB. The chairman 
was ranked among the highest-paid executives in China. The chairman publicly explained in details how his 
compensation was actually determined:  “The shareholder meeting of Huayan Property approved 7 million as my 
compensation, but SASAC did not agree. Every year, SASAC only gave me about 0.6 million. Last year (2010), my 
bonus was 50,000 and the total pay was 740,000…In SASAC’s general meeting at the beginning of every year, 
SASAC evaluates prior year performance and signs contracts with top managers regarding next year performance 
targets. In the meeting, SASAC gives to each manager an envelope in which contains a slip stating the manager’s 
pay. Each manager cannot see others’ pay, in order to avoid conflicts among the corporate leaders. This evaluation 





THE ELITE RIDING AND LINKING THE CHAMPIONS 
  
3.1  Introduction  
When approaching China’s SOEs, scholars have typically measured their governance 
attributes against the international standards of corporate governance and have generally come to 
a conclusion that the governance institutions are lacking or dysfunctional in China.  This typical 
approach tends to focus on the function of things (i.e. rules and structures) and overlook the 
character of humans. A philosophy underlying this approach is to seek corporate governance by 
the rule of law in lieu of the rule of man. It promises a functional legal regime of corporate 
governance can minimize arbitrariness exercised by human agents. The flipside of this 
underlying philosophy however implies that the personal attributes of corporate leaders can play 
a significant role in affecting the quality of corporate governance especially when legal 
institutions are weak, such as the case of China. As a result, simply focusing on rules or 
structures without investigating leadership is an insufficient approach to grasping the full picture 
of the governance of China’s SOEs. 
The importance of leadership attributes in SOE governance is further complicated by the 
political institutions in China.  The Chinese state-owner is not an ordinary controlling 
shareholder.  The Chinese Communist Party is the real hand in the glove of state ownership in 
China. As the single-ruling party, it controls all the important institutions in politics, business, 
media, academia and every sphere of public life in China. The chief control mechanism is the 
Party’s sophisticated but opaque personnel management over key positions in the important 




control over personnel was at the heart of its ability to overhaul state companies, without losing 
leverage over them at the same time” (McGregor 2010:69). The Party’s management over 
executive careers directly shapes managerial incentives and in turn influences corporate behavior 
of China’s SOEs.   
Recent studies have insightfully suggested that the Party’s executive career management 
is a fundamental explanation for why many practices diverge from the principles of corporate 
law and securities regulation. For example, scholars have found that in addition to monetary 
executive compensation, political promotion acts as another important incentive mechanism to 
address the agency problem of China’s state-owned companies (Cao et al. 2011). Moreover, 
empirical evidence shows that stock options granted to the executives of China’s state-owned 
companies are forged simply to fool foreign investors because such compensation scheme is 
incompatible with the indigenous executive career management in China (Chen et al. 2011). The 
institutionalized personnel rotations between China’s SOEs and other government units restrict 
the exercise of stock options which can drastically enlarge the pay gap between the SOEs and the 
civil servant system.  Relatedly, Pistor (2012) also argues that in China’s financial industry the 
Party’s tight control over financial cadre’s careers appears to be the dominant governance 
mechanism over ownership ties and legal rules. 
While scholarship to date has recognized the Party’s control over executive careers plays 
a significant role in shaping the governance of China’s SOEs, the personnel management logics 
of the visible hand remain obscure to outsiders (Walder 2011; Fligstein & Zhang 2009).  A 
fundamental question regarding the Party’s executive management is who the top managers 
really are. From a relational perspective, do the top managers’ career paths reflect the 




units? The personnel movements across SOEs and other types of government units may reflect a 
dimension of the flows of information and human resources in the network. Moreover, what 
kinds of attributes are advantageous and sought after in the executive labor market of China’s 
SOEs?  How cohesive is the elite at the highest echelon of China’s largest companies? How has 
the executive recruitment evolved over time? Have corporate governance reforms such as the 
introduction of the board of directors changed the executive composition? From a perspective of 
comparative corporate governance, how do the Chinese executives differ from their counterparts 
in other countries? Is the Chinese business elite composition converging toward that of the 
shareholder-oriented model or stakeholder-oriented model?  
To answer these questions, it requires an analysis of the executive backgrounds and 
career pathways. This chapter conducts a systematic investigation of the CEO biographies of 
China’s large industrial non-financial SOEs between 2001 and 2010. The career pathways of the 
financial SOEs will be examined in Chapter 4 because financial and non-financial SOEs are 
governed by different regulatory regimes in China, which may cause different patterns.  The 
focus on CEOs considers that the managerial culture of Chinese companies is highly hierarchical 
and paternalist with decision-making power concentrated in the highest echelon of the corporate 
hierarchy (Zhu et al. 2008, Kong 2006, Redding & Whitt 2007, Whitt 2010). More importantly, 
many Chinese large SOEs have not yet established the board of directors and the management 
power remains concentrated in the top leader (“yibashou”) of the corporate entity. The period of 
investigation (2001-2010) is set to evaluate the dynamics in executive composition under recent 
institutional reforms.  
Over the past decade, the Chinese government has introduced a variety of rules and 




executive reform schemes provide a roadmap to start with for identifying potential changes in the 
executive attributes including educational credentials, political qualities and career experiences. 
In addition to using the regulatory schemes as the basic analytical framework, this chapter draws 
upon three sources of knowledge to analyze the empirical findings on the educational, political 
and career attributes. The first source of information comes from China’s political and business 
organization history, which is aimed to provide a contextualized interpretation of the findings.  
Because climbing to the top echelon of the corporate hierarchy usually takes decades, the 
contemporary elite composition is largely a consequence of institutional changes accumulated in 
the past. The second source of knowledge derives from sociological theories which have been 
frequently used to explain career patterns and achievements. This chapter particularly applies 
sociologist Ronald Burt’s idea of “brokerage and closure” in network theory to explain the 
comparative advantages of certain executive career pathways and the implications for Chinese 
corporate governance and national economy (Burt 2005). The third source of knowledge draws 
from executive career studies in the literature of comparative corporate governance.  The 
reference to comparative studies shows how the Chinese executives differ from the executives of 
other corporate governance regimes. The comparison helps to solve the puzzle of how China fits 
in the taxonomy of comparative corporate capitalism. 
Under this analytical framework, this chapter shows that China’s executive composition 
over the past decade presents some stability and change under the institutional reforms. And the 
stability and change have mixed signals for corporate governance development. On the whole, 
the executive recruitment is oriented toward politically-bounded and firm-specific-knowledge 
professionalism and indicates a potential trend of bottom-up and competition-pressure-driven 




degree of closure and cohesion. While high elite cohesion may be helpful to national policy 
implementation, it poses challenges to corporate governance improvement due to an increased 
tendency of groupthink and perpetuation of old practices which usually undermine 
implementation of governance reforms envisioned in the corporate law. Moreover, the 
comparative analysis of the business elite shows that China looks similar to countries of the 
stakeholder-oriented model and obviously different from the shareholder-oriented model.  The 
apparent similarities in the elite composition among China and countries of the stakeholder-
oriented model are probably formed by different country-specific underlying causes, however. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the executive recruitment reform 
rules over the past decade and the implied changes in the executive attributes. Section 3.3 traces 
how the executives may have come to power by constructing six types of career pathways based 
on the organizational structure and relational distance. This chapter hypothesizes the potential 
development patterns of each career pathway under the institutional reforms and discusses the 
corporate governance and individual career attainment implications of each career pathway. 
Section 3.4 empirically examines the evolution of executive attributes under the formal 
institutional reforms. It draws upon the specific institutional setting, social network theory and 
comparative corporate governance literature to analyze the empirical findings. Section 3.5 
concludes with the legal implications for international regulators as well as the challenges of 
executive recruitment and corporate governance in China. 
3.2 Institutional Reforms and Executive Recruitment 
As discussed in Chapter 2, SASAC is legally tasked with a mission to consolidate the 
shareholder control rights that used to be dispersed among various government agencies, but in 




power structure.  Its appointment right is eclipsed by a deep-rooted institutional practice in China 
– that is, the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party controls the human 
resources management of all the important organizations including SOEs.  As a result, the 
executive management regulations and personnel announcements are often jointly released by 
SASAC and the Party’s Organization Department. 
Since 2003, SASAC in cooperation with the Party’s Organization Department have 
introduced plenty rules and guidelines stated to improve the quality of the SOE executive teams. 
The executive reform policies, in a nut shell, are oriented in the direction of professionalizing the 
executive teams and opening the executive labor market.
44
 As the executive recruitment reforms 
proceed, the composition of the business elite may change. This section discusses how 
professionalization and marketization may cause possible changes in three dimensions: political 
attributes, educational backgrounds, and career pathways. Due to the complexity of career 
pathways, Section 3.3 will have a more in-depth discussion on the topic.  
Professionalization. State ownership often raises the concern that politics would override 
professionalism. Seniority, personal connections (“guanxi”) and political loyalty are important 
factors in job chances and promotion opportunities in China, especially for state-affiliated 
organizations including SOEs (Walder 1995, Bian 1999). How would these factors change under 
the professionalization reform? In which dimension would professionalization take place?  
SASAC’s executive professionalization rules suggest that professionalization will occur 
in a politically-bounded fashion because political allegiance remains a paramount quality in 
selecting top managers of China’s SOEs. Political loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party as a 
                                                          
44
 Rather than reviewing in detail each regulatory scheme on executive recruitment, this chapter only gives a 
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Leadership Teams and Leaders of Central SOEs (2009), Guidance on Public Recruitments for Senior Managers of 




primary requirement suggests the Party has no intention to relinquish control over the largest 
economic organizations in China.  Professionalism is less likely to touch on areas where 
sensitive political reforms may be required or subsequently triggered. Permissible reforms are 
expected to occur in less politically-sensitive areas such as age, education, specialization, work 
experience and moral integrity, as envisioned in SASAC’s reform guidance.   
Part of the professionalization scheme is to bring young managers into and retire old 
managers from the leadership teams.
45
 Young managers are desirable because they may be more 
active, innovative and less influenced by old traditions. The professionalization reform also sets 
educational requirements. As academic credentials are an approximate indicator of intellectual 
ability, SASAC requires executives to have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree.
46
 Moreover, 
while Chinese elites traditionally are trained in engineering (Li 2001),
 
non-engineering-trained 
executives are expected to be on the rise as the division of labor becomes complex in large 
business organizations. In terms of career experience, business-related work experience should 
become preferred over political career experience. In the old days, China’s SOEs were managed 
in a way exactly like other government units, which was incompatible with modern business 
management. To take up this concern, SASAC requires executives to have at least 10 years of 
work experience in business organizations.
 47
 Besides the general requirements of age, education 
and work experience, moral integrity is a specific quality that needs significant improvement. 
Because China’s SOEs have been plagued by corruption problems, the executive reform policies 
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 In December 2004, the central SASAC issued a regulatory order to the top 53 central SOEs regarding the 
mandatory retirement age of the top managers. According to the order, the ministerial-rank managers were strictly 
required to retire when reaching the age of 65 and the vice-ministerial-rank managers when reaching the age of 60. 
Local SASACs made even more aggressive requirements. For example, according to the Provisional Rules on 
Corporate Leaders of SOEs under Heifei City SASAC, the chief-position executives such as the board chairman and 
CEO should not exceed the age of 50 and the vice-position executives such as vice-CEO no more than 45 years old. 
The reappointed chief-position executives should not exceed the age of 55 and the reappointed vice-position 
executives no more than 52.       
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Marketization. The SOE executive head-hunting process, from opening to closing, used 
to take place in the complete darkness. The job information and opportunities were available 
only to people inside the system. The closure suggests a great likelihood of perpetuation of old 
habits and lack of access to new management skills. To address this problem, since 2003 the 
central and local SASACs with the Party’s endorsement have openly solicited job applications 
for hundreds of executive positions including CEOs, vice CEOs, chief accountants (equivalent to 
CFOs) of the core companies under their supervision. Those who are interested in the executive 
openings may submit their applications and go through paper-based qualification reviews, 
standardized written examinations and face-to-face interviews. [Table 14] below shows the 
marketization recruitment in the past few years. Such executive head-hunting is targeting not 
only China’s domestic labor market but also overseas talent. The political, educational and work 
experience requirements discussed above are allowed to be relaxed for executives recruited from 
overseas through this process.
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 In 2010, thirty-one senior managers of the central SOEs were 
successfully recruited through this process, out of 1,410 applicants worldwide.
50
 The new 
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Marketization of Recruitment Process 




Number of Applicants Qualified 
to Take the Written Exam 
(STAGE 1) 
Number of Applicants Qualified 
for Interviews  
(STAGE 2) 
2003 7 463 135 N/A 
2004 23 937 408 148 
2005 25 1,207 412 159 
2006 26 1,775 499 175 
Source: raw data collected from SASAC Yearbooks 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; complied by author. 
 
Hypothetically, the marketization of the recruitment process suggests that political 
affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party may become a less important factor for executives 
recruited through this process because the value of professional experiences accumulated outside 
the state system may compensate for lack of political affiliation.  In other words, it may open up 
opportunities for outsiders -- professionals who built up their careers in private or foreign 
companies -- to parachute directly onto the top of the SOE system.  This public recruitment 
process also suggests a potential increase in the number of executives who have foreign study 
experience. 
3.3 A Typology of Executive Career Pathways 
Tracing executive career pathways is a useful method to investigate how the SOEs are 
connected with one another and with other government units through personnel relations, how 
the executives have come to power, on what aspects of career experience have changed under the 
professionalization and marketization reforms, and how the executive career backgrounds may 
influence corporate performance. This chapter constructs six types of career pathways based on 
the prevailing organizational structures of China’s SOEs and the organizational distance between 
the SOE of concern and the organizations that the executive has ever worked for prior to the 
CEO appointment.  The distance is defined by whether the prior organization is related to the 




organization is an institution outside the state system (e.g. private or foreign company). 
Organizations that fall outside the supervisory line or the state system are considered more 
distant from the SOE at issue.  This typology allows an evaluation of the degree of personnel 
integration between SOEs and other government units as well as the degree of openness of the 
executive labor market.  Based on this typology, this chapter proposes features of each career 
pathway in securing the CEO position and the implications for corporate governance. Moreover, 
rather than simply focusing on how the CEOs have come to power, this chapter considers where 
they would possibly end up right after the executive position. Tracking the post-CEO status helps 
better understand managerial incentives and get a more complete picture of the degree of the 
SOE personnel integration with other government units.  
3.3.1 Pathways to CEO 
The Single-Group Track. As discussed in Chapter 1, China’s large non-financial SOEs 
are typically organized as corporate groups registered with the state. A corporate group is legally 
required to be comprised of a parent company and at least five controlled subsidiaries. When an 
executive spent his or her whole career within one corporate group before the CEO appointment 
of that group, the executive’s career follows a single-group track.   
The single-group track is featured with climbing the corporate ladder from the bottom to 
the top. If this track is a mainstream route, it suggests a group-based seniority system is in 
operation in selecting the top managers of China’s SOEs.  Social network theory suggests 
executives coming to the top through the single-group pathway possess a high volume of firm-
specific knowledge and insider network resources. When firm-specific knowledge is valued and 
when insider social connections are important, managers following the single-group track have 




single-group track assures some professionalism due to CEO’s possession of rich firm-specific 
knowledge. However, it also presents an increased risk of excessive power concentration 
especially given that the board of directors as an internal monitoring mechanism is usually absent 
or dysfunctional and the external governance institutions are weak in China.  
The Multi-Group Track. This career pathway refers to a route in which the executive has 
work experience in other state-owned business groups prior to the CEO appointment. At first 
brush, the SOE executives following the multi-group track look similar to those changing jobs 
across employers in other executive labor markets. But unlike other labor markets normally 
governed by the invisible hand, China’s SOE executive market is centrally managed by the 
party-state. The job movements across organizations are not as free as in other labor markets. 
Leaving aside personal reasons for job change across organizations, an important institutional 
reason for forming the multi-group track is the party-state’s personnel rotation management.  
Personnel rotation is a legally institutionalized system in managing civil servants in the 
Chinese government units and the system practically spills over into the SOEs as the boundary 
between the government units and SOEs is porous.
52
 The party-state frequently rotates top 
managers across business groups of the same industry.  For example, in April 2011, the state-
owner rotated the CEOs of the three central petroleum SOEs in China, each of which is a Fortune 
Global 500 company. In the eye of the party-state, executive rotations are to perform two 
institutional functions. First, the executive rotations can reduce concentration of authority in a 
business group where institutionalized corporate oversight organs such as the board of directors 
have yet to be fully developed.  Second, personnel rotations facilitate management skills sharing 
among SOEs (Pistor 2012). Personnel rotations allow executives who gained useful skills in one 
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business group to practically share such experience with another group. For instance, it is said 
that one of the reasons that Mr. Chengyu Fu was rotated from CNOOC to Sinopec in the recent 
CEO rotations among China’s three petroleum giants is Mr. Fu’s rich overseas business 
experience learned in CNOOC can help Sinopec’s frustration in overseas expansion.  
The Supervisory-Bureau Track. A SOE executive comes to power through the 
supervisory-bureau pathway when the executive develops his or her career mainly in the SOE’s 
supervisory bureau(s). China’s large SOEs were carved out of industry-based government 
ministries or bureaus in the corporatization process, which transformed governmental organs into 
joint stock companies. The corporatized SOEs remain supervised by the government ministries 
(bureaus) in terms of industrial matters. Because of the historical integration in organizational 
structures and the continuing supervisory relationships in business, the personnel exchanges 
between the SOEs and their supervisory bureaus are quite frequent. Government officials 
through the supervisory relations can gain firm-specific knowledge and build social connections 
with employees in the supervised SOEs. In addition, supervisory government officials tend to 
have industry-wide information and social connections. The social and informational capital can 
increase the usefulness of the supervisory-bureau track in securing the executive positions.   
 Anecdotal evidence indicates that many government officials take top echelon positions 
of the SOEs as a good place in preparation for retirement. Transferring to the SOEs is 
economically attractive because the large SOEs usually offer better monetary compensation than 
other government units. It is especially practicable for senior officials in the supervisory bureaus 
to adopt this retirement strategy given that they have accumulated relevant social and knowledge 
capital in hand. Due to the late-stage nature of retirement in life course, executives coming from 




is not unique to China. In Japan, there is an institutionalized practice known as amakudari, where 
senior bureaucrats retire to join private companies or SOEs linked with or under the jurisdiction 
of their ministries or agencies when they reach mandatory retirement age, usually between 50 
and 60 (Schaede 1995, Colignon & Usui 2003). Such personnel practices in Japan have often 
been criticized as corrupt and obstructive to regulatory reforms (Carlile & Tilton 1998, Norville 
1998). The Japanese implication for China’s SOEs seems to be that the supervisory-bureau 
pathway should be restricted in terms of executive professionalization and corporate governance 
reform. 
The Unrelated-Government-Units Track.  An executive follows the unrelated-
government-units track when the executive’s career mainly develops in government-affiliated 
organs other than for-profit SOEs and supervisory bureaus prior to the CEO appointment. Such 
government units are relatively irrelevant to the focused SOE in terms of the type of 
organizational identity or the nature of business matters. For example, Mr. Biting Chen first 
worked up his way in the Party system to the Party Secretary of the Youth League Committee of 
Anhui Province, then a mayor of a city in Jiangsu Province, and then promoted to the chief 
secretary and later the vice governor of Jiangsu Province prior to his appointment as the CEO of 
Shenhua Group, one of the largest energy SOEs in China and also a Fortune Global 500 
company.  Executives with this career pathway tend to possess more political operation skills 
than firm-specific or industry-specific knowledge. SOEs with such politics-tainted executives 
may have worse performance compared to those whose executives have more firm-specific or 
industry-wide knowledge. If the unrelated-government-units track is the prevailing career 




than business purposes. Under the professionalization reform, the unrelated-government-units 
track should be on the decline.  
The Multi-Sphere Track. A SOE executive comes to power through the multi-sphere 
track when an executive’s career spans multiple types of organizations such as unaffiliated SOEs, 
supervisory bureaus, and other unrelated government units. For example, Mr. Shulin Su first 
worked his way from an entry-level technician of a subsidiary up to the vice CEO position in the 
core company of Sinopec Group (a giant petroleum SOE) and then transferred to the Party 
Standing Committee of Liaoning Province prior his appointment as the CEO of China National 
Petroleum Corporation, one of the largest oil companies in China. This type of career pathway 
essentially is a combination of the previous four types.  Compared to the single-group executives, 
the multi-sphere executives are more likely to have system-wide knowledge and diverse personal 
connections, which can be an advantage in career attainment.   The prevalence of the multi-
sphere track would suggest high personnel integration between the SOEs themselves and with 
other government units. This phenomenon may be detrimental to corporate governance because 
the SOEs would be at a higher risk of being managed in a way similar to other government units. 
Nevertheless, the multi-sphere track may create greater elite cohesion through shared career 
experiences among the Chinese political and business leaders, which can facilitate economic 
coordination and policy implementation at the national level.  
The System-Outsider Track. All the career pathways discussed so far meander strictly 
within the boundaries of the state system. Executives travelling on these pathways are system-
insiders, savvy with the operation of the state system. In contrast, system outsiders accumulate 





Unlike system insiders embedded in a closed network, system outsiders have brokerage 
ties of connectivity outside the state system that provide access to new ideas and resources (Burt 
2005). Executives coming from the system-outsider path are institutional brokers importing new 
management knowledge into the SOEs which tend to be trapped in the outdated mentality. The 
participation of system-outsiders into the SOE system may present a good sign of corporate 
governance improvement.  
While system-outsiders can use their brokerage advantages to break into the SOE system 
and win the top management positions, it is uncertain how likely the brokerage advantages can 
overcome their “liability of foreignness” – the competitive disadvantages of foreigners when 
entering into a local system.
 
 China’s SOEs have a strict hierarchy of ranks in employee 
administration which corresponds to the government’s civil service administration. It is a 
persistent tradition albeit several attempts to abolish in the past. A system-outsider’s parachuting 
onto an executive post would disrupt internal promotion expectations based on the administrative 
ranks.  It would cause a legitimacy problem when diverging from the institutionalized 
expectations. Moreover, system-outsiders often lack local personal connections such as guanxi to 
gain access to job information and opportunities of the state-affiliated organizations. As a result, 
system-outsiders may need to build up outstanding external reputation in professionalism in 
order to overcome their liability of foreignness.  
SASAC’s marketization reform of the SOE executive labor market is expected to recruit 
more executives from the system-outsider path, particularly in industries where competition 
depends on innovation and efficiency. Competition pressures may increase the likelihood of 
breaking conformity with the old recruitment practices and adopting new strategies (Oliver 1992). 




industries of critical national security. Given competition pressures and security concerns, the 
Chinese SOEs that are likely to embrace system-outsiders tend to be in industries relatively open 
to the private sector such as steel, automobile manufacturing and light industries.  
3.3.2 Post-CEO Status 
The government’s executive recruitment guidelines set forth not only criteria in selecting 
SOE executive candidates but also standards for removing executives. The grounds for dismissal 
include, for example, failure to meet performance targets in the absence of objective causes, 
reaching mandatory retirement age, having health problems, serious violation of law such as 
corruption, or an undertaking of other job responsibilities.
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  The dismissal standards raise 
questions about post-CEO career development, which is an important dimension of the executive 
personnel system.  For instance, what types of CEOs are more likely to step down due to legal 
liabilities?  Is there any path dependent effect – i.e. staying in the same pathway after the CEO 
post – in the executive training system of China’s SOEs?  The existence of path dependent 
effects signals some predictability in how the state-owner manages its top managers while the 
non-existence increases the complexity of understanding the executive training system.  
As explained previously, CEOs of the single-group track have firm-specific knowledge 
and insider social connections. The intellectual and social capital can help managers secure not 
only the CEO position but also other leadership positions such as the chairman of the board in 
the same group. Thus, the single-group CEOs may be more likely to stay in the same group as 
they leave the CEO position. If so, there is a path dependent effect in the single-group track on 
later career development. Similarly, the multi-group track and the unrelated-government-units 
track may also have path dependent effects as the CEOs of these types possess intellectual and 
social capital across multiple groups or spheres and thus have advantages in moving across 
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spheres in the government system. The path dependent effect may also happen in the supervisory 
track. However, since CEOs of the supervisory track tend to be senior in age, retirement would 
be another common career outcome.  
The post-CEO status of the system-outsider track is uncertain. It may depend on how 
well the system-outsider survives in the state system. Anecdotal evidence suggests system-
outsider managers often leave the SOEs very soon due to poor acclimation to the state system. 
When system-outsiders often quickly retreat from the SOE system, it poses a great challenge to 
SOE governance improvement through relying on external human resources. 
Finally, in addition to staying in the same path or switching to a different trajectory, the 
post-CEO career development can be disrupted and miserable. As discussed in Section 3.2, 
corruption control is a major theme in the executive reform schemes. The Chinese party-state has 
the power not only to promote the CEOs to other higher positions in the government system but 
also even to punish them to death through its judiciary machinery. While the probability of 
ending up in jail seems low, it remains quite real as evidenced in a number of recent cases where 
high-profile executives of China’s leading SOEs were ousted and faced with serious criminal 
liabilities related to their executive duties.  A prominent case, for example, is Mr. Tonghai Chen, 
the ex-CEO of Sinopec Group, was sentenced to death penalty for corruption in 2009.  
Because career outcomes are often an accumulation of previous experiences, CEOs coming 
to power through different career pathways may be at different risks of criminal behavior such as 
corruption. For example, an intuitive concern of corporate governance is that the unrelated-
government-units track may be more likely to have corrupt CEOs due to their more politics-
tainted backgrounds and little business management experience. Unlike the unrelated-




problematic. But it does not necessarily mean the single-group track would be immune to or at a 
lower risk of corruption because this track may have the problem of excessive authority 
concentration and power abuse especially when there is no effective internal monitoring 
mechanism such as the board of directors. 
3.4 Data and Methods 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 above propose the potential change patterns under the executive 
recruitment reform policies. But as always in China, formal institutional reforms do not 
guarantee actual changes. To assess the real development of China’s SOE executive recruitment 
under the institutional reforms, this chapter examines the CEO biographic backgrounds of the 
SOEs among the largest 500 companies (by revenues) in China, according the annual ranking of 
the China Enterprise Confederation and China Enterprise Directors Association. More than 60% 
of the largest 500 companies in China are SOEs. An advantage of this ranking is it takes into 
account the fact that large enterprises in China are organized as business groups in which core 
companies control a large number of subsidiaries including listed firms. The CEOs of the core 
companies in the large state-owned business groups are the focus of this chapter.  In order to 
track the effects of the institutional reforms over the past decade, this chapter examines three 
data years (i.e. 2002, 2005, and 2010) spanning before and after major reform measures.
 
The 
CEO biographic information is manually collected from multiple sources including corporate 
prospectuses, annual reports, corporate websites, government documents and websites, industrial 
association websites, and news reports.  After excluding missing data, the sample size of CEO 
biographical profiles is 272 in 2002, 274 in 2005 and 273 in 2010.
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 The total sample includes 
612 distinct CEO profiles. 
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This chapter first analyzes descriptive data to show whether the educational, political and 
career pathway attributes have changed since 2002. The main attributes are as follows: (1) 
educational attributes: alumni of Tsinghua University (China’s best university in engineering), 
alumni of C9 League (a.k.a. China’s Ivy League),
55
 engineering degree, graduate degree and 
foreign degree; (2) political attributes: membership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), age 
when joining in CPC, membership in the National Congress, Consultative Assembly, or CPC 
Congress; (3) career attributes: age of becoming the CEO, starting job title in career, types of 
career pathways, tenure and status after the CEO tenure. When constructing the career pathways, 
this chapter uses organizations as the basic units to build a sequence and then categorizes the 
sequence according to the career pathway typology defined in Section 3.3.1. The basic 
organization units include the core company of the concerning business group (coded as “core”), 
a subsidiary of the concerning business group (coded as “sub”), an unaffiliated SOE to the 
concerning business group (coded as “soe”), a supervisory bureau related to the industry matters 
of the concerning business group (coded as “super”), other government units (coded as “gov”), 
and a private company (coded as “prv”). All the sequences always end with “core” as the 
subjects are CEOs of the core companies of the state-owned business groups. With this coding 
method, for example, if a sequence is sub/sub/core (meaning moving from a subsidiary to 
another subsidiary then to the core company), the sequence belongs to the single-group track. A 
sequence of soe/sub/core is an example of the multi-group track; a sequence of super/core 
belongs to the supervisory track; a sequence of gov/gov/core is an example of the unrelated-
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government-units track; a sequence of gov/soe/super/core is an example of the multi-sphere track; 
a sequence of prv/sub/core is an example of the system-outsider track, and so forth.          
Second, for each data year, this chapter uses ordinary least squared regression to analyze 
how certain personal and organizational attributes affect career attainment.  Among many 
possible ways of measuring career attainment, this chapter uses age when appointed as the CEO 
(i.e. time to the top of the corporate hierarchy) as the dependent variable. This measure allows 
quantitative analysis and comparison with existing findings in the Western context (Hamori & 
Karaika 2009).  The personal attributes are focused on career pathways and educational 
backgrounds. Types of career pathways as one of the independent variables are measured as 
dummy variables with the single-group track as the reference category.  Educational credentials 
are measured as dummy variables, respectively, of whether the executive is a graduate of C9 
League (yes=1), whether the executive has an engineering degree, (yes=1), a graduate degree 
(yes=1), and a foreign degree (yes=1).  
In addition to personal factors, different organizational environments may affect career 
outcomes. Some China’s large SOEs recently have started to experiment with launching the 
board of directors as a device to monitor executives, though there is great doubt about the 
effectiveness of the board. This chapter tests whether SOEs having established the board of 
directors may be more active in reform and thus more likely to have younger CEOs, who tend to 
be less constrained by old traditions. This chapter includes whether the SOE has a board of 
directors as a dummy variable to take account into this effect.  Moreover, considered that SOEs 
owned by the central government tend to have national importance in the economy and thus have 
stricter standards in executive quality than SOEs owned by local governments, this chapter 




variables, firm revenues and assets are included to control for firm size, the number of 
employees to control for the internal labor market size, and return on assets for profitability.  
Third, in order to get a more complete picture of the executive training system, this 
chapter uses logistic regression models to examine how personal and organizational attributes 
affect the post-CEO status. The sample size with missing data excluded is 232 CEOs who left 
office during the period of examination.
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  The dependent variables are five types of immediate 
post-CEO statuses: (1) the chairman/director/other executive of the same business group; (2) a 
director/executive of other business groups; (3) a senior official in other government units; (4) a 
convicted prisoner; or (5) an inactive retiree/decedent.  The independent and control variables are 
similar to those used in the previous models testing the effects on age of career attainment. This 
chapter is particularly interested to see how the incoming career pathways affect the post-CEO 
status, such as whether there is a path dependent effect and which career pathway is more likely 
to produce a CEO ending up in jail. For educational backgrounds, this chapter examines whether 
better educational credentials such as graduate or foreign education would be associated with 
certain post-CEO career outcomes.  For organizational attributes, this chapter is particularly 
focused on the effects of the board of directors on the post-CEO status, such as whether SOEs 
having the board of directors are less likely to have CEOs stepping down in criminal disgrace. 
Fourth, this chapter examines the correlation between the executive career pathways and 
corporate performance.  The dependent variables are ROA and ROS in 2002, 2005 and 2010. 
The independent variables are executive career pathways and educational backgrounds, same as 
those explained previously. In addition, a number of control variables are included. Since CEOs 
with a good track of records are more likely to be retained, years in the CEO position is included 
as a control variable. The board of directors is included as a control variable as it may improve 
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performance. The (log) number of employees is to account for firm size. Finally, prior-year 
performance as the lagged dependent variable is to control for the effect of past performance on 





3.5 Results and Analysis 
3.5.1 Descriptive CEO Attributes 
[Table 16] summarizes the descriptive attributes and change patterns in education, 
political affiliation and career pathways from 2002 to 2010. 
[Table 16] 
CEO Attributes of Large State-Owned Non-Financial Enterprises in China, 2002-2010 
 2002 2005 2010 
General Attributes    
               Male 96.7% 96.4% 97.4% 
               Main Birth Place (i.e. Shandong Province) 13% (N=185) 14.1% (N=206) 11.5% (N=182) 
Educational Attributes    
               Graduate Degree 37.5% 49.3% 57.1% 
               Foreign Degree 2.9% 3.3% 4.4% 
               Tsinghua University 2.9% 2.9% 5.5% 
               C9 League 15.8% 12.8% 11.4% 
               Engineering 61.8% 62.8% 66.3% 
Political Attributes    
















               Average Age When Joining the Communist Party (CPC) 26.4 (N=51) 25.7 (N=66) 25.3 (N=77) 
               Member of National Congress, National Consultative Assembly, or CPC National Congressa 8.1% 11.7% 19.4% 
Career Attributes     
               Average Age When Becoming CEO 46.4 46.3 46.8 
               Main Starting Position Title (“Technician”) 36.1% (N=158) 33.5% (N=170) 27.8% (N=169) 
               Career Pathways    
                         1.  Single-Group Track 52.9% 56.2% 52% 
                         2. Multi-Group Track 23.5% 22.6% 24.2% 
                         3. Supervisory-Bureau Track 15.8% 9.1% 12.1% 
                         4. Unrelated-Government Unit Track 3.7% 2.9% 2.2% 
                         5. Multi-Sphere Track 4% 9.1% 9.2% 
                         6. System-Outsider Track   0% 0% .4% 
               Tenure 8.8 8.1 NAc 
               Status After CEO Positionb   NAc 
1. Chairman/Director/Executive of the Group 27.8% 23.4%  
2. Senior Government Official (e.g., Minister, Governor, Committee Member) 9.2% 4.7%  
3. Director/CEO/Senior Manager of other Groups 5.9% 6.6%   
4. Convicted Prisoner 4% 2.6%  
5. Still CEO of the Group 15.8% 39.1%  
6. Inactive Retiree/Decedent 13.6% 6.6%  
7. Unknown 23.9% 17.2%  
N (Default, if not specified otherwise) 272 274 273 
a    
The membership is counted as whether the CEO was a member of the legislative bodies of that year. 
b 
  The post-CEO status was tracked till October 2011. 
c    






Educational Attributes. The data show improvement in educational credentials since 
2002, which lends support to the view that the professionalism reforms can easily take place in 
the educational dimension. The percentage of the CEOs with a graduate degree significantly 
increased to 57.1% in 2010 from 37.5% in 2002. The percentage of the CEOs with a foreign 
degree also rose, albeit only slightly, to 4.4% in 2010. Those with foreign study experience 
usually received their degrees from academic institutes in the United States.   
As to the academic discipline, surprisingly rather than on a decline, more than 60% of the 
CEOs were still trained in engineering. The dominance of engineering-trained CEOs is an 
outcome of China’s industrial structure and political history. The Chinese government has been 
aggressively seeking technological upgrades to move up the value chain. The technological 
catch-up cannot be achieved by financial or marketing management. Moreover, when China’s 
education was battered by the tempests of Maoism, engineering was a politically safer field of 
study than most. The supply of talents therefore was more from the field of engineering. 
As to the elite school education, while the number of the CEOs who graduated from C9 
League declined to 11.4% in 2010 from 15.8% in 2002, the Tsinghua alumni network expanded, 
accounting for 5.5% in 2010. The elite school network has shrunk and become more 
concentrated in the leading engineering school in China.  
Political Attributes. Regarding political membership, the data show that at least more 
than 80% of the CEOs are members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This number is 
significantly higher than the overall employee party membership rate (around 30%) throughout 
the SOE corporate hierarchy.
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 While one may interpret the CCP membership rate is on the 
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decline, it is likely an incorrect interpretation given the increase in unknown/missing data.
58
 The 
CCP-affiliated executives joined the Party at a quite early age, around 25-26. It suggests an early 
pledge of political loyalty is helpful for later-on career development in the state system. Early 
party membership signals a higher degree of political commitment and also allows a prolonged 
course of scrutiny, cultivation and training, which thus increases the likelihood of subsequent 
promotion into elite positions (Li & Walder 2001). While most of the CEOs were CCP members, 
a very minimal number of the CEOs were affiliated with another political party in China, i.e. 
China National Democratic Construction Association, an ally of the CCP. The marginal 
representation of non-CPC party members in the SOE elite adds more symbolic than real 
importance of political diversity in the SOE system, just like in China’s political system.   
In addition to the predominance of CCP affiliation, the executive personnel integration 
into the China’s political system seems to be on the rise. The Chinese government has an 
institutionalized practice in selecting top managers into its representative national political 
bodies including National People’s Congress (the government’s symbolic legislative body), the 
National People’s Political Consultative Conference (an advisory body composed of 
representatives of different social and political groups) and the National Congress of CCP (the 
Party’s general assembly). While usually lack of substantive power, memberships in such 
political bodies represent a social status or a mark of legitimacy recognized by the party-state.  
The data show that the number of CEOs who were members of these national political bodies 
increased from 8.1% in 2002 to 19.4% in 2010. The increased representation suggests the 
growing importance of the SOEs in China’s national political system, but it also deepens the 
concern about the SOE management autonomy in terms of corporate governance. Overall, the 
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political attributes here confirm that political loyalty to the CCP remains a paramount 
requirement and personnel integration into the national political bodies continues to rise despite 
the professionalization and marketization reforms.  
Career Attributes. On average, the CEOs came to power when they were around 46 years 
old. “Technician” has been the most common initial job title in the CEOs’ careers, though it has 
declined from 35% in 2002 to 27.2% in 2010 due to more diversity in job titles.  This 
observation is closely related to their educational training, mainly in the engineering discipline.  
In respect of career pathways, the single-group track has constantly been the mainstream 
path. More than 50% of the CEOs came to power through climbing the corporate ladder.  The 
stable majority of the single-group track CEOs suggests that firm-specific knowledge is valued 
in China’s SOE management and insider connections are helpful to secure CEOs positions.  
Moreover, as many of the state-owned business groups were historically transformed from 
grouping SOEs along the hierarchical administrative chains, the prevalence of the single-group 
track may imply the pre-reform promotion logic following the administrative ranks remains in 
play. The second most common career pathway is the multi-group track, making up for more 
than 20%. The single-group and the multi-group tracks combined account for more than 75% of 
the sample observations. In other words, most of the CEOs developed their careers completely 
within the SOE system rather than moving around in different government spheres. It suggests 
that party-state maintains a certain degree of separation in human resources training between the 
political and business spheres within the state system.   
The supervisory-bureau track is the next popular pathway, followed by the multi-sphere 
track and the unrelated-government-units track. Note that there is only a marginal and declining 




the party-state does not favor executive candidates who are unfamiliar with the business matters 
of the SOE, which is consistent with its professionalization reform rules.  
None of the CEOs in 2002 and 2005 followed the system-outsider track. A sign of change 
emerged in 2010 however. There was one CEO coming to power through the system-outsider 
track; that was, Mr. Dazong Wang, the CEO of Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation, a SOE 
under Beijing SASAC’s supervision.  After completing his PhD from Cornell University, Mr. 
Wang joined General Motors (GM) and swiftly worked his way up to the top-level position 
(Senior Staff) of engineering design in GM. After working at GM for 21 years, Mr. Wang joined 
as a vice president of SAIC Motor Corp., a publicly traded subsidiary of Shanghai Automotive 
Industry Group, a SOE owned by the Shanghai SASAC. Less than two years of office in SAIC 
Motor Corp, in 2008 Mr. Wang parachuted onto the CEO position of Beijing Automotive 
Industry Corporation, a SOE under the Beijing SASAC’s supervision. Several implications are 
noteworthy from this case. First, this case happened in the automobile industry, an industry not 
monopolized by the state but relatively open to the private sector and foreign companies. 
Consistent with the expectation in Section 3.3.1, competition pressure in the non-monopoly 
industry can drive SOEs to recruit system-outsiders to improve innovation capacity. Second, it is 
a local rather than central SOE that took the initiative to embrace a system-outsider. A partial 
explanation is the central SOEs are usually of national security importance and thus less open to 
system-outsiders. It also reflects a typical institutional reform pattern in China – starting from the 
local. Third, the details of this case provide insights into what incentivizes a system-outsider to 
join SOEs and by which mechanism a system-outsider can break into the state system. As Mr. 




role in his decision of joining the SOE system.
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 His internal aspirations were realized with the 
help of external opportunities. As General Motors sought rapid expansion in China, Mr. Wang 
seized the opportunity of transferring to a GM’s joint venture in China and worked there for 
three years until 1997. During his work in China, he got acquainted with the then vice president 
(Mr. Maoyuan Hu) of Shanghai Automotive Industry Group and thereafter kept contacts with Mr. 
Hu. This social connection paved his way into the Chinese SOE system.
 
 Mr. Wang’s experience 
indicates system-insiders’ endorsement is very helpful to system-outsiders’ entry into the state 
system, which supports the common finding that personal connections (quanxi) play an 
important role in the Chinese government system (Walder 1995, Bian 1999). 
Next, [Table 16] shows that the average tenure is about 8 years. Since the CEOs on 
average came to power around 46 years old, they were only in their mid-50s at the end of the 
CEO tenure, an age still capable of active work. Thus, it raises a question about where they 
would go after the CEO tenure.  [Table 16] shows that about a quarter of the CEOs in 2002 and 
2005 followed the so-called “apprentice model” in which the CEOs were promoted to the 
chairman, director or other executive positions of the same business group. The apprentice model 
allows the CEOs to continue contributing their firm-specific knowledge and to guide their 
successors before transitioning to retirement. 
A featured post-CEO status is transfers to other government units, usually as ministers, 
governors, or government committee members. But this post-CEO career status seems to be on 
                                                          
59
 A detailed interview reported in Qicheren (Autobots, a magazine of China’s automobile industry), Nov. 2008 
(reporting Mr. Wang’s explanation : “A man should not forget his own roots. A man who does not know his own 
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the decline, down from 9.2% in 2002 to 4.7% in 2005. Close to 6% of the CEOs took up senior 
manager positions in other business groups, which suggests the government’s personnel rotation 
practice is at work in post-CEO careers. 
As SASAC’s executive recruitment reform rules repetitively emphasize executives’ 
moral integrity, the post-CEO status shows how many CEOs ended up in jail on charges related 
to their executive positions and duties.  The data show that 4% of the CEOs in 2002 and 2.6% in 
2005 were faced with criminal liabilities in relation to their executive duties. The typical criminal 
charges were corruption and embezzlement. The decline in criminal convictions seems to 
suggest some improvement in moral integrity, albeit inconclusively because many factors such 
as politics could affect the prosecution probabilities in China.  As most of the executives are 
party members, their criminal conduct often would be resolved by the Party’s internal 
investigation and sanction without proceeding to the criminal law stage (Sapio 2010). 
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Moreover, while there were a number of CEOs held liable for corruption or embezzlement under 
the Chinese criminal law, none of the CEOs in the dataset ever became defendants in litigations 
involving breach of fiduciary duties under the Chinese company law. The Chinese government 
as the controlling shareholder seems to govern the top managers in a way similar to government 
bureaucrats, who are subject to liabilities under public law such as criminal law.  
As of the end of data tracking, 15.8% of the CEOs in 2002 and 39.1% in 2005 were still 
in office. Finally, at least 13.6% in 2002 and 6.2% in 2005 were identified as inactive retirees or 
decedents while 23.9% in 2002 and 17.2% in 2005 were with unknown post-CEO status. The 
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unknown status is due to the fact that biographical information tends to become obscure when 
the CEOs left office, especially for those without moving to prominent positions.  
3.5.2 Executive Attributes in Comparative Perspective 
How are the CEOs of the Chinese large SOEs different from corporate executives in 
other countries? Based on the descriptive findings in [Table 17], this section compares Chinese 
SOE CEOs with executives of the archetype countries in comparative capitalism and 
comparative corporate governance literatures, including France of the state activism camp, Japan 
and Germany of the coordinated market and stakeholder-oriented model, and the UK and US of 
the liberal market and shareholder-oriented model (Hall & Soskice 2001, Schmidt 2003).  [Table 






Executive Attributes in Comparative Perspective 
 State Activism Coordinated Market / Stakeholder 
Oriented 
Liberal Market / Shareholder-Oriented 
China (SOEs only) France Japan Germany UK USA 
Education 
Attributes 
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(More than 50% in 
1998 down to 38% in 
2005) 
Low-Moderate Low Low Low 
Approximate Age 
of Appointment  
Mid-Late 40s Early 50s Mid-Late 50s Early 50s Early 50s Early 50s 
Average Tenure 
 
About 8 years , 
with a declining 
trend 
 
About 8 years (as of 
2011) 
About 6 years in 
2007, down from 8 
years in 1995 
About 8 years, with a 
declining trend down 
from 12 years in 
1980  
About 6-7 years 
(as of 2011) down 
from 9.6 in 1995 
 About 8 years 
down from 10 
years from 2010. 
Apprenticeship  
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Data on France from Vivien A. Schmidt, Vivien A, A Profile of the French CEO, 35 INT’L EXECUTIVE 413 (1993); Taeyoung Yoo and Soo Hee Lee, In Search of Social 
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 [Table 17] shows that CEOs of the state activism and the stakeholder-oriented models are 




business-related disciplines. The dominance of engineering-trained CEOs is most salient in 
China and Germany. With respect to the alumni network, China and Germany both are on the 
low end of elite school concentration while France and Japan are on the high end, with US and 
UK in between.  
As to career pathways, the prevailing career route in China, Japan, and Germany is 
climbing the corporate ladder to the top within a single-business group while the popular career 
track in UK and US is to follow an external labor market strategy. In France, government work 
experience is quite common: a significant number of CEOs started their careers in the public 
sector before transferring to the corporate sector. In Japan, while many executives follow the so-
called amakudari career pathway, most of them do not assume CEO positions. It seems that the 
CEOs of China’s SOEs are closest to French CEOs in terms of their career connections with the 
government.    
As to the average age of appointment, the CEOs of China’s SOEs come to power at a 
younger age (around 46 years old) than CEOs in the other countries, usually in their 50s.  This 
junior CEO phenomenon in China is consistent with the party-state’s executive 
professionalization agenda – intentionally to recruit young executives, who are more enthusiastic 
and less constrained by old traditions.  But there is no sharp difference in terms of tenure, 
currently in the range of 6-8 years with a trend of shortening in length. Finally, unlike Japan and 
US where outgoing CEOs are commonly appointed as the chairman of the same company, China 
only moderately uses the apprentice model in training and guiding CEOs, somewhat similar to 
the European counterparts. The moderate use of the apprentice model in China may be partially 




Overall, [Table 17] shows the CEOs of China’s large SOEs bear a resemblance to 
executives in countries of the stakeholder-oriented model and the state activism camp, though the 
resemblance is probably formed by different underlying historical or political forces.  The CEOs 
of China’s SOEs are least like the executives of the shareholder-oriented model. The Chinese 
CEOs share many similar attributes particularly with German CEOs while having the least in 
common with UK and US counterparts. This comparison clearly places China far outside the 





3.5.3 How Do Personal and Organizational Attributes Affect Age of Attainment? 
[Table18] shows the results about how certain personal and organizational attributes are 
associated with age of reaching the CEO position in the period of 2002-2010.   
[Table 18]  
OLS Regression Analysis of Executive Career Pathways and Age of Attainment, 2002-2010 
 Dependent Variable: Age When Becoming the CEO 
 2002 2005 2010 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Career Pathways       
1. Single-Group Track 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------Omitted as Reference Category-------------------------------------------------- 
























































6. System-Outsider Tracka 
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Observations 272 263 274 272 273 270 
Adjusted R-squared .122 .284 .049 .157 .145 .250 
The table presents unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance Level: † p<.1  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
a The system-outsider category is omitted for the years of 2002 and 2005 because there is no observation falling into this category 
 
 
While the distribution of the types of career pathways in [Table 16] is quite stable over 
the period of investigation, [Table 18] shows that the nature of the career pathways has changed 
in terms of age of career attainment. Models 1-2 show the results of 2001, with Model 2 as the 
full model including all the independent and control variables. Model 2 shows that in 2001 CEOs 




at the time of appointment than CEOs through the single-group pathway, and CEOs via the 
multi-group, unrelated-government-units and the multi-sphere pathways were older as well, 
albeit not statistically significant.  
Models 3-4 show the results of 2005, with Model 4 as the full model. Models 3-4 both 
show that in 2005 the single-group career CEOs reached the executive position at a younger age 
compared to the CEOs of all other types of career pathways, but the result for the multi-group 
and the unrelated-government-units pathways are not significant. The trend became clearer in 
2010, as shown in Models 5-6. Both the models show that CEOs coming to power through the 
single-group pathway were significantly younger than CEOs of all other types of career 
pathways. Among all the types, the system-outsiders were the oldest (b=11.465, p<.001 in Model 
6) when ascending to power. The results lend support to the hypothesis that system-outsiders 
need to have established external reputation and high professional status, usually already senior 
in age, to overcome their liability of foreignness when entering into the state system.    
Note that the CEOs of the supervisory-bureau track were constantly older as they landed 
on the executive position, which can be explained by the retirement strategy as discussed in 
Section 3.3.1.  
Overall, the career pathway results suggest that firm-specific knowledge and insider 
social networks have become significantly valuable for executive career attainment in China’s 
SOEs.  [Table 18] shows a career trend converging to the findings in the Western counterparts. 
Scholars found that in Europe and in the United States, CEOs with in-house careers spent 
significantly less time to the top compared to those adopting external labor market strategies 




Regarding the value of education, [Table 18] shows that elite school attendance was not a 
significant factor in age of career attainment. Neither was an engineering degree a significant 
factor (Models 2, 4, 6). The 2002 data suggest having a graduate degree was helpful to reaching 
the CEO positions at a younger age, but the 2005 and 2010 data indicate a weakening of that 
advantage. This could be because the value of graduate degrees has diminished as more and 
more executive candidates have such degrees.  This could also be because pursuing a graduate 
degree postponed the entry into the workforce or distracted energy from work and thus delayed 
promotions. Foreign education does not accelerate to the CEO position in 2002 but it seems help 
in 2010 (b=-2.364, p<.1).    
For organizational variables, while the board of directors has been advocated as an 
important governance reform of China’s SOEs, [Table 18] shows that the board of directors 
plays an insignificant role in affecting age of executive appointment (Models 2,4,6). This finding 
lends some support to the common observation that the real player on the stage of Chinese SOE 
governance is the Party in the shadow rather than the corporate board in the light.  
Moreover, [Table 18] shows that executives of the SOEs owned by the central 
government tend to reach the CEO position at an older age compared to those of the SOEs 
owned by the local governments, though the result is significant only for 2002 (b=2.973, p<.05). 
An institutional explanation for this finding is the executive positions of the central SOEs have a 
higher status in the administrative system and thus it takes longer time to reach the higher 
positions.  
For control variables,  [Table 18] shows that CEOs of the SOEs with larger numbers of 




competition in the internal labor market.  Other organizational variables including revenues and 
return on assets do not present statistically significant effects on the executive appointment age. 
3.5.4 How Do Personal and Organizational Attributes Affect the Post-CEO Status? 
[Table 19] shows the effects of personal and organizational attributes on the post-CEO 
status. The questions of concern here are whether there is a path dependent effect in post-CEO 
career development and what attributes are important in predicting having a criminally convicted 
CEO at the end.  
 [Table 19]  
Logistic Regression Analysis of Post-CEO Status, 2002-2010 
 Post-CEO Career Status 
 Chairman/Director/Executive 
 of the Same Group 
Director/Executive of 
Other Groups 
Senior Government Official Convicted Prisoner Inactive Retirees/Decedent  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Career Pathways           
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Organizational Variables           




























































Life course control           












































Observations 232 229 232 229 232 229 232 229 232 229 




















p-value .000 .000 .000 .002 .186 .019 .088 .022 .000 .000 
The table presents unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance Level: † p<.1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  





 The career pathway variable shows that there is no clear path dependent effect in the 
post-CEO career development. CEOs of the single-group track are not statistically significantly 
more likely to stay in the same group (Models 1 and 2). Meanwhile, CEOs of the multi-group 
group are not significantly more likely to transfer to other groups (Models 3 and 4). Similarly, 
CEOs who had work experience in other government units are not significantly more likely to 
return to government bureaus (Models 5 and 6).  The lack of clear path dependent effects 
suggests the complexity and unpredictability in the elite training system.    
 An interesting finding about the association between the incoming career pathway and 
the outgoing career status might be CEOs of the unrelated-government-units track are less likely 
to be subject to criminal charges at the end of the CEO position, though the results are not 
statistically significant (Models 7 and 8). This finding may be interpreted in two ways. On the 
one hand, it might relieve a common concern that such type of CEOs are more likely to 
mismanage corporate governance and incur criminal liability for corruption because they have 
more politics-tainted backgrounds and little business experience. On the other hand, this finding 
could suggest that CEOs of the unrelated-government-units track might be simply more politics-
savvy in managing their careers in the state system and have more political resources to get away 
from legal liabilities, which is not a good sign for corporate governance.  Finally, this Article 
does not find CEOs of the supervisory-bureau track tend to transition to inactive retirees after the 
CEO tenure, which does not support the hypothesis in Section 3.3.2.  
 For educational attributes, [Table 19] shows that CEOs who graduated from the elite 
schools are more likely to stay in the same group (Models 1 and 2) and less likely to end up in 
prison (Model 8, b= 16.387). Engineering-trained CEOs are also less likely to be criminally 




also less likely to be criminally convicted after the CEO tenure, though the result is not 
significant. Foreign-educated CEOs are more likely to transfer to positions in other business 
groups (Models 3 and 4) while less likely to commit crimes such as corruption (Models 7 and 8). 
In general, [Table 19] shows that better education is negatively associated with the likelihood of 
having a criminally-liable CEO at the end. Improvement in executive educational credentials 
may be a good sign for the quality of leadership. 
 As to organizational variables, CEOs in the SOEs which have set up the board of 
directors are more likely to assume the chairman, director or other executive positions in the 
same business group (b=1.234, p<.01). The result is unsurprising given that the transition to the 
chairman or director position is only possible when a board exists in the group.  Moreover, the 
presence of the board of directors reduces the likelihood of becoming a senior official in 
government bureaus (b= -1.032, p<.05), which suggests the board might play role in untangling 
political connections. However, the board of directors fails to play an effective role in reducing 
the likelihood of (outrageous) executive criminal behavior (b= .739). This finding suggests the 
monitoring function of the board of directors is not properly at work.  [Table 19] also shows that 
CEOs of the central SOEs are less likely to transfer to government bureaus after tenure, 
compared to CEOs of the local ones (b= -1.398, p<.05). The post-CEO personnel integration 
between the SOEs and other government units seems higher at the local than the central level.    
 Finally, for control variables, neither the size of revenues nor return on assets is an 
insignificant factor in predicting the post-CEO status. The number of employees is significantly 
and positively associated with the government official status but not with other post-CEO 





3.5.5 Executive Attributes and Firm Performance 
[Table 20] shows that SOEs with CEOs of the unrelated-government-unit pathway have 
the worst performance in ROA and ROS, compared with SOEs with CEOs of other types. The 
results are statistically significant for ROA albeit generally not significant for ROS. It suggests 
political career CEOs do not help corporate performance. Note that the system-outsider track has 
the best performance among all other types (Model 5, b=4.228, p<.01; Model 6, b=1.055; Model 
11, b=2.473; Model 12, b=1.691, p<.05), which indicates that outsiders may bring new 
management knowledge to improve firm efficiency.   
[Table 20]  
Executive Attributes and Firm Performance 
 Performance 
 ROA ROS 
 2002 2002 2005 2005 2010 2010 2002 2002 2005 2005 2010 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CEO Individual Attributes             
Career Pathways             














































































4 Unrelated-Gov.-Units Track 
             


























6 System-Outsider Track※ 
 











































































































































Organizational Attributes             
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Observations 226 224 273 272 271 261 228 226 273 272 271 261 
R-squared .074 .451 .053 .802 .071 .770 .047 .598 .027 .863 .021 .722 
The table presents unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+ p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 




[Table 20] also shows that SOEs with a long-tenure CEO have better performance, 
especially for ROA. The finding supports the hypothesis that well-performing CEOs are likely to 
be retained and continue deliver good performance.   
While the establishment of the board of directors is regarded as an important reform to 
improve corporate governance, the results in [Table 20] do not promise a positive effect on firm 
performance.  Central government ownership and employment size are insignificant factors for 
corporate performance. Finally, prior year performance is significantly associated with present 
year performance.  The regression models in [Table 20] do not have the problem of 
heteroscedasticity.    
3.6 Implications 
This chapter shows the executive recruitment of China’s large SOEs is oriented toward 
politically-bounded and firm-specific knowledge professsionalism as well as potential bottom-up 
and competition-driven marketization. It also shows a convergence toward Western findings 
where the single-group pathway abundant with firm-specific knowledge and insider social 
connections is emerging as an advantageous route in executive career attainment. Moreover, this 
chapter shows the complexity of the Chinese elite training system, where there is no clear path 
dependent effect on the post-CEO status and there is no conclusively bad association between 
political career experience and executive criminal liabilities. This chapter also finds little 
evidence that the board of directors of China’s SOEs plays any significant role in affecting 
executive career development or avoiding serious executive criminal behavior.  Finally, this 
chapter shows SOEs with political career CEOs tend to have worst performance. Based on the 




challenges posed to China’s SOEs particularly through the lens of social network theory, and the 
directions for future research.  
3.6.1 Legal Implications for the International Capital Market 
SOEs, not just from China but many other emerging markets, have become important 
international investors.
  
As of the end of 2010, there were at least 650 state-owned transnational 
companies controlling more than 8,500 foreign affiliates across the globe. While relatively small 
in number (less than 1% of all transnational companies), their foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
substantial, reaching roughly 11% of global FDI flows in 2010 (UNCTAD 2011).  The global 
expansion of SOEs raises questions to international investors and regulators about the adequacy 
of existing rules and enforcement in dealing with this new type of companies.   
Judging by current international securities standards, do Chinese SOEs’ corporate 
disclosures to international investors provide an adequate and accurate depiction of their actual 
governance practices? Chinese SOEs always in their corporate disclosures significantly 
downplay their connections to the Chinese government and its ruling political party. The role of 
the government is very often condensed in one simple sentence -- the company is owned by the 
State, and the role of the Chinese Communist Party is virtually never mentioned.  Chinese SOEs 
rarely disclose in their prospectuses or annual reports the top managers’ membership in the Party 
and their affiliation with the national representative political bodies. The executive biographies 
in such disclosures are focused on business experiences but void of political backgrounds, 
intentionally making the top executive look similar to their Western counterparts.  Also, they 
never disclose the fact that the appointment power is actually with the Chinese Communist Party 
not the board of directors. Furthermore, there is no disclosure that the top managers are 




other government units. In short, a significant amount of material information is omitted or 
misrepresented. While the lack of adequate disclosure is mainly a result of the secretive culture 
of the Chinese government, it is also an outcome partly of calculated advice by Western 
investment bankers, law firms and accounting firms to make Chinese SOEs attractive to 
international investors (McGregor 2010, Walter & Howie 2003) and international securities 
regulators’ generally loose enforcement against foreign companies, regardless of state-owned 
companies or not (Siegel 2005). 
With the global expansion of SOEs, international regulators are now often considering 
how to appropriately define and identify an SOE under relevant laws, particularly in the regime 
of anti-trust and foreign investment laws.  The findings in this chapter provide an additional and 
tangible way of how to identity a SOE. While over the past decade the Chinese government has 
reduced its ownership stake in many SOEs, the executive personnel integration with some 
important government organs have been increasing rather than decreasing at the same time. In 
other words, the size of ownership stake alone is an insufficient indicator to precisely judge the 
potential degree of state involvement in the management of SOEs. The executive personnel 
integration with the state system can be an important indicator of evaluating the extent of the 
government involvement as well as corporate investment purposes driven by top managers’ 




3.6.2 Challenges for Corporate Governance Improvement 
The empirical evidence in this chapter shows that the business elite of the Chinese large 
SOEs are a very cohesive group in terms of their educational training, political affiliation and 
career experience. The current executive labor market remains a system-insider’s game. The elite 
cohesion presents advantages and challenges to Chinese corporate governance and national 
economy.   
According to sociologist Ron Burt’s analysis of “brokerage and closure” in social 
structure, while high cohesion can help consensus formation and policy implementation, it runs 
risks of closure, groupthink and lack of creativity (Burt  2007).  Building brokerage ties reaching 
outside the closed system can import new ideas and stimulate innovation.  As competition in the 
global economy has become more dependent on innovation capacity, Chinese SOEs in order to 
gain a competition edge need more inputs of new talents and new management skills. The 
Chinese government seems to be aware of the potential closure problems and thus intends to 
build brokerage ties through opening the executive labor market.  
In the eyes of the Party, neither complete closure nor complete openness is desirable 
because complete closure lacks competitiveness and complete openness runs the risk of losing 
control. It will take time for the Chinese government to learn how to strike a balance between 
closure and openness. The openness of the executive labor market probably will start from 
lower-level managers to high level-managers, from the business groups owned by the local 
governments to those controlled by the central government, from companies faced with fierce 
competition pressure to companies in the monopolized sectors. But the whole process will 




government still takes it as the most important way to continue its control over the large 
enterprises as the government reduces its ownership stakes.  
Moreover, while China’s SOEs have a demand for professionals who are trained outside 
the state system, the executive reform process can be conditioned by the supply side of talents -- 
how system-outsiders are interested in joining the SOEs. According to SASAC officials, it 
happened several times in the past where they extended offers to system-outsiders but the 
candidates declined the offers because the pay was way below the market price.
61
 To handle this 
problem, the Chinese government is experimenting with a dual system in executive 
compensation. Under the dual system, system-insiders as in tradition get a pay unilaterally set by 
SASAC’s evaluation while system-outsiders are paid based on market prices through contract 
negotiation. The latter compensation is usually much higher than the former. It is unclear 
whether such dualism will work well because anecdotal evidence shows that it can brew 
resentment among system insiders.
62
 In addition, the SOE management culture typically tainted 
with political complexities may make system-outsiders shy away from joining the state system. 
As a result, the executive labor market probably will continue to be dominated by system-
insiders for a long time, which increases the risks of perpetuating old practices including 
sidestepping the board of directors in major corporate governance matters. 
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 For example, Mr. Jigang Jiang, the Director of central SASAC’s Second Executive Administration Bureau, 
explained that “In 2005, there was a candidate who studied aboard and worked in a foreign multinational company 
and then transferred to the CEO position of the multinational’s branch in China. The candidate applied for a vice 
CEO position of a central SOE. He passed the written exam and interviews with the highest scores. We really 
wanted to hire him, but the hiring goal was not realized due to compensation gaps. The candidate asked for a pay at 
least on par with his current pay ($200,000 USD). The candidate was very sincere and said he was motivated by 
patriotism and the passion to contribute to the development of central SOEs, so he did not ask for any pay raise but 
hoped to stay on his current level. The deal was eventually killed because the asking pay in fact was equal to the 
total compensation of the other seven top managers of the hiring SOE.” See Beijing News, Forty Percent of the 







TIGHT AND LOOSE CONNECTIONS TO THE FINANCIAL WORLD 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The availability of financial capital is an important factor in corporate growth. Industrial 
firms can use internal and external sources to support capital needs.  Very often industrial firms 
cannot merely rely on internal profits to satisfy their capital demands but extremely need to 
resort to external financial sources.  The relationship between industrial firms and financial 
institutes thus plays a critical role in affecting firm performance and ultimately national 
economic development.  
Existing literature has provided evidence showing industrial firms in major capitalisms 
often build dense and direct ownership and/or directorship relations with financial institutions 
(especially banks) as a means to manage resource dependence and reduce uncertainties. For 
example, the Japanese horizontal post-war keiretsu were bank-centered business groups. In the 
keiretsu’s heyday, the large commercial bank (known as the main bank) as the central actor in 
the business network provided security in financial resources as well as monitoring in 
management through its lending, ownership and board connections with member companies 
(Aoki &1994). But as Japanese industrial firms have had more financing alternatives to bank 
loans, their ties with banks have been unwinding since the past decade (Schaede 2006, Lincoln & 
Shimotani 2010). In the United States, for most part of the twentieth century, commercial banks 
occupied the central position of the interlocking directorship network of the large companies 
(Mizruchi 1982).  But since the late 1980s, the market-based system has overtaken the credit-




interfirm network (Davis & Mizruchi 1999).  The centrality of banks and financial institutions in 
the corporate network can also be found in many advanced and transition economies (Scott 1991 
for a review, Aguilera 1998, Pahor et al. 2004).  
Does the commonly observed phenomenon of bank centrality exist in the corporate 
network of China’s SOEs?  Do Chinese industrial SOEs use ownership and/or personnel ties 
with banks to secure or strengthen access to financial resources?  This chapter shows that there 
are weak and sparse ownership and personnel connections but strong capital flows between the 
financial and non-financial SOEs.  Chinese industrial SOEs do not use straight ownership or 
personnel ties to co-opt financial institutions as commonly found in other capitalist or transition 
regimes. The industrial SOEs’ financial resources are secured through vertical and other hidden 
connections ultimately leading to the party-state. The Chinese SOE network presents party-state 
centrality rather than bank centrality. 
4.2 Weak Ownership Connections 
Banks are the central institutions in China’s financial system (Walter and Howie 2011).  
Prior to 1978, the Chinese banking system comprised only one bank – the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC). In the era of China’s planned economy, the PBOC assumed comprehensive roles 
in the national financial system including managing monetary policy, revenue collection and 
allocation. The modernization of the Chinese banking system began in 1978.  The PBOC 
gradually transformed into China’s central bank and transferred its commercial banking 
functions to subsequently-established big four banks. The big four banks include Bank of China, 
China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China.  In addition to the big four banks, there are twelve second-tier commercial banks and 




there are three policy banks responsible for financing national economic development projects. 
All the three policy banks are directly and wholly-owned by the central government.  
[Figure 13] shows the ownership network of existing sixteen publicly-traded commercial 
banks in China.  Of the 117 national groups under the central SASAC, only 24 groups have an 
ownership stake in these major banks, with an average minority stake of 2.9 percent (median 
=1.3 percent). And of the multi-hundreds of state-owned groups under the local SASACs, only 
14 groups have an ownership connection to these major banks, on average holding a minority 
stake of 4.86 percent (median=1.93 percent).   
[Figure 13]  
Ownership Network of Chinese Major Banks and Industrial SOEs (2012)  
 
 
Source: raw data collected from the top 10 shareholder information published by the16 publicly traded banks (2012). 
The network only reports the banks’ ownership connections with the SOEs under the central and local SASACs’ 







The loose ownership connection between the state-owned industrial groups and the major 
banks is a calculated decision by Chinese policymakers.  Under the Chinese legal system, 
Chinese banks are prohibited from owning stakes in non-banking financial institutions and 
industrial companies while industrial groups are discouraged (albeit legally allowed) from 
holding controlling stakes in banks.
63
 The ownership separation is designed to reduce risks given 
the immature management and regulatory condition both in the financial industry and the state-
owned sector.  
But in recent years, many industrial SOEs have been gradually expanding into the 
financial industry territory, especially by using finance companies as a portal to the financial 
world, as shown in [Figure 14]. The finance companies act as an experimental learning device 
for industrial SOEs to gain know-how of the financial industry. It is a process that gradually 
combines industry and finance. This ownership connection pattern permitted by Chinese 
policymakers essentially reflects the predominant economic reform principles in China – 
experimentalism and gradualism (Woo 1999). 
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[Figure 14]  
State-Owned Finance Companies’ Investment in Financial Institutes (2009) 
 
Source: raw data collected from Almanac of Finance Companies in China (2010). 
Note: There are 31 finance companies (blue triangle nodes) in the graph. If X company has an ownership stake in Y 
company, it is denoted as XY. 
  
4.3 Separate but Cohesive Elite Groups 
Corporate elite networks can facilitate resources flows and promote class cohesion 
(Mizruchi 1996, Useem 1980).  The most studied type of corporate elite networks is formed by 
interlocking directorships  (Koenig and Gogel 1981, Mizruchi 1982, Useem 1984, Mizruchi 1996, 
Kono et al., 1998,  Davis, Yoo, Baker 2003). Existing research shows that there are relatively 
few interlocking directorates among Chinese listed companies and sparse interlocks with 
financial institutions (Ren et al. 2009).  Beyond the listed companies, the core companies of the 
large state-owned business groups also have very few interlocks as many of the core companies 
themselves do not even have a board of directors. At present, interlocking boards do not act as a 




Another important mechanism to form the corporate elite network is through interfirm career 
movements (i.e. career pathways). Interfirm mobility helps mutual understanding in organization 
management and creates social channels to facilitate resource exchanges. Dense career 
connections to the major banks strengthen the industrial SOEs’ access to financial resources 
while sparse connections indicate specialization is an important principle in the elite training 
system and the industrial SOEs reply on other mechanisms to secure financial capital from the 
banks. 
This chapter collects and analyzes data on executive career pathways of the major banks 
to assess the scale of the elite career network across the financial and non-financial SOEs. The 
sample includes 58 unique executive profiles as of 2011 covering the CEOs of the big 4 banks, 
the 12 second-tier banks and 42 third-tier banks.
64
  The bank executive background data are 
manually collected from multiple sources including corporate annual reports, securities 
prospectuses, corporate and government websites. To ensure information reliability, each 
executive career profile is based on at least two information sources.  
A career pathway is constructed as a directed sequence composed of movements across 
organizations. The organizations are categorized into several types based on the nature and status 
of the organization, including: financial regulatory institution, first-tier bank, second-tier bank, 
third-tier bank, foreign bank, industrial SOE, academic institution, other government bureau, and 
other financial institution. Each CEO has his/her own organizational sequence (e.g., People’s 
Bank of China (financial regulatory institution) Bank of China (first-tier bank)  Bank of 
Shanghai (second-tier bank)). Using social network analysis, all the career pathways can be 
organized into a career network graph. 
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[Figure 15] shows the career network composed of the career pathways of the 58 bank 
CEOs. The network includes merely 8 industrial SOEs and only 7 executive career pathways 
ever crossing at least one of the industrial SOEs. The executive interfirm mobility takes place 
mainly between organizations within the financial industry. There are only sparse career 
connections across the major banks and the industrial SOEs.  Thus, the career network seems to 
play a marginal role in facilitating resources exchanges across the major banks and the industrial 
SOEs in China.  
[Figure 15] 
Bank CEO Career Network (2011) 
 
 
Furthermore, when focusing on the relations among the major banks alone (by removing 
other types of organizations from [Figure 15]), there appears a hierarchically-descending pattern 
in the bank elite’s interfirm job movements—moving from a higher-status organization to a 




[Figure 16]  
Bank CEO Network Career with Non-Bank Institutes Removed (2011)  
 
 
To confirm this hierarchically-descending pattern, this chapter adopts a “frequent 
sequence mining” method in the field of computer science to find the most frequent executive 
career patterns in the banking sector. The details of the sequence mining method are explained in 
Appendix.  With this frequent sequence mining strategy, the most common career patterns are 
reported in [Table 21].  
  
Central Bank / 







Bank CEO Attributes (2011)  
 Tier 1 Bank CEOs Tier 2 Bank CEOs Tier 3 Bank CEOs Total 
Career Attributes     




Length 2-Subsequence:  
Tier 1 Bank  Tier 1 
Bank  
(3 paths =75%)† 
 
Government Bureau   








Tier 2  Bank (6 
paths=50%)† 
 
Tier 1 Bank  Tier 2 Bank 
(4 paths) 
 
Tier 2 Bank  Tier 2 Bank 
(4 paths) 
Length 2-Subsequences: 




Institution   
Tier 3 Bank (11 paths) 
 
Government Bureau   
Tier 3 Bank (8 paths) 
 
Length 2-Subsequences: 




Institution  Tier3 Bank 
(11 paths) 
 
Government Bureau   
Tier 3 Bank (8 paths) 
 
Regulatory Financial 
Institution   
Tier 2 Bank (7 paths) 
 
Tier 1 Bank  Tier2 Bank 
(6 paths) 
 
Average Age When 
Becoming CEO 
 
52.5 50.8 44.7 46.4 
Gender (Male) 
 
100% 100% 92.9% 94.8% 
Educational     
Graduate Degree 100% 75% 81.3% 72.4% 
Foreign Degree 25% 25% 4.8% 10.3% 
Tsinghua University 0% 0% 2.4% 1.7% 
C9 League 25% 8.3% 11.9% 12.1% 
Business 
 
100% 83.3% 88.1% 87.9% 
Political     
Party Membership     
1. CPC Member 100% 83.3% 90.5% 89.7% 
2. Others/Unknown 0% 16.7% 9.5% 10.3% 
Average Age When 
Joining the CPC 
 
21 (N=2) -- 26.2 (N=5) 24.7 (N=7) 
Members of National 
Congress, National 
Consultative Assembly,  
or CPC National Congress 
 
75% 16.7% 0% 8.6% 
Observations 4 12 42 58 
†this pattern is with minsup >=50%. 
 [Table 21] shows that the most common career pattern for the CEOs of the first-tier 
banks (i.e. the big four banks) is a sequence of job movements from a first-tier bank to another 
first-tier bank. The second popular pattern is movements from a local government to a first-tier 
bank. The executive career pathways of the top tier banks present a lateral-training and an 
administrative-training movement pattern rather than a descending movement pattern along the 




CEOs of the second-tier and third-tier banks. The common career movement pattern for the 
second-tier bank CEOs is from the financial regulatory institution (i.e., the People’s Bank of 
China, the central bank) to a second-tier bank. The popular pattern for the third-tier bank CEOs 
is from a first-tier bank to a third-tier bank. The hierarchically-descending career pattern suggests 
that the elite training system of the banking industry values the management knowledge of 
higher-status organizations and diffuses such knowledge from the higher to the lower 
organizations. It is a top-down oriented learning and training network. 
Besides the career pathways, [Table 21] also shows other executive career, educational 
and political attributes of the major banks in China.  The executives of the higher-tier banks tend 
to be older when assuming their positions because it takes more time to reach the higher-status 
positions. 
In terms of education, a great majority of the bank CEOs at all tiers have a business-
related degree and a graduate degree. The CEOs of the first- and second-tier banks are more 
likely to have overseas study experience than those of the third-tier banks, which suggests 
foreign education may be more important for higher-status banks as they have more international 
business.  Only a small minority of the CEOs received their college degrees from the elite 
university in China, which may be partially explained by the fact that the reputation of the top 
Chinese universities is built on engineering rather than business.  In terms of political 
backgrounds, a dominant majority of the bank CEOs are members of the Chinese Communist 
Party.  Moreover, the top-tier CEOs are significantly more likely to be members of the major 
national political assemblies than lower-tier CEOs, which is explainable as the candidacy in 




To further examine the executive relations across the financial and non-financial SOEs, 
[Table 22] compares the CEO attributes of the two elite groups of the state-owned sector. There 
are great similarities between the bank and industrial CEOs.  Both elite groups present the 
dominance of male CEOs.  A majority of the bank and industrial CEOs have a graduate degree 
(57.1% for the industrial CEOs and 72.4% for the bank CEOs) but foreign-educated CEOs 
remain a small minority (5.5% for the industrial CEOs and 10.3% for the bank CEOs).  Elite 
school dominance does not exist in the composition of both elite groups; only a little more than 
10% of the CEOs were alumni of the Chinese elite universities.  In terms of political 
backgrounds, most of the bank and industrial CEOs are members of the Chinese Communist 
Party and joined the party at a quite early age, around 25 years old. Both elite groups show 
connections with the three national political representative bodies, with a greater percentage 







CEO Attributes Comparison  
 Industrial SOE CEO 
(2010) 
Bank CEOs (2011) 




Graduate Degree 57.1% 72.4% 
Foreign Degree 4.4% 10.3% 
Tsinghua University 5.5% 1.7% 
C9 League 11.4% 12.1% 
Business --- 87.9% 




Party Membership   
1. CPC Member 80.6% 89.7% 
2. Others/Unknown 19.4% 10.3% 
Average Age When Joining the CPC 25.3 (N=77) 24.7(N=7) 
Members of National Congress, National Consultative 
Assembly,  





Work Experience in Finance .07% --- 
Work Experience in Industrial SOEs --- 12.1% 
Average Age When Becoming CEO 46.8 46.4 





Observations 273 58 
 
The composition of the two elite groups presents not only cohesion but also 
specialization.  A majority (66.3%) of the industrial CEOs are educated in engineering-related 
fields and most (89.7%) of the bank CEOs are in business-related fields. Relatedly, only 0.7% of 
the industrial CEOs have ever worked in financial institutions and 12.1% of the bank CEOs ever 
in industrial SOEs. Cross-sector career experience is rare. The extreme rareness of the industrial 
CEOs entering into the financial sector suggests that the Chinese government manages the 
financial sector with great caution. 
The divergent career pathways also reflect the specialization feature. The most common 




top within a single business group. Such industrial CEOs possess a good volume of group-
specific knowledge. Unlike the industrial CEOs, the most frequent career pathway for the bank 
CEOs follows a hierarchically-descending pattern across organizations within the banking 
industry.  Compared to industrial production management, financial knowledge tends to be more 
generalized across organizations. Such knowledge mobility allows more interfirm career 
movements in the banking industry.  The bank CEOs thus tend to have industry-wide rather than 
group-specific knowledge.  
Overall, the composition of the bank and industrial CEOs demonstrates a high degree of 
cohesion and specialization.  The financial and non-financial executives have many shared 
identities that promote class cohesion but at the same time possess specialized skills to maintain 
certain management rationality of the state-owned sector. The sparse personnel connections 
between the financial and industrial SOEs reflect the specialization in the elite training system 
and also indicate that the flow of financial resources is not secured through the personnel 
network but something else.    
4.4 Strong Capital Flows through the Hidden Ultimate Connection 
 The loose ownership and personnel connections between the industrial SOEs and the 
major banks prove that the bank-centrality phenomenon does not exist in the Chinese state-
owned corporate network.  The industrial SOEs do not use direct ownership or personnel 
connection to the banks to secure financial resources. However, the industrial SOEs enjoy 
endless flows of money from the major banks, absorbing more than 80% of bank loans in China 
(Chiu & Liews 2006, Cary 2013). The coordination mechanism between the industrial and the 
financial giants obviously is not reliant on direct lateral shareholding or personnel exchanges.  




non-financial SOEs together to a common entity: the party-state. At the national level, the central 
industrial groups are supervised by the central SASAC and the large banks are controlled by the 
Ministry of Finance, and both the central SASAC and the Ministry of Finance are controlled by 
the State Council and interchangeably the Party. The State Council itself is the critical 
coordination connection between the industrial and financial SOEs. Similar vertical connections 
are present at the local government level. The local governments own local industrial SOEs 
through their own SASACs and control local city commercial banks through their financial 
bureaus. The formal vertical ownership ties give the local governments coordination powers over 
the local SOEs and the local city commercial banks.  Although Chinese local governments do not 
have ownership stakes in the major state-owned banks (e.g., the big four banks), the local 
officials have de facto appointments powers over bank executive positions of the banks’ branch 
offices and have close social ties with the branch managers (Tsai 2004). The local governments 
through these information connections can readily direct capital to the industrial SOEs under 
their control.   
As all the important industrial SOEs and banks have direct or indirect ties to the same 
owner, the industrial SOEs can easily secure their financial resources through the ultimate 
common connection. It practically makes the use of immediate ownership or personnel 
connections across the financial and industrial worlds redundant.  Furthermore, when resource 
availability is guaranteed through the ultimate common connection, the major concern for the 
state as the owner and as the policymaker shifts toward risk control in the system.  The sparse 
lateral ownership and personnel connections between the industrial SOEs and the major banks 
help to reduce management complexity and risk connectivity of the state-owner sector, which is 




management problems. Such lack of lateral connections at the same time reinforces the vertical 
control of the party- state. Unlike other capitalisms, the corporate network in China’s state-





INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS: SOURCES OF GOVERNANCE CHANGE? 
 
5.1 Introduction  
China is not only a strong magnet for foreign direct investment (FDI) but also becomes a 
significant source of FDI. The Chinese government’s “going global” policy, formally adopted in 
2001, ushered in China’s remarkable increase in outward investment.  China’s outward FDI flow 
has increased from $915 million in 2000 to $84 billion in 2012 (World Investment Report 2013), 
ranking at the third largest country in the world, behind United States and Japan.  This 
astonishing growth in outward FDI is mainly contributed by Chinese SOEs. As of 2011, the 




 Under the “going global” policy, Chinese SOEs have gone on a shopping spree to 
acquire companies abroad. Their global expansion, however, often faces challenges and concerns 
in host countries. One of the common concerns is the governance of Chinese SOEs has low 
transparency and often deviates from internationally-recognized corporate governance standards.   
Some host countries such as Australia, Canada and USA have welcomed Chinese SOEs with 
great caution through regulatory reviews. As China’s SOEs continue to globalize, it raises an 
important question about how their governance would change. Specifically speaking, can 
mergers and acquisitions that connect China’s SOEs with foreign companies/investors and 
                                                          
65
 This is a conservative estimation. According to the Ministry of Commerce’s data, wholly-state-owned enterprises 
accounted for 62.7%, limited liability companies for 24.9%, joint stock limited liability companies for 7.6%, private 
enterprises 1.7%, joint-stock partnerships 1.6%, foreign firms 0.9%, collective enterprises 0.2%, firms from Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwan 0.2% and others 0.2%. But many limited liability companies and joint stock limited 
liability companies are also wholly-state-owned or state-controlled. It has been estimated actually about 85-90% 





expose them to foreign institutions serve as an effective mechanism for Chinese SOEs to learn 
and converge on the prevailing international corporate governance practices?  
The pursuit of this question is not only of practical importance for international investors 
and regulators with the view to develop investment relationships with China’s SOEs but also of 
academic significance in several disciplines. First, corporate governance scholars have a 
perennial debate on the future of national corporate governance systems (Gorden and Roe 2004) 
– will they converge on a universal model (especially the shareholder-oriented model or the 
Anglo-Saxon model) or will they continue to retain their national differences? According to the 
convergence school, capital market integration through cross-border mergers and acquisitions as 
well as overseas listing is a strong driver of convergence in governance (Yoshikwa and Rasheed 
2009). International mergers and acquisitions connect firms of different governance systems and 
often require changes in the governance structure of acquiring or acquired firms, or both. 
Overseas listing connects the listing firm to foreign investors and requires the firm to adopt 
governance rules set by the foreign stock exchange and relevant regulators, which makes the 
governance structure of the listing firm converge on the foreign model (Coffee 2002).  Unlike the 
convergence school, the persistence school would predict little convergence for the SOEs 
embedded in China’s idiosyncratic state capitalism. But recent SOE reforms in China such as 
launching the board of directors and institutionalizing independent directors have indicated at 
least some formal convergence (Gilson 2001) or de jure convergence (Khanna, Kogan, Palepu 
2006). Ostensibly, such convergence appears encouraging evidence to the convergence theory. 
However, it remains unclear whether internationalization is an apt explanation for this 




SOEs, especially through equity connections with foreign companies/investors, are more likely 
to reform their corporate governance structure? 
Second, as noted by scholars of international business, extant research on multinational 
firms unfortunately has limited integration with corporate governance (Wu and Tihanyi 2013). 
The most researched area in the topic of corporate governance in multinational firms is 
internationalization strategy.  Researchers show that ownership structure (Bhaumik et al. 2009, 
Benito et al. 2011), board composition (Filatotchev et al. 2001, Lien et al. 2005), top 
management team (Tihanyi et al. 2000) and executive compensation (Sanders 2004) have an 
impact on the degree of internationalization. But there is a research lacuna regarding how the 
governance of headquarters in the home country may change as a result of internationalization. 
An investigation of how China’s SOEs may reform in governance as they globalize is an attempt 
to fill this void.     
This chapter uses insights derived from network studies and institutional theory to 
evaluate the relationship between Chinese SOEs’ internationalization and their governance 
reform patterns. The empirical findings in this chapter indicate that the degree of globalization 
(measured by the number of acquisitions, the number of joint ventures, overseas revenues, and 
overseas listing) seems virtually irrelevant to the reform patterns of the SOEs under the central 
SASAC’s supervision.  This chapter offers two possible explanations for the absence of 
correlation between internationalization and governance reform. First, the investment structure 
and investment geography pose obstacles to transmitting positive outward investment impact on 
the core company in the group.  Second, more importantly, the governance reform is a result 
more of the government’s central planning than market behavior decided at the firm level. It 




governance or behavior, we need to look beyond the individual firm and analyze the 
organizational network in which the firm is embedded. It seems that the Chinese state-owner 
does not take the degree of internationalization at the firm level as a relevant factor in setting the 
reform pace for the SOEs under their control. But how the Chinese state-owner selected the 
governance reform candidates remains a black box.  
5.2 Analytical Framework 
Investment is relational in the sense that it creates not only flows of money but also 
channels of influence. The relational nature of investment becomes particularly complex for 
overseas investment across different institutional environments. Scholars of international 
business have shown how the institutional distance between the home country and the host 
country would affect a firm’s entry modes or contract governance arrangements as well as 
subsequent performance of the investment vehicle in the host country (e.g., Abdi and Aulakh 
2012, Cui and Jiang 2012). In addition, international business scholars are concerned about the 
spillover effects of inward FDI on the capacity of domestic companies and institutions in the host 
country, especially debating whether multinational companies headquartered in advanced 
economies would import positive or impose negative effects on the local institutions of less 
developed economies (Javorcik 2004). Current international business literature, however, 
understudies how a company’s outward investment would create inbound influence on the 
company itself as well as potential spillover effects on the institutional qualities of the home 
country. The inattention is explainable as the dominant players in the global investment market 
traditionally have been firms in advanced economies that have little reason to emulate immature 
institutions of less developed economies. But as firms in less developed economies have 




activities may influence their internal governance now turns to be a question worthy of 
exploration. As Chinese SOEs are investing globally, how do their international investment 
connections influence their internal corporate governance practices?   
Institutional theory suggests an organization’s behavior is influenced by the economic, 
legal and political environments in which it operates.  The environments create normative forces 
that drive how an organization should operate, regardless of whether the organization has 
particular concerns that might make such structures useful to its functioning (Tolbert & Zucker 
1983, DiMaggio & Powell1983, Meyer &Rowan 1977). Conformity to institutional expectations 
helps the organization acquire legitimacy. Different environments impose different normative 
pressures and thus produce different organizational structures and behavior.  When an 
organization born and operating in a certain environment enters into a new environment, it may 
be under normative pressure to change its organizational structures or behavior so as to adapt to 
and establish legitimacy in the new environment. The normative pressure may be more intense 
when the new environment is dissimilar from the original environment.   
As different countries have different institutional environments, this institutional 
approach suggests an interactive effect between an SOE’s country of origin and the SOE’s 
investment country in predicting the potential of SOE corporate governance change. In other 
words, the institutional distance between the origin country and the destination country of 
investment matters in evaluating the potential of SOE governance change. While there are many 
dimensions of institutional environments, this chapter is focused only on corporate governance 







Institutional Distance and SOE Governance Change Potential 
  Destination Country 








(High) Institutional match  Little 





(High) Institutional mismatch Little 
inbound influence on governance, but 







(High) Institutional mismatch  High 
suspicion and pressure to change 
 
 
(High) Institutional match  Little 




For analytical convenience, a country can either be a (relatively) strong governance 
regime or a (relatively) weak governance regime. Admittedly, this dichotomous categorization 
may be oversimplified given the complexity of assessing the quality of corporate governance 
institutions.  Several attempts to compare corporate governance across countries through 
quantitative indicators (LLSV 1998, Martynova and Renneboog 2010, Global Competitive 
Reports 2001-2014 from World Economic Forum, Country Rankings from Governance Metrics 
International 2009) have been subject to cautions and criticisms (Spamann 2010, Bhagat et al. 
2008, Aguilera and Desender 2012). The quantitative governance indices present limitations and 
inconsistencies among themselves, nevertheless, their results constantly show that most 
developed countries rank high on the indices and most developing countries including China 
gravitate toward the bottom.  There should be little controversy if China is placed in the weak 
governance category and developed countries such as United States, United Kingdom, and 
Australia in the strong governance category. 
When both the origin country and the destination country are in the same type of 




If there is a high degree of institutional match, there would be of little normative pressure on the 
investing SOE or the investing state-owner to change the SOE governance practices. In other 
words, there would be only marginal inbound influence from such outward investment. The 
institutional match provides a comfort zone for the SOE to continue its traditional practices even 
when they operate across national boundaries. The upper left cell and the lower right cell in 
[Table 23] show the scenarios of institutional match.  The upper left cell shows a scenario in 
which an SOE from a strong corporate governance regime invests in a parallel regime. An 
example is Norsk Hydro, a Norwegian SOE, invests in Sweden. The lower right cell shows a 
situation where an SOE from a weak governance regime invests in another weak regime, such as 
Sinopec, a Chinese SOE, investing in Nigeria.   
To the contrary, when there is a high degree of institutional mismatch between the origin 
country and the destination country, institutional conformity would be a source of pressure to 
change governance practices. But the direction of governance impact runs in different ways 
depending on where the better institutions are located. The upper right cell in [Table 23] 
illustrates a situation where a SOE from a strong governance regime invests in a poor regime. An 
example is Norsk Hydro invests in Algeria. The governance impact tends to run in the direction 
from the better regime to the poor regime. The governance implication of this type of investment 
has been well-examined in the FDI literature concerning how FDI from advanced economies 
benefit domestic firms and institutional development of emerging markets (Görg and Greenaway 
2004, Aitken and Harrison 1999, Smarzynska Javorcik 2004, Dang, 2013).  
The lower left cell in [Table 23] illustrates a scenario where a SOE from a weak 
governance regime invests in a strong regime, such as Sinopec investing in the United States.  A 




review processes to ensure foreign investments are consistent with national interests. Compared 
to investments by foreign private companies, investments by foreign government-controlled 
entities are subject to higher/additional regulatory review standards given that they have greater 
potential to harm national interests of the host country.
66
 One of the common review standards is 
to assess whether the SOE’s corporate governance is in place to ensure management 
independence from the government’s control.
67
 While the investment review systems are based 
on statues or regulations, the actual operation of the review processes is more of politics than law 
because governments have considerable discretion in interpreting the meaning of “national 
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 Foreign investment in Australia is regulated under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (the FATA) 
and by the Australian Government’s Foreign Investment Policy (the Policy). The Policy provides the framework for 
Government scrutiny of proposed foreign investment while the FATA, together with the Foreign Acquisitions and 
Takeovers Regulations 1989, sets out which types of foreign investment proposal require notification to or prior 
approval by the Government, and provides monetary thresholds below which the relevant FATA provisions do not 
apply Investment Policy (the Policy). In Australia, all investments by foreign government controlled entities are 
subject to the prior notification requirement, regardless of investment size. For more details about the Australian 
regulatory system and assessment, see  Andrew Shearer and Mark Thirlwell, Is the Foreign Investment Review 
Board Acting Fairly?, Australia Open Investment Future (AOIF) Paper 4, Dec. 2008, 
http://www.ipa.org.au/library/publication/1229471411_document_thirwell_updated.pdf.  
 In Canada, the regulatory regime operates under the Investment Canada Act. When a foreign investor 
acquires control of a Canadian business and the asset value of the Canadian business being acquired equals or 
exceeds a certain threshold, the foreign investor must prove that the investment is of net benefit to Canada. In 
December 2007, Industry Canada promulgated SOE Guidelines under the Investment Canada Act partly as a 
reaction to growing public concerns over foreign SOEs’ acquisition of controlling stakes in prominent Canadian 
businesses. In 2009, the Investment Canada Act was amended to allow the government to block foreign investments 
based on national security concerns. Very recently in December 2012, the Canadian government further revised the 
review guidelines for foreign SOE investment to increase scrutiny over investment by foreign SOEs, along with the 
announcement of approving the high-profile and contentious acquisitions by Petronas and CNOOC. 
 In the United States, parties to a transaction that could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign 
person may file a notice with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to determine 
whether such transaction would present any national security risks. Foreign government controlled transactions is an 
important factor of whether CFIUS would initiate an investigation. See Guidance Concerning the National Security 
Review Conducted by CFIUS http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-
investment/Documents/CFIUSGuidance.pdf. 
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 The Foreign Investment Review Board (the Board) of Australia good corporate governance is one of the 
obligations that investors should undertake. See http://www.firb.gov.au/content/who.asp?NavID=48. The Guidelines 
on Investment by State-Owned Enterprises, released by Industry Canada, include: “The governance and commercial 
orientation of SOEs are considered in determining whether reviewable acquisitions of control in Canada by the SOE 
are of net benefit to Canada;” and “this examination will include whether the non-Canadian adheres to Canadian 
standards of corporate governance, and to Canadian laws and practices.” Guidance Concerning the National Security 
Review Conducted by CFIUS take “whether corporate governance structures are in place to ensure management 




interests”, “net benefits” and “national security.”
68
 As a result, foreign SOEs may face not only 
legal but also political pressure to change governance. This case of institutional mismatch has the 
greatest potential of positive inbound influence flowing from the host country back to the 
headquarters and home country. This chapter labels this investment relation as positive 
institutional mismatch, where there may be positive inward influence derived from the outward 
investment. 
 The basic idea of [Table 23] suggests China’s SOEs are more likely to adopt 
internationally-recognized corporate governance practices when they invest in places of positive 
institutional mismatch and much less likely to do so if they mainly invest in places of 
institutional match (i.e. countries with similarly weak or even worse institutional conditions). It 
raises an empirical question: in what types of foreign countries do Chinese SOEs mainly invest? 
Do Chinese SOEs mainly invest in countries of positive institutional mismatch, such as the 
United States? Extant literature has focused on Chinese SOEs’ outward investment in Africa. 
While the SOEs have contributed some significant economic development to Africa, their 
governance, social and environmental practices there have been criticized for failing to meet 
international standards by a great margin (Keenan 2009; Chintu and Williamson 2013). If Africa 
or other weak governance countries are the main investment destinations, it suggests Chinese 
SOEs’ global expansion would face little normative pressure to change their governance 
practices. But the governance reform potential is more likely if they mainly invest in advanced 
economies, especially those with regulatory processes scrutinizing investments by foreign SOEs.        
The macro-institutional distance between the origin country and the destination country 
of investment provides a broad-brush baseline model of change potential in the governance of 
SOEs. But not all SOEs even of the same country would be the same. There are organization-
                                                          
68




level variances which bring about different inbound influence from outward investment. This 
chapter focuses on two micro-organizational conditions: the firm’s entry modes and investing 
entity. 
Existing literature has shown that a firm’s choice of entry modes is affected by the 
institutional distance between the home country and the host country.  Cui and Jiang (2012), for 
example, show that institutional mismatch is a source of pressure for Chinese SOEs to choose 
joint ventures rather than acquisitions as the entry mode because acquiring an existing business is 
more likely to face regulatory or political hurdles. While the original choice of entry modes is 
affected by institutional distance between the home country and the host country, once the choice 
has been made, the choice can subsequently produce different levels of inbound influence 
derived from such outward activity.  
Common entry modes into foreign markets include two categories: equity-based and non-
equity based. Non-equity based entry modes are exporting and licensing. Because non-equity 
based entry modes have little exposure to the corporate governance system in the host country, it 
would induce only marginal inbound influence on the governance of SOEs in the home country. 
Equity-based entry modes can be divided by ownership into two types: wholly-owned and 
partially-owned operations. Wholly-owned operations are green-field investment (i.e. setting up 
wholly-owned subsidiaries) and full acquisition of existing local firms in the host country. 
Partially-owned operations refer to partial acquisition of existing local firms and setting up joint 
ventures with local firms in the host country. Among all these equity-based types, greed-field 
investment is the most integrated with the SOE operations in the home country and the least 
exposed to direct interaction with corporate governance of local firms in the host country. 




country can be limited. Compared to green-field investment, full acquisition has a higher level of 
exposure to corporate governance practices in the host country.  Takeovers by foreign investors 
may be subject to regulatory approval conditioned on some governance changes of the investing 
SOE. Moreover, old practices in the acquired company may continue and thus potentially diffuse 
to the parent SOE in the home country. Partially-owned operations also possess great potential of 
inbound influence. Partial acquisition and joint ventures require SOEs to negotiate and arrange 
governance structures with local shareholders. The ownership interaction and integration create 
opportunities for SOEs to learn the operation of the corporate governance system in the host 
country.  [Table 24] summarizes the types of entry modes and the levels of potential inbound 
influence on corporate governance of SOEs in the home country.    
[Table 24] 
Entry Modes and Potential Inbound Influence on Corporate Governance 
Entry Modes Potential Inbound Influence on Corporate Governance 
Non-Equity Based  
        Exporting Low 
        Licensing Low 
Equity-Based  
        Wholly-Owned Operations  
                    Green-Field Investment  Low-Medium 
                    Full Acquisition Medium-High 
        Partially-Owned Operations  
                   Partial Acquisition Medium-High 
                   Joint Ventures Medium High 
 
When deciding how to invest in a foreign country, firms need to decide whether to invest 
directly itself or through subsidiaries. As explained in Chapter 1, the ownership structure of the 
Chinese SOE is a hierarchy controlled by the core company in the business group. The layers of 
ownership create degrees of distance between the core company and their overseas subsidiaries. 
Close ties produce stronger influence than distant ties do. On the one hand, the multiple layers of 




freedom for overseas subsidiaries to adopt local corporate governance practices in the host 
country. (But it may also create more agency problems as SASAC hasn’t had a good track of 
Chinese national champions’ overseas activities).
69
 On the other hand, the distance from the core 
company and the state-owner may weaken the potential inbound influence on the core company. 
It leads to a hypothesis that foreign investments made directly by the core company may bring 
out more inbound influence on the core company than those made by the core company’s 
subsidiaries. 
In addition to foreign direct investment, overseas listing is another important strategy for 
Chinese SOEs to build international equity connections. Some Chinese SOEs have listed shares 
in the world’s leading capital markets including Hong Kong, Singapore, U.S. and UK. The 
institutional relationship between China and the major capital markets can be characterized as 
institutional mismatch. According to the bonding theory in corporate governance literature, firms 
with a view to improve corporate governance, particularly those from emerging markets, may 
cross-list their shares in a better governance regime (Coffee 2002). By cross-listing in a stronger 
institutional regime such as US, Chinese SOEs must comply with stricter standards and 
consequently have better governance. Chi and Zhang (2010) show that Chinese firms cross-listed 
in Hong Kong has better pay-performance sensitivity than the mainland firms without cross-
listing and the effect is greater for SOEs than private firms. Cong et al. (2010) also find Chinese 
firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore have better corporate governance quality (measured by 
a combined index) than their counterparts with domestic listing only. Hung et al.  (2008) find 
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 In response to an outbreak of SOE overseas investment scandals, SASAC promulgated Provisional Measures on 
Supervising Central Enterprises’ Overseas Assets (2011) and Provisional Measures Managing Central Enterprises’ 
Overseas Property Rights (2011) and Provisional Measures Managing Central Enterprises’ Overseas Investment 
(2012). As of 2011, 27.3% of the about 2000 overseas subsidiaries of the central SOEs were running at a loss and 
72.7% were making profits or breaking even, according to the Department Head (Mr. Ziming Shi)of Outward 




that China’s overseas listed SOEs have more professional boards of directors, greater accounting 
conservatism, higher investment efficiency and better stock performance than their domestically 
listed counterparts.  Given that the overseas listed firms are major members of the state-owned 
business groups and their top management teams (including boards of directors) very often 
overlap with the teams of the core companies, the overseas listed subsidiaries may diffuse 
modern corporate governance practices such as independent directors back to the core companies.    
It raises an empirical question: do overseas listing help diffuse positive corporate governance 
reform back to the parent SOE?   
5.3 Data and Methods 
The SOEs under the central SASAC’s control are the dominant players of China’s 
outward investment. At present, there are 113 enterprises under the central SASAC’s supervision. 
As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, these enterprises are organized as business groups within 
which the core companies control a large army of subsidiaries. According to the official data, in 
2011, the non-financial SOEs under the central government’s control accounted for (at least) 
67.2% of the outward FDI (flow).
70
 Of the top100 non-financial companies by outward FDI 
stock in 2012, 57% are SOEs owned by the central government, 31% owned by local 
governments and only 12% private.
71
  This chapter will focus on the 113 central SOEs to 
evaluate how international connections would influence the SOE governance reform in China. 
The dependent variable is governance change. The most important governance reform of 
the central SOEs is the institutionalization of the board of directors and independent directors.  In 
2004, the central SASAC with the State Council’s approval, began to experiment with the idea of 
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 2011 Statistical Bulletins of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (published by Ministry of Commerce of 
People’s Republic of China, National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China, and State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange). 
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establishing the board of directors in the SOEs’ under its supervision. According to the SASAC’s 
initial design, the board of directors generally should be comprised of no less than 9 directors 
and at least 2 should be outside directors; and the percentage of outside directors should 
gradually increase with improvement in the supply of outside directors.
72
  As per SASAC’s most 
recent rules, the board size generally should be between 7 and 13 directors with a majority as 
outside directors.
73
 Note that although most of the central SOEs did not have a board of directors 
before SASAC’s policy, there were a number of exceptions. For instance, China Chengtong 
Holdings Group Ltd, a diversified industrial group, had established the board of directors as early 
as 1992. These pre-SASAC boards were comprised of insiders only and some had only chairman 
and vice-chairman without any other board members. Unlike the pre-SASAC board, the new 
board model that SASAC promotes is featured with outside directors. The adoption of outsider 
directors appears that China’s SOEs are converging on the international standard (or the Anglo-
Saxon model). Such governance change however is more in the form than in the substance 
because the board of directors lacks the very essential power to appoint top managers and 
outsider directors are often retired government officials or former SOE executives. Nevertheless, 
it may be a step forward to approaching actual governance change. This chapter uses the 
existence of outsider directors on the board to represent a type of governance change. The data 
regarding whether and when the SOE has the board of directors and outside directors were 
manually collected from the personnel appointments announcements and enterprise reform 
releases posted on SASAC’s website. Corporate websites, annual reports, securities prospectuses 
and news reports are also used as a supplementary source. According to the data collected 
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  Article 16, Opinions on Constructing the Board of Directors of the Wholly-Owned State-Owned Enterprises 
(Experimental), released on June 10 2004, SASAC Development & Reform (2004) No. 229. 
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  Article 22, Provisional Measures on Regulating the Operation of Experimental Boards of Directors of Central 








In addition to the existence of outside directors, the existence of foreign educated 
executives is another indicator of governance change. As the SOEs become multinational firms, 
their management teams would include professionals with international experience. As shown in 
Chapter 3, the executive market is overwhelming dominated by system-siders and only a 
marginal minority of the CEOs have foreign education experience. Having executives who have 
overseas study experience is a change to the governance tradition.  This chapter collected data on 
educational backgrounds of the CEOs and vice CEOs of the 113 SOEs in the year of 2013.  The 
biographic information was collected from the corporate websites, annual reports, government 
websites and documents, and industrial association websites, and news reports. There are 638 
executive observations (113 CEOs and 525 Vice CEOs). Of the 638 executives, 59 hold a 
foreign degree; and of the 113 SOEs, 39 have at least one foreign-educated executive.  
The independent variables include multiple dimensions of internationalization.  
International equity connections are the focus of this chapter. International equity connections 
may be constructed in many forms and will be tested in following ways. First, international 
equity connections can be made through cross-border joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions. 
Data on cross-border joint ventures as well as mergers and acquisitions were manually collected 
from the SDC Platinum Database. The transactions include the deals by the core company itself 
or its subsidiaries. The dataset cover the years from 2003 to 2011. The degree of 
internationalization is operationalized as the number of deals accumulated from 2003 to (t-1) 
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 Note that there are cases where the board of directors was established but the positions of outside directors were 
not filled or could not be confirmed through publically available data. The cases typically happened for firms that 






 Point-biserial correlation will be performed on the relationship between the accumulated 
number of deals (t-1) and the dependent variable (t).  Furthermore, to empirically examine how 
location (advanced or emerging economies) and investment identity (core or subsidiary) would 
affect governance change, the correlation models will be performed on various segments of the 
dataset, including all kinds of deals regardless of location and investment identity, deals in 
advanced economies only, deals by core companies only, and deals by core companies in 
advanced economies. 
Second, data on the central SOEs’ overseas subsidiaries were collected from Directory of 
Overseas Investment Institutions, a database maintained by the Ministry of Commerce of China. 
The database contains the new establishments of overseas investment entities subject to the 
Ministry of Commerce’s approval.  While not all establishments of overseas operations are 
subject to regulatory approval, the data can serve as an estimate of the number of overseas 
subsidiaries.
76
 The database covers the central SOEs’ investments as early as 1983, but most of 
the investment occurred after 2000, the year in which the “going global” policy was formally 
introduced. According to the database, as of 2012, the central SOEs established 1,680 overseas 
operations.  The degree of internationalization is measured as the accumulated number of 
overseas subsidiaries toward t-1.The statistical methods will be similar to the above models used 
for the data collected from SDC Platinum.  
Third, overseas listing is another way to build international equity connections.  Simple 
linear regression will be used to examine the relationship between the time of overseas listing 
and the time of introducing independent directors. Moreover, Cramer’s V will be used to show 
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 SDC Platinum Database does not provide the dollar amount of every transaction.  
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 According to the State Council’s Decision on Investment Reform (2004), all of the central SOEs’ overseas 
investments should be subject to approval or notice, depending on the size of the investment. Measure on Overseas 
Investment (2009) provides that the latest conditions under which the investment should be subject to approval by 




whether the core company has an overseas listed subsidiary has a strong or weak correlation with 
the existence of independent directors and executives who have foreign education experience. 
Fourth, this chapter will use logistic regressions to examine the relationship between 
internationalization and governance attributes. The dependent variables will be whether there is 
any outside director on the board in 2013 and whether there is any foreign-educated top manager 
in 2013. The independent variables will be various internationalization indicators including the 
accumulated number of acquisitions toward 2011, the accumulated number of joint ventures 
toward 2011, the accumulated number of overseas subsidiaries as of 2012, and whether the group 
has an overseas listed firm (yes=1). The control variables will be as follows: logged revenues 
(2010) to control for firm size, ROA for efficiency (2010), and the status of the group in the 
government bureaucratic hierarchy. Groups that hold a higher status in the government system 
(i.e., a vice-ministerial rank) would be more impervious to international pressure as they are 




5.4 Results and Analysis 
[Table 25] shows the number of the central SOEs’ overseas acquisitions, joint ventures 
and subsidiary establishments by country in the period of 2003-2011. Hong Kong has been an 
important place for the central SOEs’ activity in overseas acquisitions, joint ventures and 
subsidiaries.  However, Chinese SOEs’ investments in Hong Kong very often are simply “round-
tripping” -- where Chinese firms take money offshore, dress up in financial secrecy, then return 
back home to illegally enjoy the tax benefits available only to foreigners (Xiao 2004, Morck et al. 
2008).
77
 Moreover, the SOEs often use Hong Kong incorporated companies to engage in 
investment in other countries, which makes Hong Kong more a portal than a destination of the 
SOEs’ foreign investment (Morck etl al. 2008). Excluding Hong Kong, the top countries of the 
central SOEs’ acquisition activities are Australia, Canada, United States, Singapore and United 
Kingdom.  These countries (except Singapore) economically happen to be economically liberal 
markets per the varieties-of-capitalism literature, politically mature democracies, and all in the 
Anglo-Saxon law family.  In other words, the central SOEs’ acquisition activities take place 
significantly in countries whose institutional environments are very dissimilar to China –
economically having pervasive state ownership, politically being non-democratic and in the civil 
law system (“bad” corporate law regime per the law and finance literature). The high degree of 
institutional mismatch suggests Chinese SOEs would face great normative pressure on their 
governance structure when entering into these markets.  
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[Table 25]  
Overseas Acquisition Deals of China’s National Champions, 2003-2011 
Location of Acquisitons 
Number of Acquisition Deals (%) 
Location of Joint Ventures 
Number of JV Deals (%) 
Location of Subsidariy Establishements  




























































































































Source: raw data on acquisitions and joint ventures are manually collected from the SDC Platinum M&A database; 
raw data on subsidiary establishments are manually collected from Directory of Overseas Investment Institutions 
published by Ministry of Commerce of China.  
 
[Table 25] also shows that excluding missing data, a majority of the deals are acquisitions 
of absolute controlling stakes, with an average stake at 68.9% after acquisition. The popularity in 
controlling ownership stakes suggests Chinese SOEs may be more interested in being an active 
controller than a passive observer in corporate management. Their control interest is often 




the investment destinations. The central SOEs’ major investment destinations including Australia, 
Canada, the United State and the United Kingdom have a foreign investment review system that 
can block acquisitions by foreign investors based on concerns to national security and/or 
economic benefits. Under the foreign investment regulatory review, the foreign acquiring entity 
may be required to comply with certain conditions imposed by the regulators in exchange for 
regulatory approval.  For example, CNOOC Ltd., a major subsidiary of China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation, a wholly-stated owned enterprise under the central SASAC’s supervision, 
agreed to the Canadian government that it will list its shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 
exchange for the government’s regulatory approval to its $15.1 billion takeover of Nexen Inc., a 
Canadian oil and gas company. The share listing requirement is intended as a measure to make 
CNOOC Ltd.’s corporate governance practices consistent with Canadian standards. The foreign 
investment regulatory review systems in these advanced economies where Chinese SOEs mainly 
investment present a potential mechanism to influence the SOE governance.  
While the normative pressure imposed by the macro-institutional environments may 
make Chinese SOEs learn and converge on the international governance standards, the learning 
and convergence potential can be lessened by the use of indirect investment vehicles. [Table 25] 
shows that 83.9% of the acquisitions are done through the downstream subsidiaries rather than 
the core companies in the business groups. As discussed in Section 2.3, the subsidiaries are 
embedded in the business group network controlled by the core company and ultimately by the 
party-state. This ownership structure can effectively shield the core company and the party-state 
from disclosing their governance practices and even hide actual practices in subsidiaries. In such 
cases, the core companies are not directly exposed to the normative pressure; therefore, the 




In addition to direct acquisitions, joint ventures are another type of international equity 
connections. Australia, the United States, and Canada again have the highest concentration of the 
foreign joint ventures deals. About 35% of the joint ventures are established through the core 
companies, much higher than the acquisition deals where there are only about 16% via the core 
companies. Because joint ventures are usually not subject to regulatory review requirements, 
core companies themselves even without using subsidiaries as the shield can still maintain 
obscurity about their governance practices to foreigners. 
[Table 25] also shows the geographic distribution of subsidiary establishments. Hong 
Kong again tops the list as it has been used as a main portal to foreign investment. Unlike 
mergers and joint ventures, subsidiary establishments do not present obvious concentration in a 
few advanced economies but wide dispersion in various countries.  Moreover, most (91.7%) of 
them are established through subsidiaries rather than core companies. The investment locations 
and the indirect relationship with the parent SOEs suggest little impact on the parent SOEs 
through overseas subsidiary establishments.    
  [Table 26] further shows the correlation between various internationalization indicators 
and whether the core company has any outside director on its board. The degree of 
internationalization, whether measured as the number of overseas acquisitions, the number of 
overseas joint ventures or the number of overseas subsidiary establishments, has a very weak or 
virtually zero correlation with the existence of an outside director on the board. Investments 
directly by the core companies themselves do not present a better chance of adopting an outside 
director. Neither do investments in Australia, Canada and the United States present a meaningful 




potentially change governance. Internationalization is also virtually irrelevant to whether the 






[Table 26]  
Point-Biserial Coefficients between Internationalization and Outside Directors  
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Correlations between Number of Acquisitions 
and Existence of Outside Directors 
 
        
All Deals 
 
.008 -.027 -.049 -.067 -.111 -.120 -.141 -.006 
Deals by Core Companies 
 
-.045 -.091 -.074 -.084 -.132 -.126 -.169 .046 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong 
Excluded) 
 
.123 -.031 -.024 -.045 -.084 -.093 -.119 .009 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong 
Included) 
 
.110 -.003 -.028 -.057 -.106 -.116 -.125 -.021 
Deals by Core Company in Advanced Economies 
(Hong Kong Excluded) 
 
-.037 -.085 -.032 -.010 -.101 -.109 -.172 .073 
Deals by Core Company in Advanced Economies 
(Hong Kong Included) 
 
-.038 -.085 -.032 -.019 -.109 -.119 -.182 .086 
Deals by Core Company in Australia, Canada, USA 
 
-.023 -.067 -.079 -.086 -.128 -.123 -.173 .027 
Correlations between Number of Joint Ventures 
and Existence of Outside Directors 
 
        
All Deals 
 
.082 -.039 -.024 -.037 -.043 -.086 -.099 .051 
Deals by Core Companies 
 
.103 -.032 -.004 -.019 -.026 -.072 -.071 .052 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong 
Excluded) 
 
-.065 -.023 -.052 -.058 -.024 -.080 -.041 .111 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong 
Included) 
 
-.062 -.050 -.061 -.074 -.064 -.113 -.082 .046 
Deals by Core Company in Advanced Economies 
(Hong Kong Excluded) 
 
-.022 -.053 -.058 -.001 .020 -.065 .059 .126 
Deals by Core Company in Advanced Economies 
(Hong Kong Included) 
 
-.022 -.065 -.069 -.014 .006 -.074 .048 .103 
Deals by Core Company in Australia, Canada, USA 
 
---a -.040 -.041 056 .038 -.046 -.057 -.044 
Correlations between Number of Overseas 
Subsidiaries and Existence of Outside Directors 
 
        
All Establishments 
 
-.052 .015 .146 .013 .006 -.018 -.032 .008 
Establishments by Core Companies 
 
-.052 .058 .131 .121 .054 .121 .162 .168 
Establishments in Advanced Economies (Hong 
Kong Excluded) 
 
-.067 .051 .084 .041 .049 .031 .058 .120 
Establishments in Advanced Economies (Hong 
Kong Included) 
 
-.047 .101 .136 .105 .077 .046 .052 .165 
Establishments by Core Company in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong Excluded) 
 
-.046 .063 .037 .026 -.018 -.039 .047 .107 
Establishments by Core Company in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong Included) 
 
-.049 .056 .029 .014 -.038 -.032 .066 .161 
Establishments by Core Companies in Australia, 
Canada, USA 
 
-.037 .022 .004 -.014 -.067 -.075 .107 .097 
Ｎ 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Deals are accumulated to the prior year. For example, in 2005 the correlation is between the deals accumulated until 2004 (t-1) 
and whether the firm had an outside director in 2005 (t). Advanced economies include countries according to IMF Advanced 
Economies List (World Economic Outlook, October 2012, p. 180).  





Point-Biserial Coefficients between Internationalization and  
Foreign-Educated Top Managers 
 
 
Existence of Foreign-Educated Top Manager (2013) 






Deals by Core Companies 
 
.145 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Excluded) 
 
.071 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Included) 
 
.098 
Deals by Core Company in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Excluded) 
 
.194 
Deals by Core Company in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Included) 
 
.205 
Deals by Core Company in Australia, Canada, USA 
 
.148 






Deals by Core Companies 
 
.191 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Excluded) 
 
.093 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Included) 
 
.109 
Deals by Core Company in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Excluded) 
 
.194 
Deals by Core Company in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Included) 
 
.161 
Deals by Core Companies in Australia, Canada, USA 
 
.071 






Establishments by Core Companies 
 
.133 
Establishments in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Excluded) 
 
.009 
Establishments in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Included) 
 
.013 
Establishments by Core Company in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Excluded) 
 
.063 
Establishments by Core Company in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong Included) 
 
.093 









[Figure 17] shows a simple linear regression on time of overseas IPO (initial public 
offering) and time of introducing outsider directors. It shows that early overseas listing is 
associated with later adoption of outsider directors. In other words, the parent SOE that is 
supposed to have a longer exposure to international corporate governance through its overseas 
listed subsidiary tends to adopt outsider directors later rather than sooner.  The idea that 
internationalization as a main driver of governance reform for China’s SOEs is again called into 
doubt. 
[Figure 17] 






 [Table 28] shows logistic regressions on various internationalization indicators and 





















1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Time of Overseas Listing
Fitted values Time of Ushering in Independent Directors
                                                                                 
          _cons     2458.235   173.2032    14.19   0.000     2098.039    2818.431
overseaslisting    -.2241928   .0865129    -2.59   0.017    -.4041061   -.0442794
                                                                                 
independentdi~s        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
       Total    147.478261    22  6.70355731           Root MSE      =  2.3068
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2062
    Residual    111.743885    21  5.32113736           R-squared     =  0.2423
       Model    35.7343763     1  35.7343763           Prob > F      =  0.0170
                                                       F(  1,    21) =    6.72




existence of any outside directors on the board.  Note that in Models 2-5 all the odds ratios for 
international indicators are close to 1, suggesting virtually no relationship between 
internationalization and existence of outsider directors.  The odds ratios for number of overseas 
acquisitions (.968), number of overseas joint ventures (.916) and number of overseas subsidiary 
establishments (.996) are actually less than 1. In other words, more internationalization is less 
likely to having outsider directors on the board, which is counterintuitive and against the 
proposed hypotheses in this chapter. While having an overseas listing subsidiary increases the 
odds of having an outside director on the board in the parent SOE, the effect is very minimal, by 





 [Table 28]  
Logistic Regressions on Internationalization and Governance Attributes, Odds Ratios 
*p < .05, ** p <.01. However, given the sample size is close to the whole population and the purpose of the study is to provide a 
historical review rather than future prediction, p-values are not the focus of interpretation. 
The coefficients reported in this table are odds ratios. An odds ratio less than 1 suggests that the event is less likely to occur in the 
group coded 1 than in the group coded 0. An odd ratio close to 1 indicates little effect. Cohen’s (1988) rule of thumb for 
interpreting odds ratios is as follows: 1.5 = small, 2.5= medium and 4.3 = large. 
 
Models 6-10 show the relationship between internationalization and existence of any 
foreign educated executive. Note that the odds ratios of number of overseas acquisitions (.998), 
number of joint ventures (1.063), and number of overseas subsidiary establishments (.998) are 
close to 1, indicating virtually no relationship between these internationalization indicators and 
existence of any foreign educated executive in the parent SOE.  Moreover, having overseas listed 
subsidiary significantly reduces the odds of having a foreign educated executive in the parent 
SOE by 72.3% (=1-0.277). The result is contrary to the expectation that overseas listing would 
expose the parent SOE to international corporate governance and thus increase the chances of 
including a foreign-educated professional in the top management team. 
For control variables, SOEs with larger revenues are more likely to adopt outside 
directors but generally less likely to have foreign educated executives. More profitable firms 
(measured by ROA) are more likely to have outside directors and foreign-educated top managers. 
 
 
Existence of Outside Director (2013)  
(Yes=1) 
Existence of Foreign Educated Top Manager (2013) 
(Yes=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Internationalization Indicators           





    .998 
(.020) 
   
Number of Overseas Joint 
Ventures (2003-2011)   
 
  .916 
(.056) 
    1.063 
(.064) 
  
Number of Overseas Subsidiary 
Establishments (toward 2012)  
 
   .996 
(.008) 
    .998 
(.008) 
 
Overseas Listing (Yes=1) 
 
    1.029 
(.539) 
    .277* 
(.161) 























































































X2 9.48(3) 11.48(4) 11.66(4) 9.73(4) 9.48(4) 3.75(3) 3.76(4) 4.85(4) 3.82(4) 9.06(4) 
p-value .024 .022 .020 .045 .050 .290 .439 .304 .431 .060 




The SOEs with a vice-ministerial rank in the government system are less likely to have outsider 
directors on the board but more likely to have foreign educated executives.  
5.5  Discussion  
The empirical findings in this chapter find little evidence that international equity 
connections play any significant role in the governance reform pattern of China’s central SOEs. 
Chinese SOEs’ international investment activity appears virtually irrelevant to their governance 
reform pace.  It casts a shadow over the optimistic view that international exposure would be an 
effective driving force to change the SOEs’ governance practices.  It also raises a set of related 
questions. Why does the SOEs’ international investment activity have little bearing on their 
governance reform pace? If it is not internationalization, what is the main force in driving their 
governance reform pattern? Three explanations are offered to explain the limited effect of 
internationalization on the SOE governance reform pace.    
First, the idea that international equity connections either through FDI or overseas listing 
can push for governance change of the parent SOE assumes that there is some diffusion of 
governance practices flowing from the host country back to the headquarters in the home country. 
However, the diffusion influence may be diluted through layers of ownership that shield the 
parent SOE from transparency and pressure to reform. As shown previously in [Table 25], a 
majority of investment deals are done through subsidiaries rather than the core companies 
themselves. This investment structure may weaken the potential governance influence.  
Moreover, while the top investment destinations are advanced economies with regulatory 
processes scrutinizing investments by foreign SOEs, they only account for a minority of the 




and United States; and of the 150, only 26 are by core companies. As a result, the SOEs may 
have insufficient direct exposure to the environments of high institutional mismatch. 
Second, it entails an inquiry into Chinese SOEs’ globalization motivation. The Chinese 
government formally ushered in the “going global” policy in 2000. A review of the government 
policy statements shows that the “going global” policy is aimed to participate in international 
technology cooperation and competition, take full advantages of international and domestic 
markets, encourage external processing trade, resources exploration as well as international 
construction contracting and develop a collection of multinational companies and well-known 
brands. Corporate governance improvement seems not a primary consideration from the 
policymaker’s perspective. Consistent with the government’s policy, empirical studies have 
confirmed that market size expansion and natural resources acquisitions are important motives 
for Chinese SOEs’ outward direct investments (Hurst 2011, Buckley et al. 2007, Kolstag &Wilg 
2012).   
While Chinese policymakers might not intend governance improvement through 
international trade or outward direct investments, they indeed took overseas listing as an 
important internationalization strategy to improve SOE governance.  Scholars have shown that 
overseas listed SOEs have lower earnings management, more professional directors on the board, 
higher investment efficiency and greater firm valuation than their domestically listed 
counterparts (Hung et al. 2008). However, empirical evidence in this chapter indicates that the 
positive effects are limited to the listed subsidiaries and not effectively reflected in their parent 
companies.  The lack of positive diffusion to the parent companies may be related to the strategic 
way Chinese SOEs crafted their overseas listings. The conventional strategy is to carve out the 




other problems in the unlisted part of the group, usually the core company (Howie and Walter 
2006). This assets segregation strategy may practically concentrate corporate problems in the 
core company and thus may make the governance reform of the core company more challenging.   
Third, the notion that the firm would improve governance as a response to international 
pressure takes a market-based perspective. It assumes the market power can drive the firm to 
change its behavior. However, the behavior of China’s SOEs is determined not only by market 
forces but probably more by the government’s decisions.  It is often the Chinese government 
rather than the market to select which firms to engage in reform. The Chinese government 
handpicked which firms could list shares abroad. SASAC selected in batches which SOEs were 
eligible to experiment with the board of directors and independent directors. SASAC together 
with the Party’s Organization Department consider factors other than market demand when 
appointing top managers. The lack of correlation between internationalization and governance 
reform at the firm-level data suggests Chinese policymakers take little account of 
internationalization in formulating SOE reform agenda. The reform pace is determined by 






This dissertation has tried to open the black box of China’s state capitalism by shifting 
the focus from agency problems in individual listed firms to networks of firms embedded in the 
party-state. The relational anatomy has provided a better understanding of the architecture of 
China’s state-owned sector that supports the national economic development.  It has explained 
the specific institutional mechanisms that deviate actual governance practices from the laws on 
the books. It has raised significant questions about the adequacy of international regulatory 
regimes in addressing investment and other market activity by Chinese SOEs.  And it has also 
cast doubt on the effectiveness of international forces to meaningfully change practices of the 
very central players of China’s state-owned sector.  
   As Chinese SOEs are embedded a control network densely knitted by various types of 
relations in addition to legally-defined ownership, making SOEs independent of the party-state’s 
control is not just a matter of privatization. Dis-embedding the SOEs entails drastic political 
reform that destabilizes all the ties with the single-ruling party. But such political reform is 
nowhere in sight. Of course, it is not to say the current system will not change. The architecture 
of China’s SOEs is not a static model but a work in progress. Under China’s new leadership, 
another round of SOE governance reform is now underway.  Chinese policymakers have outlined 
a vision for China as a “mixed ownership economy” where the boundary between the state-
owned sector and the non-state-owned sector will be more blurred.
78
 Under the “mixed 
ownership” policy, private capital will be invited into the state-owned sector through ways such 
as public listing and investment at the core-company level. Mixed ownership is expected to 
“preserve SOEs’ value and increase their competitiveness” as well as “exploit the comparative 
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 <Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms> was adopted at the close of the 




advantages of various types of ownership for mutual development.” State ownership and private 
ownership have their own distinctive merits and problems. Ownership integration across the 
state-owned sector and private sector, if done in a right way, may produce synergy and gain 
competitive edges;
79
 but if done improperly, it may complicate the situation. As mixed 
ownership is expected to be more extensive in the years to come, will it distance SOEs from the 
state’s control, as hoped by liberalization advocates? Alternatively, will ownership integration 
instead embed private enterprises deeper into the party-state system?  The SOEs’ dense and 
complex relations with the party-state as shown in this dissertation give little reason for optimism 
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 The idea of “mixed ownership” echoes Stark (1996)’s idea of “recombinant property” to analyze the economic 
reform in Eastern Europe. Recombinant property is a strategy used to hedge uncertainties by blurring the boundary 





Abdi, a., & Aulakh, P. S. (2012). Do Country-Level Institutional Frameworks and Interfirm 
Governance Arrangements substitute or complement in international business 
relationships? Journal of International Business Studies, 43, 477–497. 
Aguilera, R. V. (1998). Directorship Interlocks in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Spain. 
European Sociological Review, 14(4), 319-342. 
Aoki, M., & Patrick, H. (Eds.). (1994). The Japanese Main Bank System. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Benito, G. R., Lunnan, R., & Tomassen, S. (2011). Distant Encounters of the Third Kind: 
Multinational Companies Locating Divisional Headquarters Abroad. Journal of 
Management Studies, 48(2), 373–394. 
Bhagat, S., Bolton, B. J., & Romano, R. (2008). The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance 
Indices. Columbia Law Review, 108(8), 1803-1882. 
Bhaumik, S. K., Driffield, N., & Pal, S. (2010). Does Ownership Structure of Emerging-Market 
Firms Affect Their Outward FDI? The Case of the Indian Automotive and 
Pharmaceutical Sectors. Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 437–450. 
Bian, Y. (1999). Getting a Job Through a Web of "Guanxi" in China. In Networks in the Global 
Village: Life in Contemporary Communities. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Bremmer, I. (2011). The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and 
Corporations? . Portfolio Trade. 
Burns, J. P. (1994). Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 
Nomenklatura. China Quarterly, 138, 458-. 
Burt, R. S. (2007). Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital. Oxford University 
Press. 
Cao, J. M. (2011). Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship between Pay and 
Performance. Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper No. 11-53. 
Carlile, L. E., & Tilton, M. C. (1998). Is Japan Really Changing? In L. E. Carlile, & M. C. Tilton 
(Eds.), Is Japan Really Changing Its Ways?: Regulatory Reform and the Japanese 




Carney, M., Shapiro, D., & Tang, Y. (2009). Business Group Performance in China: Ownership 
and Temporal Considerations. Management and Organization Review, 5(2), 167-193. 
Cary, E. (2013, June 19). Reforming China’s State-Owned Enterprises. Retrieved from The 
Dillopat: http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/reforming-chinas-state-owned-enterprises/ 
Chang, S., & Choi, U. (1988). Strategy, Structure, and Performance of Korean Business Groups: 
A Transaction Cost Approach. Journal of Industrial Economics, 37, 414-158. 
Chen, H. (2004). Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System 1990-1998. 
China Quarterly, 179, 703-. 
Chen, J. E. (2011). Managerial Power Theory, Tournament Theory, and Executive Pay in China. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1176-1199. 
Cheung, S. Y.-L. (2010). Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central Vs. Local Government 
Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms. Review of Finance, 14(4), 669-694. 
Cheung, Y.-L., Jiang, P., & Piman Limpaphayom, T. L. (2008). Does Corporate Governance 
Matter in China? China Economic Review, 19(3), 460-479. 
Chi, W., & Zhang, H. (2010). Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with Cross-Listing? 
Evidence from China. China Economic Review, 21(1), 150-160. 
Chintu, N., & Williamson, P. J. (2013, March/April). Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in Africa: 
Myths and Realities. Ivey Business Journal. 
Chiu, B., & Lewis, M. (2006). Reforming China's State-owned Enterprises and Banks. Edward 
Elgar Publishing. 
Coffee, J. C. (2002). Racing towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market 
Competition on International Corporate Governance. Columbia Law Review, 102(7), 
1757-1831. 
Colignon, R. A., & Usui, C. (2003). Amakudari:The Hidden Fabric of Japan's Economy. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Cong, L. M. (2010). Earnings Quality and Corporate Governance Bonding. Corporate 
Ownership and Control, 10(2), 183. 
Conyona, M. J., & He, L. (2011). Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China. 




Cui, L., & Jiang, F. (2012). State Ownership Effect on Firms' FDI Ownership Decisions under 
Institutional Pressure: A Study of Chinese Outward-Investing Firms. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 43, 264–284. 
Dang, A. D. (2013). How Foreign Direct Investment Promote Institutional Quality: Evidence 
from Vietnam. Journal of Comparative Economics, 41(4), 1054-1072. 
Davis, G. F. (1991). Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill Takeover Defense 
through the Intercorporate Network. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 583-613. 
Davis, G. F. (1996). The Significance of Board Interlocks for Corporate Governance. Corporate 
Governance, 4, 154-159. 
Davis, G. F., Yoo, M., & Baker, W. E. (2003). The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 
1982-2001. Strategic Organization, 1(3), 301-326. 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism 
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 
147-160. 
Economist. (2010, October 14). Innovation in China: Patens, Yes; Ideas, Maybe. Retrieved from 
The Economist: http://www.economist.com/node/17257940 
Economist. (2012, 1 21). The Visible Hand. Retrieved from The Economist: 
http://www.economist.com/node/21542931 
Fang, G., Wang, X., & Xu, H. (2011). NERI Index of Marketization of Chinas Provinces 2011 
Report (Chinese Edition). Economic Science Press. 
Filatotchev, I., & Wright, M. (2011). Agency Perspectives on Corporate Governance of 
Multinational Enterprises. Journal of Management Studies, 48(2), 471-486. 
Fligstein, N., & Zhang, J. (2009). A New Agenda for Research on the Trajactory of Chinese 
Capitalism. Management and Organization Review, 7(1), 39-62. 
Gargiulo, R. G. (1999). Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come From? American Journal 
of Sociology, 104(5), 1439-1493. 
Gerald F. Davis, M. Y. (2003). The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001. 
Strategic Organization, 1, 301-326. 
Gilson, R. J. (2001). Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function. The 




Gilson, R. J. (2006). Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy. Harvard Law Review, 119, 1642-. 
Global Competitive Report. (n.d.). Retrieved March 5, 2014, from World Economic Forum: 
http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness 
Gordon, J. N., & Roe, M. J. (Eds.). (2004). Convergence and Persistence in Corporate 
Governance. Cambridge University Press. 
Görg, H., & Greenaway, D. (2004). Much Ado About Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really 
Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment? The World Bank Research Observer, 19(2), 
171-197. 
Granovetter, M. (1974). Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers . The University Of 
Chicago Press. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481-510. 
Granovetter, M. (2005). Business Groups and Social Organization . In N. J. Smelser, & R. 
Swedberg, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (pp. 429-450). Princeton, New Jersey : 
Princeton University Press . 
Grant, S. D. (2012). Disappearing act: An Analysis of the Boundaries between the Nonprofit & 
For-Profit Sectors. PhD Dissertation STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY. 
Greve, G. F. (1997). Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s. American 
Journal of Sociology, 103, 1-37. 
Guest, P. M. (2009). The Impact of Business Group Affiliation on Performance: Evidence from 
China’s ‘National Champions’. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 34(4), 617-631. 
Gwen Moore, S. S. (2002). Elite Interlocks in Three U.S. Sectors: Nonprofit, Corporate, and 
Government. Social Science Quarterly, 83(3), 726-744. 
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. W. (Eds.). (2001). Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford University Press. 
Hamori, M., & Kararika, M. (2009). External Labor Market Strategy and Career Success: CEO 
Careers in Europe and the United States. Human Resource Management, 48(3), 355-378. 




Hung, M., Wong, T., & Zhang, T. (2008). Political Relations and Overseas Stock Exchange 
Listing: Evidence from Chinese State- owned Enterprises. Working Paper. 
Hurst, L. (2011). Comparative Analysis of the Determinants of China's State-Owned Outward 
Direct Investment in OECD and Non-OECD Countries. China and World Economy, 19, 
74-91. 
itken, B. J., & Harrison, A. E. (1990). Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela. American Economic Review, 89(3), 605-618. 
Javorcik, B. S. (The American Economic Review). Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the 
Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages. 
Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, 94(3), 605-627. 
Jeong-Bon Kim, C. H. (2006). Ownership Structure, Business Group Affiliation, Listing Status, 
and Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
23(2), 427-464. 
Jones, L. P. (1980). Government, Business and. Harvard University Press). 
Kato, T., & Long, C. (2006). Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate 
Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 54(4), 45-983. 
Keenan, P. (2009). Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of Unconditioned Wealth. 
Berkley Journal of International Law, 27(1), 84-126. 
Keister, L. A. (1998). Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and Firm Performance in 
China's Transition Economy. American Journal of Sociology, 104, 404-440. 
Keister, L. A. (2000). Chinese Business Groups: The Structure and Impact of Interfirm Relations 
During Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Keister, L. A. (2001). Exchange Structures in Transition: Lending and Trade Relations in 
Chinese Business Groups. American Journal of Sociology, 104, 404-440. 
Keister, L. A. (2009). Interfirm Relations in China: Group Structure and Firm Performance in 
Business Groups. American Behavioral Scientist, 52(12), 1709-1730. 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (1997). Why Focused Strategies May be Wrong for Emerging Markets. 




Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (1999). Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy: 
The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile. Journal of Economic Management Strategy, 
8, 271-310. 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (2000). The Future of Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Long 
Run Evidence from Chile. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3), 268-285. 
Khanna, T., & Rivkin, J. W. (2001). Estimating the Performance Effects of Business Groups in 
Emerging Markets. Strategic Management Journal, 22, 45-74. 
Koenig, T., & Gogel, R. (1980). Interlocking Corporate Directorships as a Social Network. 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 40(1), 37-50. 
Kogut, B., & Walker, G. (2001). The Small World of Germany and the Durability of National 
Networks. American Sociological Review, 66(June ), 317-335. 
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2012). What Determines Chinese Outward FDI? Journal of World 
Business, 47(1), 26-34. 
Kong, S.-H. (2006). An Empirical Investigation of Mainland Chinese Organizational Ideology. 
Asian Business & Management, 5, 357-378. 
Kono, C., Palmer, D., Friedland, R., & Zafonte, M. (1998). Lost in Space: The Geography of 
Corporate Interlocking Directorates. American Journal of Sociology, 103(4), 863-911. 
Lee, D. H. (2006). Chinese Business Groups: Their Origins and Development. In S.-J. C. ed, 
Business Group in East Asia: Financial Crisis and New Growth. 
Leff, N. H. (1978). Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries: 
The Economic Groups. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 26, 661-675. 
Li, B., & Walder, A. G. (2001). Career Advancement as Party Patronage: Sponsored Mobility 
into the Chinese Administrative Elite, 1949-1996. American Journal of Sociology, 106(5), 
1371-1408. 
Lien, Y.-C., Piesse, J., Strange, R., & Filatotchev, I. (2005). The Role of Corporate Governance 
in FDI Decisions: Evidence from Taiwan. International Business Review, 14(6), 739–763. 
Lin, L.-W. (2007). orporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global Supply Chain: 
Resistance, Reconsideration, and Resolution in China. Cardozo Journal of International 




Lin, L.-W. (2009). Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in 
Global Supply Chains as an Example. American Journal of Comparative Law, 57(3). 
Lin, L.-W. (2010). Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural 
Change? Berkeley Journal of International Law, 28(1). 
Lin, L.-W. (2013). State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive Career 
Approach. Columbia Business Law Review, 2013, 743. 
Lin, L.-W., & Milhaupt, C. J. (2013). We Are the (National) Champions:Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China. Stanford Law Review, 65, 697-760. 
Lincoln, J., Gerlach, M., & Ahmadjian, C. (1996). Keiretsu Networks and Corporate 
Performance in Japan. American Sociological Review, 61, 67-88. 
Ma, X., Yao, X., & Xi, Y. (2006). Business Group Affiliation and Firm Performance in a 
Transition Economy: A Focus on Ownership Voids. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
23(4), 467-483. 
Martin J. Conyon, L. H. (2012). CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance in China. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(6), 575-592. 
Martin, M. (2011). Whose Money? The Tug-of-War over Chinese State Enterprise Profits . FIIA 
BRIEFING PAPER NO. 79 . 
Martynova, M., & Renneboog, L. (2010). A Corporate Governance Index: Convergence and 
Diversity of National Corporate Governance Regulations. CentER Discussion Paper 
Series No. 2010-17; TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-012. . 
McGregor, R. (2010). The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers. Harper 
Perennial. 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth 
and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340-363. 
Michael A. Witt, M. (2010). China: What Variety of Capitalism? INSEAD Working Paper. 
Michael Carney, D. S. (2009). Business Group Performance in China: Ownership and Temporal 
Considerations. Management and Organization Review, 5(2), 167-193. 
Michael Firth, P. M. (2006). Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China. Journal of 




Michael Firth, P. M. (2007). How Ownership and Corporate Governance Influence Chief 
Executive Pay in China's Listed Firms. Journal of Business Research, 60(7), 776-785. 
Milhaupt, R. J. (2010). Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing 
Democracies. American Journal of Comparative Law, 59, 227-288. 
Mizruchi, G. F. (1999). The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial Banks in the U.S. System 
of Corporate Governance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 215-239. 
Mizruchi, M. (1996). What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of 
Research on Interlocking Directorates. Annual Review of Sociology, 22, 271-98. 
Mizruchi, M. S. (1982). The American Corporate Network, 1904-1974. SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Morck, a., & Zhao, B. Y. (2008). Perspectives on China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 39, 337–350. 
Naughton, B. (2008). SASAC and Rising Corporate Power in China. China Leadership Monitor. 
Norville, E. (1998). The 'Illiberal' Roots of Japanese Financial Regulatory Reform. In L. E. 
Carlile, & M. C. Tilton (Eds.), Is Japan Really Changing Its Ways? Regulatory Reform 
and the Japanese Economy (pp. 111-141). Washington D.C.: Brookings Instittute Press. 
Oliver, C. (1990). Determinants of Interorganizationall Relationships: Integration and Future 
Directions. Academy of Management Review, 15(2), 241-265. 
Oliver, C. (1992). The Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization. Organization Studies, 13(4), 563-
588. 
Pahor, M., Prašnikar, J., & Ferligoj, A. (2004). Building a Corporate Network in a Transition 
Economy: The Case of Slovenia. Post-Communist Economies, 307-331. 
Pistor, K. (2012). The Governance of China's Finance. In E. R. Morck, & H. W.-C. Yeoung 
(Eds.), Capitalizing China. Cambridge: NBER. 
Podolny, J. M., & Page, K. L. (1998). Network Forms of Organization. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 24, 57-76. 





Ren, B., Au, K. Y., & Birtch, T. A. (2009). China’s Business Network Structure during 
Institutional Transitions. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(2), 219-240. 
Ruth V. Aguilera, K. A. (2012). Challenges in the Measuring of Comparative Corporate 
Governance: A Review of the Main Indices. Research Methodology in Strategy and 
Management, 8, 289-322. 
Sanders, W. G., & Carpenter, M. A. (The Academy of Management Journal). 
Internationalization and Firm Governance: The Roles of CEO Compensation, Top Team 
Composition, and Board Structure. 158-178, 158-178. 
Sapio, F. (2010). Sovereign Power and the Law in China. BRILL. 
Schaede, U. (1995). The "Old Boy" Network and Government-Business Relationships in Japan. 
Journal of Japanese Studies, 21(2), 293-317. 
Schaede, U. (2006). The Strategic Logic of Japanese Keiretsu, Main Banks and Cross-
Shareholdings, Revisited. Center on Japanese Economy and Business Working Paper. 
Schmidt, V. A. (2003). French Capitalism Transformed, Yet Still a Third Variety of Capitalism. 
Economy and Society, 32(4), 526-554. 
Scott, J. (1991). Networks of Corporate Power: A Comparative Assessment. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 181-203. 
Shambaugh, D. (2008). Training China’s Political Elite: The Party School System. The China 
Quarterly, 196, 827-844. 
Shimotani, J. R. (2010). Business Networks in Postwar Japan: Whither the Keiretsu? In A. M. 
Colpan, T. Hikino, & J. R. Lincoln (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Business Groups. 
Oxford University Press. 
Siegel, J. (2005). Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively By Renting U.S. Securities 
Laws? Journal of Financial Economics, 75, 319-359. 
Singh, D. A., & Gaur, A. S. (2009). Business Group Affiliation, Firm Governance, and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from China and India. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 17(4), 411-425. 
Smarzynska Javorcik, B. (2004). Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of 
Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers Through Backward Linkages. merican 




Spamann, H. (2009). The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited. Review of Financial Studies, 
23(2), 467-486. 
Stark, D. (1996). Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism. American Journal of 
Sociology, 101(4), 993-1027. 
Stark, D., & Vedres, B. (2006). Social Times of Network Spaces: Network Sequences and 
Foreign Investment in Hungary. American Journal of Sociology, 111(5), 1367-1411. 
Stewart, I. B. (2010, 8 17). China's State Capitialism Poses Ethical Challenges. Retrieved from 
Asian Times: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LH17Cb01.html 
Tarun Khanna, J. K. (2006). Globalization and Similarities in Corporate Governance: A Cross-
Country Analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(1), 69-90. 
Thomas Gold, D. G. (2002). Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the 
Changing Nature of Guanxi. Cambridge University Press. 
Tihanyi, L., Ellst, A. E., Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (2000). Composition of the Top 
Management Team and Firm International Diversification. Journal of Management, 
26(6), 1157–1177. 
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1983). Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of 
Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 1880-1935. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 28, 22-39. 
Tsai, K. S. (2004). Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China. Cornell University 
Press. 
UNCTAD. (2011). World Investment Report 2011.  
Useem, M. (1980). Corporations and the Corporate Elite. Annual Review of Sociology, 6, 41-77. 
Useem, M. (1984). The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political 
Activity in the U. S. and U. K. Oxford University Press. 
Vedres, B., & Stark, D. (2010). Structural Folds: Generative Disruption in Overlapping Groups. 
American Journal of Sociology, 115(4), forthcoming . 
Walder, A. G. (1995). Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order. American 




Walder, A. G. (2011). From Control to Ownership: China's Mamangerial Revolution. 
Management and Organization Review, 7(1), 19-38. 
Walter, C. E., & Howie, F. J. (2011). Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of 
China's Extraordinary Rise. Wiley. 
Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Social Network Analysis. Cambridge University Press. 
Witt, G. R. (2007). The Future of Chinese Capitalism. Oxford University Press. 
Woo, W. T. (1999). The Real Reasons for China's Growth. The China Journal, 41, 115-137. 
Wu, N. H., & Thhanyi, L. (2013). Corporate Governance, Multinational Firms, and 
Internationalization. In M. Wright, D. S. Siegel, K. Keasey, & I. Filatotchev (Eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance. Oxford University Press. 
Wu, Y. (2003). Qiye Jituan Fali Yanjui [Research on Legal Theories of Business Groups]. 
Beijing: Law Press. 
Xiao, G. (2004). Round-Tripping Foreign Direct Investment in the People’s Republic of China: 
Scale, Causes and Implications . ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 7 . 
Xinhua. (2013, 4 25). Patent Applications Surge in China but Quality Remains Low. Retrieved 
from Xinhua News: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-
04/25/c_132340216.htm 
Yoshikawa, T., & Rasheed, A. A. (2009). Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical 
Review and Future Directions. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 
388-404. 
Zang, Z. H. (2005). Jituan Gongsi Zhanlue: Zhiding, Shishi yu Pingjia [Group Companies’ 
Strategies: Analysis, Implementation and Evaluation. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. 
Zhang, J. (2013). Inside China's Shadow Banking: The Next Subprime Crisis . Enrich 
Professional Publishing Inc. 
Zheng, H. (n.d.). Guoyou Zichan Guanli Tizhi yu Guoyou Konggu Gongsi Yanjiu 
[MANAGEMENT OF STATE-OWNED ASSETS AND STATE-CONTROLLED 
COMPANIES]. 2009. 
Zhihong Chen, Y. G. (2013). Are Stock Option Grants to Directors of State-Controlled Chinese 





Zhu, C. C. (2008). Development of HR Practices in Transitional Economies: Evidence from 























Appendix: Frequent Sequence Mining 
 
Frequent sequence mining is a method to discover all the subsequences that occur frequently 
among given sequences. There are multiple strategies to find the frequent patterns depending on 
what types of subsequences to be included. The subsequences of the bank executive career 
pathways examined in Section 4.3 are directed because job movements across organizations are 
temporal.  The subsequences can be consecutive and non-consecutive (i.e. allowing gaps in 
subsequence).  For example, <a b c> is counted as a subsequence of <a b c a c> and also can be 
counted as a subsequence of <a c b a c>.  
 
To extract sequential patterns, it starts with the shortest length k-subsequence, i.e. k=1. For 
example, given a sequence <a c b a c>, candidate length-1 subsequences are <a> <b> and <c>. 
Candidate length-2 subsequences are <a c>, < c b>, <b a>, <a c>, <a a> etc. In total, 10 
candidate length-2 subsequences can be extracted from the sequence, i.e. ( 
 
)    .   
 
When reporting results, there is a user-specified minimum support threshold, commonly denoted 
as minsup. It means reporting patterns which are supported by a minimum percentage of 
sequences. For example, given sequences <a b c d>, < c c d d>, <a b b d>, <b b c d>, <a c c d>, 
report length 2-subsequences with minsup >=50%. The reported subsequences are <c d> and <a 
d>.  
 
To apply the frequent sequence mining method, the career pathways are coded in the following 
way. A career pathway is composed of the organizations that a CEO had ever worked for before 
assuming the CEO position. There are different types of organizations including financial 
regulatory institution, first-tier bank, second-tier bank, third-tier bank, foreign bank, industrial 
SOE, academic institution, other government bureau, and other financial institution.  For coding 
simplification, financial regulatory institution is coded as A, first-tier bank as B, second-tier bank 
as C, third-tier bank as D, industrial SOE as E, other financial institution as F, other government 
bureau as G, private/foreign institution as H, and academic institution I.  
 
Each CEO has his or her own sequence, for example, ABCD, meaning job movements from a 
financial regulatory institution to a first-tier bank, then to a second-tier bank and then to a third-
tier bank. Such data structure of the career pathways thus is analyzable with the frequent 
sequence mining method as explained above. 
 
